Ethics Paper
11/2/2020 Topic: ARISTOTLE SELECTION
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ARISTOTLE SELECTION John Wilhelmsson
All Sections
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS
by Aristotle
I
Every art, every teachable science, and in like manner every action and moral choice, aims, it is thought, at some good. For this reason a common, and by no means bad, description of the final good is, "that which all things aim at."
Now there plainly is a difference in the ends proposed: for in some cases they are acts of working, and in others certain works or tangible results beyond and beside the acts of working: and where there are certain ends beyond and beside the actions, the works are in their nature better than the acts of working. Again, since actions and arts and sciences are many, the ends likewise come to be many. For example, the end of the healing art is health; the end of the ship-building art is a vessel; the end of the military art is victory; and the end of domestic management is wealth.
And whichever of such actions, arts, or sciences range under them (as under that of horsemanship the art of making bridles, and all that are connected with the manufacture of horse-tack in general), in all such cases the ends of the higher arts are always more choice-worthy than those under them, because it is with a view to the former that the latter are pursued.
Since then of all things that may be done there is some one end which we desire for its own sake, and with a view to which we desire everything else; and since we do not choose in all instances with a further end in view (for this would go on to infinity, and so the desire would never be satisfied and fruitless), this plainly must be the final good—the best thing of all.
Surely then, even with reference to actual life and conduct, the knowledge of it must have great weight; and like archers, with a target to shot at, we shall be more likely to hit upon what is right: and if so, we ought to try to describe, in outline at least, what it is and of which of the sciences it is the end.
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Now one would naturally suppose it to be the end of that which is most commanding and most inclusive: and to this description, plainly answers: for this determines which of the sciences should be in communities, and which kind of individuals should learn them, and what degree of proficiency is to be required. Again; we see also ranging under this the most highly esteemed sciences, such as the military arts, and that of domestic management, and rhetoric. Since this uses all of the other practical sciences, and moreover lays down rules as to what men are to do, and from what to abstain, the end of this must include the ends of the rest, and so must be the good of man. And grant that this is the same to the individual and to the community, yet surely that of the latter is plainly greater and more perfect to discover and preserve: for to do this even for a single individual is a matter for contentment; but to do it for a whole nation, and for communities in general, is more noble and godlike…
And now, resuming the statement with which we started, since all knowledge and moral choice grasps at a good of some kind, what good is that which we say it aims at? Or, in other words, what is the highest of all goods achievable by action?
So far as name goes, there is a pretty general agreement that it is happiness, as both the multitude and the refined few call it, and "living well" and "doing well" they conceive to be the same as "being happy;" but about the nature of this happiness, men dispute, and the multitude do not in their account of it agree with the wise. For some say it is one of those things which is palpable and apparent, like pleasure or wealth or honor; in fact, some think one thing, some another; and often the same man gives a different account of it; for when ill, he calls it health; when poor, wealth: and, conscious of their own ignorance, men admire those who talk grandly and above their comprehension. Some again hold it to be something by itself, other than and besides these many good things, which is the underlying cause of their being good.
Now to consider all opinions would perhaps be rather a fruitless task; so it shall suffice to consider those which are most generally professed, or are thought to have some reason in them…
Now of the final good men seem to form their notions from the different modes of life, as we might naturally expect: the vulgar masses conceive it to be pleasure, and hence they are content with the life of sensual enjoyment. For there are three types of life which stand out prominently in view: the life of pleasure, the life of politics, and the life of contemplation.
Now the vulgar masses are plainly quite slavish, choosing a life like that of brute animals: yet they obtain some consideration, because many of the great share the tastes of Sardanapalus. The refined and active again conceive it to be honor: for this may be said to be the end of the life of politics: yet this is plainly too superficial for the object of our search, because it is thought to rest with those
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who give honor rather than with those who receive it, for the final good we feel instinctively must be something that is intrinsic to us, and thus not easily taken away.
And besides, men seem to pursue honor, that they may believe themselves to be good: for instance, they seek to be honored by the wise, and by those among whom they are known, and for virtue: clearly then, in the opinion at least of these men, virtue is higher than honor. In truth, one would be much more inclined to think this to be the end of the life of politics; yet this itself is plainly not sufficiently final: for it is conceived possible, that a man possessed of virtue might sleep or be inactive all through his life, or, as a third case, suffer the greatest evils and misfortunes: and the man who should live thus no one would call happy, except for mere disputation's sake…
A third line of life is that of contemplation, of which we shall make our examination later.
As for the life of money-making, it is one of constraint, and wealth manifestly is not the good we are seeking, because it is for use, that is, for the sake of something else: and hence one would rather conceive the aforementioned ends to be the right ones, for men rest content with them for their own sakes. Yet, clearly, they are not the objects of our search either, though many words have been wasted on them. So much then for these…
And now let us return to the good of which we are searching. What can it be? For manifestly it is different in different actions and arts. For it is different in the healing arts and in the military arts, and similarly in the rest. What then is the final good in each? Is it not "that for the sake of which the other things are done?" and this in the healing arts is health, and in the military arts victory, and in that of house-building, a house, and in any other thing something else; in short, in every action and moral choice there is an end. So that if there is some one end of all of these things which are and may be done, this must be the good we are looking for.
Thus our discussion after some traversing about has come to the same point which we reached before. And this we must now try even more to clear up.
Now since the ends are plainly many, and of these we choose some with a view to others it is clear that all are not final: but the final good is manifestly something final; and so, if there is some one and only end that is final, this must be the object of our search: but if several, then it will be the most final of them.
Now that which we seek for itself we call more final than that which is sought with a view to something else. And that which is never an object of choice with a view to something else is thought greater than that which is only valued with a view to something else: and so by the term "absolutely final," we denote that which is an object of choice always in itself, and never with a view to something else.
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And of this nature happiness is most thought to be, for this we choose always for its own sake, and never with a view to anything further: whereas honor, pleasure, intellect, in fact every excellence we choose for its own sakes we also choose with a view to happiness, conceiving that by using them as instruments we shall become happy: but no man chooses happiness with a view to them, nor in fact with a view to any other thing whatsoever.
The same result is seen to follow also from the notion of self-sufficiency, a quality thought to belong to the final good. Now by sufficient for self, we mean not for a single individual living a solitary life, but for his parents also and children and wife, and, in general, friends and countrymen; for man is by nature adapted to a social existence. But of these, of course, some limit must be fixed: for if one extends it to parents and descendants and friends' friends, there is no end to it. This point must be left for future investigation: for the present we define that to be self-sufficient which taken alone makes life choice-worthy, and to be in want of nothing; now of such kind we think happiness to be: and further, to be most choice-worthy of all things; not being compared with any other thing, for if we were to make such a comparison we would only find that happiness is always the greatest good.
So then happiness is manifestly something final and self-sufficient, being the end of all things which are and may be done.
But, it may be, to call happiness the final good is a mere truism, and what is wanted is some clearer account of its real nature. Now this object may be easily attained, when we have discovered what the work of man is; for as in the case of the flute-player, sculpture, or artisan of any kind, or, more generally, all who have any work or course of action, their final good and excellence is thought to reside in their work, so it would seem to be with man, if there is any work belonging to him.
Are we then to suppose, that while the carpenter and cobbler have certain works and courses of action, man as man alone has none, but is left by nature without a work? Or would not one rather hold, that as eye, hand, and foot, and generally each of his members, has some special work; so too the whole man, as distinct from all of these, has some work of his own?
What then can this be? Not merely the life of nourishment and growth, because that plainly is shared with plants and vegetables, and we want what is peculiar to man. We must separate off then the life of mere nourishment and growth, and next will come the life of sensation: but this again is commonly shared by horses, oxen, and every other animal. There remains then a rational life of an active nature: and of this nature there are two parts called rational, the one being obedient to reason, the other as having and exerting it. Again, as this life is also spoken of in two ways, we must focus on that which is in the way of actual working, because this is thought to be most properly entitled to the name. If then the work of man is a working of the soul in accordance with reason, or
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at least not independently of reason, and we say that the work of any given subject, and of that subject good of its kind, are the same in kind (as, for instance, of a harp-player and a good harp- player, and so on in every case, adding to the work eminence in the way of excellence; I mean, the work of a harp-player is to play the harp, and of a good harp-player to play it well); if, I say, this is so, and we assume that the work of man is to be life of a certain kind, that is to say a working of the soul, and actions with reason, and of a good man to do these things well and nobly, and in fact everything is finished off well in the way of the excellence which peculiarly belongs to it: if all this is so, then the good of man is "a working of the soul in the way of excellence," or, if excellence admits of degrees, in the way of the best and most perfect excellence.
And we must add, in a complete life; for as it is not one fine day that makes a spring, so it is not one day or a short time that makes a man blessed and happy…
We must now inquire concerning happiness, not only from our own conclusion and the data on which our reasoning proceeds, but also likewise from what is commonly said about it: because with the truth there is always a harmony, and with falsehood a disharmony.
Now there is a common division of goods into three classes; one being called external, the other two respectively those of the soul and body, and those belonging to the soul we call most properly and especially good. Well, in our definition we assume that the actions and workings of the soul constitute happiness, and these of course belong to the soul.
And so our account is a good one, at least according to this opinion, which is of ancient date, and accepted by those who profess philosophy.
Rightly too are certain actions and workings said to be ends, for the goods of the soul should be internal rather than external. Agreeing also with our definition is the common notion that the happy man lives well and does well, for it has been stated by us to be pretty much a kind of living well and doing well.
But further, the points required in happiness are found in combination in our account of it.
For some think it is virtue, others practical wisdom, others a kind of natural philosophy; others that it is these or some combination of these with pleasure, or at least not independent of it; while others take it to be external prosperity.
Of these opinions, some rest on the authority of the majority, some on antiquity, and others on that of a few men of note: and it is not likely that these classes should all be wrong , but be right on at least some if not most.
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Now with those who assert it to be virtue (excellence), or some kind of virtue, our account agrees: for working in the way of excellence surely
belongs to excellence.
And there is an important difference between conceiving of the final good as a possession or as an activity, in other words, as a mere state or as a working. For the state or habit may possibly exist in a subject without effecting any good, as, for instance, in him who is asleep, or in any other way inactive; but the working cannot be so, for it will of necessity act, and act well. And as at the Olympic Games it is not the finest and strongest men who are crowned, but they who enter the race, for out of these the champions are selected; so too in life, of the honorable and the good, it is only they who act that rightly win the prizes.
Their life too is in itself pleasant: for the feeling of pleasure is a mental sensation, and each feels pleasure at what he is said to be fond of: a horse, for instance, to him who is fond of horses, and a sight to him who is fond of sights: and so in like manner just acts to him who is fond of justice, and more generally the things in accordance with virtue to him who is fond of virtue. Now in the case of the vulgar masses the things which they individually esteem pleasant clash, because they are not so by nature, but to the lovers of nobleness those things are pleasant which are so by nature: and the actions in accordance with virtue are of this kind, so that they are pleasant both to the man who performs them and also by nature in themselves.
So then their life has no need of pleasure as a kind of addition, but involves pleasure in itself. For, besides what I have just mentioned, a man is not a good man at all who feels no pleasure in noble actions, just as no one would call that man just who does not feel pleasure in just acts, or liberal who does not feel pleasure in liberal acts, and similarly in the case of the other virtues which might be enumerated: and if this is so, then the actions in accordance with virtue must be in themselves pleasurable. Then again they are certainly good and noble, and each of these in the highest degree; if we are to take as right the judgment of the good man, for he judges as we have said.
Happiness is then most excellent, most noble, and most pleasant, and these attributes are not separated as in the well-known Delian inscription: “Most noble is that which is most just, but best is health; and naturally most pleasant is the obtaining one's desires.” For all these co-exist in the best acts of working: and we say happiness is the one that is the best of them all.
Still it is quite plain that it does require the addition of external goods, as we have said: because without such things it is impossible, or at least in all events not easy, to do noble acts: for friends, money, and political influence are in a manner instruments whereby many things are done. Some things seem to depend upon divine blessing; like good birth, for instance, or fine offspring, or even
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personal beauty: for he is not at all capable of happiness who is cursed in these. As we have said already, the addition of prosperity of this kind does seem necessary to complete the idea of happiness; thus some rank good fortune, and others virtue, with happiness.
The question is thus raised, whether it is a thing that can be learned, or acquired by habit or discipline of some other kind, or whether it comes in the way of divine grace, or even in the way of chance…
Having determined these points, let us examine with respect to happiness, whether it belongs to the class of things praiseworthy or things precious.
Now it is plain that everything which is a subject of praise is praised for being of a certain kind and bearing a certain relation to something else: for instance, the just, and the valiant, and generally the good man, and virtue itself, we praise because of the actions and the results: and the strong man, and the quick runner, and so forth, we praise for being of a certain nature and bearing a certain relation to something good and excellent (and this is illustrated by attempts to praise the gods; for they are presented in a ludicrous aspect by being referred to by human standards, and this results from the fact, that all praise does, as we have said, imply reference to a standard). Now if it is to such objects that praise belongs, it is evident that what is applicable to the best objects is not praise, but something higher and better: which is a plain matter of fact, for not only do we call the gods blessed and happy, but of the men who most nearly resemble the gods we also pronounce them blessed. And in like manner in respect of goods; no man thinks of praising happiness as he does the principle of justice, but calls it blessed, as being something more godlike and more excellent…
Moreover, since happiness is a kind of working of the soul in the way of perfect excellence, we must inquire concerning virtue: for through doing so we shall probably have a clearer view concerning happiness…
II
Virtue then is of two kinds, intellectual and moral: now intellectual virtue comes originally, and is increased subsequently, by teaching (for the most part that is), and therefore needs experience and time; while moral virtue comes through habit.
From this fact it is plain that not one of the moral virtues comes to be in us merely by nature: because if such things existed by nature, none could be changed by habit: a stone, for instance, by nature gravitating downwards, could never by habit be brought to ascend, not even if one were to try and accustom it by throwing it up ten thousand times; nor in fact could anything whose nature
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is in one way be brought by habit to be in another. The virtues then come to be in us neither by nature, nor in spite of nature, but we are furnished by nature with a capacity for receiving them and are perfected in them through habit.
Again, in whatever cases we get things by nature, we get the faculties first and perform the acts afterwards; an illustration of this is the case of our bodily senses, for it was not from having often seen or heard that we got these senses, but just the reverse: we had them and so exercised them, but did not have them because we had exercised them. But the virtues we get by first performing single acts of work, which, again, is the case of other things, as in the arts; for what we have to make we learn how to make by making: men come to be builders, for instance, by building; harp- players, by playing the harp: exactly so, by doing just acts we become just; by doing the actions of self-mastery we come to be perfected in self-mastery; and by doing brave actions brave…
Again, every virtue is either produced or destroyed from and by the very same circumstances: art too in like manner; I mean it is by playing the harp that both the good and the bad harp-players are formed: and similarly builders and all the rest; by building well men will become good builders; by building badly bad ones: in fact, if this had not been so, there would have been no need of instructors, but all men would have been at once good or bad in their arts without them.
So too then is it with the virtues: for by acting in the various relations in which we are thrown with our fellow men, we come to be, some just, some unjust: and by acting in dangerous positions and being habituated to feel fear or confidence, we come to be, some brave, others cowards.
Similarly is it also with respect to the occasions of lust and anger: for some men come to be perfected in self-mastery and mild, while others have no self-control; the one class by behaving in one way, the other by behaving in another. Or, in one word, habits are produced from like actions: and so what we have to do is to give a certain character to these particular actions, because the habits formed correspond to the differences of these.
So then, whether we are trained this way or that way straight from childhood, makes not a small but an important difference, or rather I would say it makes all the difference…
Since then the object of the present treatise is not mere speculation, as it is of some others (for we are inquiring not merely that we may know what virtue is but that we may become virtuous, or else our inquiry is useless), we must consider as to how we are to do the particular actions, because, as we have just said, the quality of the habits which shall be formed depends on this…
First then this must be noted, that it is the nature of such things to be spoiled by defect and excess; as we see in the case of health and strength, for excessive training impairs the strength as well as
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deficient training: meat and drink, in like manner, in too great or too small quantities, impair the health: while in due proportion they cause, increase, and preserve it.
Thus it is the same with the habits of perfected self-mastery and courage and the rest of the virtues: for the man who flies from and fears all things, and never stands up against anything, comes to be a coward; and he who fears nothing, but goes at everything, comes to be rash. In like manner too, he that tastes of every pleasure and abstains from none comes to lose all self-control; while he who avoids all comes as it were to lose his faculties of perception: that is to say, the habits of perfected self-mastery and courage are spoiled by the excess and defect, but by the mean states are preserved.
Furthermore, not only do the origination and growth of the habits come from and by the same circumstances, but also the acts of working after the habits are formed will be exercised in the same way: for so it is also with those things which are more apparent, strength for instance: for this comes by taking plenty of food and doing plenty of work, and the man who has attained strength is best able to do these: and so it is with the virtues, for not only do we by abstaining from pleasures come to be perfected in self-mastery, but when we have come to be so we can best abstain from pleasures: similarly too with courage: for it is by accustoming ourselves to despise objects of fear and stand up against them that we come to be brave...
So then it seems every one possessed of skill avoids excess and defect and seeks for and chooses the mean, not the absolute mean, but the mean in relation to himself.
Now if all skill accomplishes well its work by keeping an eye on the mean, and bringing the works to this point it is common enough to say such works as are in a good state, that "one cannot add to or take anything from them," under the notion of excess or defect. And good artisans, as we say, work with their eye on this, and excellence, like nature, is more exact and better than any art in the world, so it must have an ability to aim at the mean.
It is moral excellence, i.e. virtue, of course which I mean, because this is concerned with feelings and actions, and in these there can be excess and defect and the mean: it is possible, for instance, to feel the emotions of fear, confidence, lust, anger, compassion, and pleasure and pain generally, too much or too little, and in either case wrongly; but to feel them at the right time, in the right way, towards the right person, for the right reason, as we should do is the mean, or in other words the best state, and this is the property of virtue.
In like manner too with respect to actions, there may be excess and defect and the mean. Now virtue is concerned with feelings and actions, in which the excess is wrong and the defect is blamed but the mean is praised and goes right; and both these circumstances belong to virtue.
Virtue then is in a sense a mean state, since it certainly has an aptitude for aiming at the mean.
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Again, one may go wrong in many ways, but right only in one; and so the former is easy, the latter difficult; it is easy to miss the mark and hard to hit it: and for this reason both the excess and the defect belong to vice, and the mean state to virtue; for, as the poet says, "Men may be bad in many ways, But good in one alone." Virtue then is a state exercised by a deliberate choice, being in relation to the mean, determined by reason, as the man of practical wisdom would determine it.
It is a middle state between too faulty ones, in the way of excess on one side and of defect on the other: because the faulty states on one side fall short of, and those on the other exceed, what is right, both in the case of the feelings and the actions; but virtue finds, and when found adopts, the mean.
And so, viewing it with respect to its essence and definition, virtue is a mean state; but with reference to the final good and to excellence it is the highest state possible.
But it must not be supposed that every action or every feeling is capable of subsisting in this mean state, because some states immediately convey the notion of badness, like malevolence, shamelessness, and envy; and in the case of actions, adultery, theft, and murder; for all these and the like are in themselves bad.
In these then you never can go right, but must always be wrong: nor in such does the right or wrong depend on the selection of a proper person, time, or manner (take adultery for instance), but simply doing any one of these things is being wrong.
You might as well require that there should be determined a mean state, an excess and a defect in respect of acting unjustly, being cowardly, or giving up all control of the passions: for at this rate there will be of excess and defect a mean state; of excess, excess; and of defect, defect.
But just as of perfected self-mastery and courage there is no excess and defect, because the mean is in one point of view the highest possible state, so in neither of these faulty states can you have a mean state, excess, or defect, but however they are done they are wrong: you cannot, in short, have of excess, defect, or mean state in these; for there is no virtue in unjust acts.
It is not enough, however, to state this in general terms, we must also apply it to particular instances, because in treatises on moral conduct general statements have an air of vagueness, but those that go into detail are of greater reality: for the actions after all must be in detail, and the general statements, to be worth anything, must hold good here.
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I. In respect of fears and confidence or boldness: The mean state is courage, the defect is to be a coward, and the excess is to be rash.
II. In respect of pleasures and pains (but not all, and perhaps fewer pains than pleasures): The mean state here is perfected self-mastery, the excess total absence of self-control. As for defect in respect of pleasure, we will call this insensibility.
III. In respect of giving and taking wealth: The mean state is liberality, the excess extravagance, and the defect stinginess: here each of the extremes involves really an excess and defect contrary to each other. I mean, the extravagant gives out too much and takes in too little, while the stingy man takes in too much and gives out too little…
Now that moral virtue is a mean state, and how it is so, and that it lies between two faulty states, one in the way of excess and another in the way of defect, and that is so because it has an tendency to aim at the mean both in feelings and in actions, all this has now been set forth fully and sufficiently.
And so it is hard to be good: for surely hard it is in each instance to find the mean, just as to find the mean point or centre of a circle is not what any man can do, but only one who knows how: just so to be angry, to give money, and handle expenses, is what any man can do, and easy: but to do these to the right person, in the right proportion, at the right time, with the right object, and in the right manner, this is not as before what any man can do, nor is it easy; and for this cause goodness is rare, praiseworthy, and noble.
IX
Now if happiness is a working in the way of excellence of course that excellence must be the highest, that is to say, the excellence of the best principle. Whether then this best principle is the intellect or some other thing that is thought naturally to rule and to lead and to conceive of noble and divine things, whether being in its own nature divine or the most divine of all our internal principles, the working of this in accordance with its own proper excellence must be perfect happiness.
That it is the contemplative life has been already stated: and this would seem to be consistent with what we said before and with truth: for, in the first place, this working is of the highest kind, since the intellect is the highest of our internal principles and the subjects with which it converses are the highest of all which fall within the range of our knowledge.
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Next, it is also most continuous: for we are better able to contemplate than to do anything else whatsoever continuously.
Again, we think pleasure must be in some way an ingredient in happiness, and of all workings in accordance with excellence that in the way of philosophy is confessed to be the most pleasant: at least the pursuit of philosophy is thought to contain pleasures admirable for purity and permanence; and it is reasonable to suppose that its employment is more pleasant to those who have mastered it, than to those who are yet seeking it.
And the self-sufficiency which people speak of will attach chiefly to the contemplative life: of course the actual necessaries of life are alike needed by the philosopher, the just man, and all the other characters; but, supposing all sufficiently supplied with these, the just man needs people towards whom to practice his justice; and in like manner the man of perfected self-mastery, and the brave man, and so of the rest; whereas the philosopher can contemplate and speculate even when quite alone, and the more entirely he deserves the name the more able is he to do so: and although it may be that he can do better by having co-workers, he is still certainly most self-sufficient.
Also, happiness is thought to stand in perfect rest; for we toil that we may be at rest, and war that we may be at peace. Now all the practical virtues require either politics or war for their working, and the actions regarding these are thought to exclude rest; those of war entirely, because no one chooses war, nor prepares for war, for war's sake: he would indeed be thought a bloodthirsty villain who should make enemies of his friends to secure the existence of fighting and bloodshed. The working also of the statesman excludes the idea of rest, and, besides the actual work of government, seeks for power and dignities or at least happiness for the man himself and his fellow citizens: a happiness distinct from the national happiness which we evidently seek as being different and distinct.
If then of all of the actions in accordance with the various virtues those of politics and war are preeminent in honor and greatness, and these are restless, and aim at some further end and are not choice worthy for their own sakes, but the working of the intellect, being apt for contemplation, is thought to excel in earnestness, and to aim at no end beyond itself and to have pleasure of its own which helps to increase the working, and if the attributes of self-sufficiency, and capacity of rest, and tirelessness (as far as is compatible with human nature), and all other attributes of the highest happiness, plainly belong to this working, this must be perfect happiness, if attained in a complete duration of life (a condition added because none of the points of happiness can be incomplete).
Such a life will be higher than mere human nature, because a man will live like this not in so far as he is man but in so far as there is in him a divine principle. And in the proportion that this divine principle excels his human nature the working of its excellence shall excel that of any other
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excellence. Therefore, if pure intellect, as compared to human nature, is divine, so too, compared with man's ordinary life, will the life in accordance with it be.
Yet must we now give ear to those who bid us as humans to mind only human affairs, or as mortals only mortal things? Absolutely not! For as far as we can we must divinize ourselves and do all with a view to living in accordance with the highest principle in us, for small as it is in quantity, in the quality of its power and preciousness it far exceeds all others.
In fact this principle would seem to constitute each man's "self," since it is supreme and above all others in goodness it would be absurd then for a man not to choose his own life but that of some other.
And here will apply an observation made before, that whatever is proper to each is naturally best and most pleasant to him: such this is to man the life in accordance with pure intellect, and if so, this is also the happiest.
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This translation of Aristotle’s Ethics originally by D. P. Chase in 1915 with revisions by the editor.
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