ethical theory discussion

Aristotle's Ethics builds on the other parts of his philosophy especially the metaphysics and psychology. The crucial terms for the ethics are arete (virtue/excellence) and eudaimonia (happiness/flourishing).

All actions aim at the good. The good can be seen as activity or product. For instance, one can swim because they find the activity itself inherently pleasurable. In this case the activity is seen as the good. However, if one swims because the doctor says one needs exercise then the good is the product of the activity: health.

Next, Aristotle inquires as to the good for humans. Many believe it is happiness but happiness has been defined variously. Some define it as pleasure, some as honor, some as contemplation (EN 1.5 1095b16). Aristotle shows here his method of moving from what people commonly believe to a more adequate account. He wants to capture what is legitimate in common beliefs (endoxa).

Aristotle bases his conception of happiness on the function (ergon) that is the characteristic activity of humans. This is where he connects his Ethic with the De Anima. The function of plants is the life of nutrition and growth. The life of animals is sensation, thus showing the inadequacy of pleasure as the end of human beings. Final, the rational soul's function is to possess intelligence and obey reason. Here Aristotle shows that the function of humans bifurcates; humans are capable of theoretical reason, as well as practical rationality.

In book 2 Aristotle discusses the nature of the virtues. Virtues are excellences which allow one to fulfil one's function well. There are two general types of virtues which correspond to the two functions of the soul: intellectual virtues and moral virtues. The intellectual virtues come from teaching while the moral virtues come through habit.

Aristotle says that virtues are neither emotions nor capacities for emotions for we are not blamed or praised for our emotions or are capacities for emotions. Virtues, then are characteristics: our responses or attitudes towards our emotions and appetites. Virtues can be understood further as means between excesses and deficiencies. For instance, courage is the mean and thus the virtue between the extremes of rashness and cowardice.

Some actions and emotions are bad as such not because they are excessive or deficient; Aristotle mentions adultery, murder, and envy.

In the 1950's Elizabeth Anscombe ushered in a revival of aristotelian or virtue ethics. Since then there has been a proliferation of articles and books on this tradition making it a rival to Kantian and Utilitarian ethics, hitherto, the two dominate paradigms in moral theory.

A few objections can be raised to Virtue ethics of the Aristotelian variety. We will survey just a few here.

One objections is that virtue ethics is non-codifiable. Aristotle says that virtues are the sorts of actions that virtuous people would do and the way they would do them. Aristotle believes that the virtues are relative means and as such they depend upon our aptitudes. For instance, what is courageous for the Navy Seal is not what is courageous for my Grandmother. Some see this flexible account as a defect in that Aristotle doesn't offer a "decision procedure" for right action. Anscombe suggests a possible response to this objection. There are multiple ways that someone can go wrong. One can use the vice terms as ways of constraining our actions; we can ask ourselves, would such an action make me a buffoon, dishonest, cowardly, miserly etc. Another possibility is by looking at Saints and heroes; that is,before performing a given action we can ask ourselves "what would Gandhi, Christ, King Jr. do in the situation at hand.

Another objection is the relativism objection. Some would contend that what is virtuous for Aristotle is merely a reflection of what his culture valued. MacIntyre has shown, for instance, that some of the virtues associated with Aristotle's "high- minded man" are incompatible with later lists of virtues such as the Christian virtues. There are two responses to the charge of relativism. One is the tu quoque (you also) response which basically says all moral theories fall prey to this objection of relativism. A stronger response is to argue that there are certain core virtues which are fundamental to all cultures (See Hursthouse and Nussbaum).

Another objection, along the lines of the relativism objection, argues that the virtues aren't even necessary for well being. An argument like this is associated with Marx. For Marx, under communism certain virtues will not even be necessary. On this account, certain virtues are only necessary because capitalism requires them. This objection is not entirely convincing for it is unlikely that even in the workers' paradise a virtue like courage will never be required.

Other objections relate to the completeness of the virtues, that is whether if one has one virtue they must have all.

Finally, many see a tension in Aristotle's account of eudaimonia. One account sees human flourishing as found in a life of action and practical rationality. His other view sees the life of contemplation as best. Ackrill suggests a way out of this supposed tension; he believes that the life of practical rationality and action makes possible the life of contemplation(See Ackrill 141).