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1. Watch: The Presidency & the Bureaucracy

Welcome to module for the presidency and the bureaucracy. This week the focus is on the presidency and the bureaucracy as they relate to making US foreign policy. Naturally will only scratch the surface. But for the precedent, this means discussing the constitutional mandate. The commander-in-chief and Head of State. In the area of US foreign policy, the President has a number of options to act. First, he's really the point person for the agenda he wishes to set with his administration. But precedence can also issue executive memorandums of agreement, statements, and orders. These can all be more or less binding depending on the political contexts. It's real or perceived importance. And whether congressional approval, opposition, or oversight require the President to somehow alter, modify, or even suspend such commitments. It's also possible that presidential agreements, statements, and orders can at times be more symbolic than substantive or differently.

A more formal way of affirming longstanding policies and practices of previous administrations. In some cases, presidential agreement statements in orders may carry over into the next presidential administration unless opposed by the new president. On other occasions as more recently with President Trump, the new president may wish to either ignore or continue observing the letter or the spirit of previous agreement statements and orders. On yet still other occasions, a president can issue an order that is more difficult for a future president to undo. Like President Trump's decision to move the US Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Whatever the case here, the President as options that cross over into foreign policy. As much as domestic politics. Naturally, the President has broad spending powers within the context of the foreign policy bureaucracies that serve him. And these include the state and defense departments, the CIA and other intelligence agencies, the Treasury, Commerce, and Agriculture to departments Homeland Security and the Office of Management and Budget. All of these have significant footprints in US foreign policy agendas. Among other powers the president has is the appointment of ambassadors, as well as the discretionary authorization of the use of force. However different, this may look to large, small, or secretive operations. All of this adds up to significant administrative, military, and political power.

Assuming a president knows how to use it. And if necessary, to overcome bureaucratic and congressional efforts at sabotage, delay, or outright opposition. Perhaps the most important allies the President has in policy-making are the National Security Council and other voices associated with the policy making process, including the National Security Advisor and Secretary of State. Along with these critical influences, the vice president, US Trade Representative, and White House Chief of Staff, along with the First Lady, may all play important roles in getting the President's ear on major and minor aspects of US foreign policy. While the US foreign policy bureaucracy as ostensibly serve behest of the president, each department or agency has a history as an independent organization and an institutional culture with its own mission, goals, governance, and professional code of honor. If the State Department, Defense Department, the CIA, commerce, or DHS, are committed to assist the President achieve his or her policy objectives. It should come as no surprise to see that pockets of resistance to presidential agendas will naturally emerge from these sectors given their independent institutional culture of long-term professional staffs with ideas and agendas of the row. However, independent such institutional cultures may be as part of the US foreign policy bureaucracy. Most consider it a professional duty to help the President achieve his or her policy priorities. No doubt, all of this looks neat on an organizational chart. But it should come as little surprise to recognize that despite the appearance of rationality and order, a process of making US foreign policy as a product of presidential demand can be quite uneven, and that is the polite version. Finally, note the over the horizon issues in each chapter Have a great week.

2. Watch: The National Security Council Interagency Process

The best way for policy options to come up through the system do the President is through the process that we call the inter-agency decades ago. I think it was easier to say. This is an issue for the Defense Department. This is an issue for the treasury. This is for an issue for the state department. There is a notion now that there are many players that are required to deal and solve a problem, and they need to be all pulling in the same direction. And that of course, is the coordination function that's at the essence of what's called the inner agency process. All the agencies of government who have equities in any particular interest meet at a much lower level initially than the precedent. If there's a difference of opinion that requires higher level deliberations, they would bump it up a level.

A I enjoyed reading the interagency process, trying to get what I used to call the highest common denominator out of the process that the lowest. If we could agree on 80%, that was something the President didn't have to decide whether or not the President gets actually physically involved is a matter of judgment. One of the most valuable things the President has his time and any time that you waste his time that can't be spent doing other things. One of the more effective processes we had was when the President decided to change our strategy in Iraq and increase our troop presence there. We had a deputies committee that was working options doing analysis, what a brewer assumption in Iraq, how those assumptions change. And then you had in parallel to that, using that information, a conversation that the President conducted with his national security principles. There was a disagreement as to what we should be doing. The President wanted to have a process where we understood the basis for those disagreements. But he also wanted to, through his questioning to try to bring his national security principles together because he was changing strategy in a middle of a war. In order to do that, he needed to carry the country with him. And the key thing about carrying the country was it going to be carried first his own advisers and then carry the military leadership who were fighting this war. That was the kind of process where we had a good blending of interagency work to develop options and then real engagement between the President and his senior leadership to come to a decision that in the end of the day, only the president could make.

3. Watch: Running a National Security Council Meeting

An NSC meeting can be called for a variety. Res, Iraq invaded Kuwait. That's a crisis you call an NSC, meaning to evaluate the situation. You call an NSC meeting when a study has been prepared. That as controversial elements, you call it when the President wants one to discuss an issue. Any decision-making process has to fit the president. And the way he likes to receive information processes and make decisions. And different presidents like to do it in different way. President Nixon, for example, didn't much like meetings. He like papers. He liked to read papers and studying them, make decisions that way. President Ford, on the other hand, love to hear his advisers debating the issues that helped him refine his own thinking and make decisions. So it needs to be tailored for the president because if the president doesn't find it useful, It's not going to be useful. We talk through the most difficult operational issues what to do about the Iran nuclear program. What do about the Syrian nuclear reactor? We could talk through those in a situation of complete candor. People could explain their views without concern that they would show up in the newspaper. What you want is with great stability, real disagreement of views vetted in front of the president.

A president then makes a decision. And everybody is clear on what is the way forward. That's the system when it's working right now for the NFC to function well, there has to be collaboration asked to be compromise, but at the same time, there has to be disagreement. And sometimes it can be it can be rough. I made people have strong views. Defense always wants to protect as much as it can. State always wanted to do diplomacy. The president needs to cut the budget. Congress is speeding up and everybody. So, you can have some very testy discussions. And those fascinating, I love those meetings because strong views shouted back and forth across the table. And I got to say this is what I'm going to recommend to the President.

4. Watch: Reforming the National Security Council: What's Necessary?

Welcome to today's Council on Foreign Relations meeting on reforming the National Security Council. And I'd also like to welcome the members around the country and the world listening via live stream. I'm Karen Liang and I write about national security for the Washington Post. But most importantly, we're fortunate today to have as our speakers, three people have personal and academic experience in the national security sphere, and specifically, the National Security Council operates. Ambassador Robert Blackwell joins us via video from importers in New York, where he is a Henry Kissinger Senior Fellow for US foreign policy, is worth multiple time zones. Nsc staff most recently as NSC. And as you can see in his lengthy biography in the program Ambassador back, Blackwell has also had a long and distinguished career as a diplomat, an academic, and an author of books and papers on virtually every area of wooden house. Eva became president of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs in 2013. After more than four years as the Obama administration's ambassador to NATO. Before US government service, he was a senior fellow at Brookings Institution where he specialized in American foreign policy and the transatlantic relationship. Mac Dassler, to my right, teaches Public Policy at the University of Maryland and has advised presidents and secretaries of state on economic and foreign policy and held senior research positions at some of our most distinguished think tanks. He has authored a lot of books, including with Ambassador adult or one that is particularly pertinent to our conversation here today. In the shadow of the Oval Office, published in 2009, was a combination of a decade of work that they did together, including the compilation of oral histories of officials who served on the NSC staff and related rates of presidents from JFK through George W Bush. The book itself as a historical analysis of national security advisors who serve those precedence, what they did, how they did it, and their recommendations for how the role should be undertaken. It gets work that's been invaluable to many, certainly in my position and probably for many years. So, with that, let's get started. As you know, this session is on the record, will talk for a bit among ourselves and then we'll open the floor to questions. So our title today is reforming the NSC and that assumes that it needs reform. I have to say that the need to change the way it operates as a new administration takes over is not in and of itself a new concept. Under Jimmy Carter. Some thought the National Security Adviser was too powerful. And under Ronald Reagan, the NSC was seen as disorganized and to operational two-week under George W Bush, too big and powerful under Barack Obama. So I'd like to start with Ambassador back. Well, you've worked for a number of national security council president's. What is it that makes a good National Security Advisor and an effective, smooth running NSC. Well, good morning everybody. And good to be with you. Well, let me put it like this. I think many in Washington and in the audience would regard the model for National Security Advisor as Brent Scowcroft. And so and I worked for brand. So let me just say, how did Brandt do the job? Well, first of all, the National Security Advisor obviously has to have a close relationship with the President. Has to have a temperament that is congenial to the president. He doesn't necessarily, by the way, have to know the president when he takes his position as National Security Advisor. Curiously, Henry Kissinger, it hadn't 15-minute meeting with Richard Nixon at a cocktail party before he was offered the job. So, but he certainly over time has to have that relationship. Second, and of course we assume it has to be very smart. But second, it's a big management job because getting before the President, decisions he needs to make. And then being sure the decisions he makes are implemented is a big management job. And some of the NSC advisors who haven't done all that well, haven't, because they concentrated on their substantive advice to the President at the expense of their management role. And third, and this may even be the most important. He asked to have a temperament, a non disputations temperament. If I have to put it if I can put it like that, because he needs to be or she needs to be able instinctively to be fair minded in presenting options to the president. Of course, the president, least in my experience, will usually ask the NSC advise, Well, what do you think? But that's after the NSC by adviser. At best and, and this was certainly brand would present to the President in a fair-minded way the various options that various members of the cabinet supported. So just to conclude, this is a very tough and challenging job. And it's because of that, that I suppose two-thirds of the National Security Advisers since the Kennedy years have actually failed in their, in their job and have been replaced or quit. In addition to the personality and the National Security Advisor, obviously the structure is very important on one of the first things every administration has done in the last half century is to produce a document right at the beginning, talking about how national security policy-making will be structured, how the process is going to work. I know Eva, you participated in that process for President Obama. I wonder if you could talk a little bit about how that works and how important it is. So in part in order to do the job in the way that, that Bob has described it, you need to have a process in an organization that facilitates, that's particularly that last point. The ability to understand what other people and other agencies think and then how to present what they think and an objective and trust and trust fulfilling manner to the president. And over the course of the last 50 years, the way in which that process has been put together by presence has changed. Except that since Brent Scowcroft in 1989 actually coming out of commission report that he chaired as a result of the Iran-Contra affair. We've had a relatively similar kind of structure. A structure where you have a Principles Committee that is chaired by the National Security Advisor and whose members are all the members of the National Security Council minus the president and sometimes the Vice President. And so you have the senior cabinet figures coming together on a regular basis, chaired by, by the President's National Security Advisor. You then have the, the, the deputies committee, which is the number twos and most of the departments sometimes a number three depending on what department you're talking about that is trying to manage the process almost on a day-to-day basis. And it's the crisis management facility, a facilitator. And then third, you have, and this is where it changes from administration to administration. Should've had the Assistant Secretary level interagency working groups which get renamed to under every president because that's the President's prerogative. So currently the inter-agency policy committees, IP sees that it sometimes get chaired by departments and sometimes get chaired by, by the NSC. There's always a big fight about that issue on whether department gets to chair it. Over time. The reality is, is because the central mechanism is in the White House, it tends to be chaired by, by the NSC. So even in the Obama administration, where initially there was that, What was it called? Psd one, the first memorandum by the President laid out the interagency process. There was some thought being given at the State Department, either chairing a coach, sharing some of the regional eyepieces. That's never happened was pretty much abandoned pretty early on. It for one simple reason, the assistant secretaries you were supposed to chair those meetings aren't actually confirmed until 67 months into an administration. So somebody's gotta do the job and the person and the NSC is going to be there on day one because they don't have to be confirmed assuming that they had been appointed. That will be there on day one. So those are the those are the big decisions that you make. And for every administration, the question is, do we have the same process or do we have a different process of interagency management? I would I would suggest that that's one part, but that does not need reform. It can work. There's a question about how many meetings you do and how frequently they are and how you run them. That was actually less a process or an organizational one more process question. And then there is a larger issue which we may want to get into later. What is the competence that the NSC covers vis-a-vis all the other issues that are out there, whether it's international economic issues or counterterrorism issues and homeland security issues. And that, of course, this is an issue that is right now being debated within the Trump transition team. Bob, an IPO, have done an admirable job of setting forth both the role of the National Security Advisor and of the structure, the formal structure that has developed and has persisted for the last, yes, we're talking 30 years now in 1986. 1987 for that. But of course, driving a lot of this and sometimes distorting it is the development of the role of the president and the relationship of the President to the National Security Advisor. And these, we have a book we could recommend food. Look at that. But basically, I'll say guys, this is varied enormously from president to president. And it often defeats the dreams of reformers. Example, right at the beginning of the Obama administration, there was perhaps an unusual amount of ferment in the national security community wanted to improve the process. Impressive reports were multi-hundred page reports were written. Big structure. A lot of people wanted to return to the way President Eisenhower ran the NSC back of the 950 is which had a fair amount to recommended. Only problem was I remember and apparently General Jones, the first Obama Nash security. But it has some interest in this. However, essentially the president did not. And the President and General Jones never hit it off in the sense that he respected General Jones, General Jones and respected in the President and all this. But they never hit off in terms of the day-to-day policy management relationships. And the people who were, who had worked for Obama for a long time, that political aids, the policies and the White House essentially jumped into the vacuum and got, as well as the depth that then deputy Tom Donaldson, who essentially did a lot of the National Security Advisor job until that was changed. So you find episodes where the structure is one way and the personal relationships don't work out. And therefore they get, and it's since the President is dominant. Now we're all particularly recognizing that right now with a somewhat unusual president about to take office. But point I would make is, for every president there is, there are idiosyncrasies. There are different style preferences and they tend to shape how the process operates. The, Before we go to the specifics of, of what's happening now, I wanted to talk a little bit about the size of the NSC staff. Brent Scowcroft said that his was about 50 people and he thought that Yes, just about right. But it's pretty much doubled in every administration since then. To the point where you had more than 400 people working on the NSC staff in the Obama White House. Arguably, many of those were not policy people there. They need a lot more technicians and they used to There's an administrative staff, but there were a lot of policy people there. The administration has said it's worked to make it smaller. And in fact, congress has moved with legislation in the NBA this year to mandate some argument over whether they actually have the power to do that. But anyway, they've done it in legislation that it can't be more than 200 people. How important is that? I mean, the size dictate function. This function dictates size, is it, does it make a big difference? Let me jump in on that. And that Eva will also maybe at the very top, on the very top handful of issues. Probably not very much because those are handled by the President of the chief people, the secretaries, the deputy secretaries and so forth. What I think where I think it does matter isn't a lot of other issues. Most of these, if you have couple of 100 policy people which the Obama had and administration had until at least near the end of the administration. Most of them never see the President except maybe to shake his hand when they're hired and when they're fire. And they don't know the president. But and most of them don't have any real relationship with the National Security Advisor. But they have a mandate to work in their policy areas and they're aggressive. People who were interested making a difference. So they take initiative, so they try to control what goes glow. So as a result, you have, it increases the difficulty of people in the agencies being able to take initiatives and lead and connect effectively with the National Security Advisor. And it makes it. But because there's still only one security advisor when President one Kevin level, it creates a bottleneck because all these people are generating ideas and they're mostly good I, good people. I mean, they're active, they care. They've come to get them because they want to make a difference. But I think just in that sense, the large number is the enemy of the good and the Scowcroft idea with evil. And I wrote a piece and in 2000 for Brookings, which we basically said, we think 40 to 50 is about right now that did not include Homeland Security. So if you add that, it makes it a little bigger. But clearly with under W Bush and then under Barack Obama, it's got a lot bigger though evil may want to speak to so very recent changes. So a couple of points on it. First, the idea that Congress should legislate presidential staff in the White House. They may or may not be allowed to do it, but it is not a wise thing to do. The president should be able to choose how he. Sometime, someday, she gets advice from the people that he or she wants to get advice from. And it's not for Congress to decide it. It's number 12. In terms of policy staff. You've written carrying that the National Security Council under Susan Rice has actually, for the first time really, since Brent Scowcroft said, let's look at what's the right size of this organization. And they've taken a very serious look at, at how many people do they need and they've cut the staff quite dramatically, particularly on the policy on the policy side. So it's now under the soon to be mandated to 100 policy professional staff. They've also tried to figure out how to streamline the process by which decisions are made. And Clinton principal meetings and deputies meetings, which were sort of overtaking the day-to-day responsibilities off principles and deputies around through the departments. Third, just to echo. Max, last point is the more people you have, the more busy they will be on issues that they shouldn't be busy. Um, and, and the, the core thought that everybody should wake up with from the National Security Advisor until the lowest policy person is at, is what I am concerned about something the President ought to be or is interested in? Absolutely, yeah, and if the answer is no, then don't worry about it. Let somebody else trigger it out. You have an entire bureaucracy that is, that exist for the very purpose of worrying about the things that the President doesn't or shouldn't worry about. And staff should only worry about the things that the president is or should be an underscore, should be concerned about. And when you have 506075, make it a 100 people, you probably got enough to cover that broad range of issues with, again, the caveat, depending on how broad range of issues it doesn't include trade policy, doesn't include your domestic homeland security and disaster response policy. So the larger the remit of the NSC, the larger the staff will be. A key organizational decision that the President needs to make very early on in the administration. Do you, Bob, you've seen this from the inside through several administrations. What's your view about, about the size, size, dictating function or a function dictating size. What difference does it make from the inside? All let me first say I agree entirely with what has just been said. In every respect. I just observe there doesn't seem to be an obvious relationship between the size of the NSC staff and the quality of the policies that the President is following. It may even be an inverse relationship. But if we think of the late great **** new stamp President's get the kind of the organizations they want. And so this president will get the kind of organization he wants through his National Security Advisor. And whether that errs on the side of larger or smaller item think really matters all that much. As long as it's reasonable. I don't think 400 is reasonable because it has the effect, as my colleagues have said, of getting NSC staffers, quote, on behalf of the President, involved in policies that no president would be interested in. So I think I have about a 100 is right. Could be a little more, little less, but certainly not as large as it is banned in recent administrations. So when we don't, we don't know a lot about what President-Elect Trump wants from his national security staff. What we do now is that he has already changed the structure somewhat. At least we know that from appointments that have been made, not because there has been any structural documents released, but he has apparently revived the separate homeland Security Council, which the Obama administration subsumed into the, into the NSC. He has elevated the National Economic Council. He has created the National Trade Council. And he's appointed heads of all of these in the White House. All of whom report directly to him, and presumably all of them have staffs. And so I wonder what any of you think about what that says, about how smoothly the system's going to run, what his interests are and how he intends to pursue them through the White House. I'll make two points. First, on the issue of the Homeland Security Council. The Homeland Security Council exists in the Obama administration. The Council, which is a group of people with meats at the principal level and can meet with the President and is chaired at the principal's level by the Homeland Security Advisor. Today. We don't know yet whether the change. So the appointment, I guess it's Tom boss or as the new Homeland Security Advisor as assistant to the President for Homeland Security Affairs and counter-terrorism. So same title as Lisa Monaco has today, but doesn't she's still report three says no, she doesn't. She reports directly to the president. But This is where it changes, a change that the Obama administration made us, they abolished and Homeland Security Council staff and merged it with the NSC. So the question is, are we going to have a separate staff dealing with homeland security, counter-terrorism, and cybersecurity. There is a cybersecurity staff under the CIO in in the White House today? That we don't know, but we just don't know how that is going to happen. The larger point is exactly your point that on the big issues dealing with the international affairs, ranging from Homeland Security through national security to economic affairs and trade. We are now going to have four individuals who are all in the White House directly reporting to the president. Then the question is, who's going to coordinate the coordinators? Because these are for people who are going to be coordinating various parts of the government. And then they have to coordinate with themselves. Because strangely enough, foreign economic policy and trade policy or not, that's different. And many of our national security and foreign policy issues involve both trade and counter-terrorism, et cetera. So the coordination of the coordination function is within the White House, is a recipe for more staff. Because who's going to coordinate the coordinators? More staff, obviously, and a recipe for potential conflict. Now, everything we know about Donald Trump's management style through the campaign, he seems to like that. He wants to have different to people coming forward with different points of view. He's creating the White House organization, that it will do that in spades. We haven't even talked about the domestic side and the Chief of Staff side. So it's going to have a lot of people reporting directly to him and he will make the eye, presumably the decisions, the President's often career organizations to signal priority. There where every president since Richard Nixon who has had a White House staff that have dealt to some degree with international economic issues outside of the NSC, whoever Clinton, when he ran and his campaigns, really wanted to emphasize and economic issues. And so he announced he was going to create it, did create the National Economic Council, the NEC, which is parallel to that. And for his first couple of years it really was parallel to these NSC because it had a, Bob Rubin was a very strong and very effective leader of that. Thereafter it became somewhat less important, but it became a consequential entity. Now, again, George Bush created the Homeland Security Council and staff. So then you had these three and then this was pulled away. You still have Obama, you saw the advisor, but as Evo pointed out, the staffs will emerge, not me the biggest, the biggest problem. There's a dilemma here because as a defender of the separate economic staff, I would say, yeah, ideally, you'd like to have everything under the National Security Advisor. But historically, massive security advisors have not responded adequately to the economic agenda. And because of that, the, it has tended to be neglected and it is moved to other people because they were driving forces and in politics and Congress, in industry. And that pushed it that way. So you had a, you, I think the biggest redundancy is this combination of national economic council and an ISO Trade Council. He's obviously there's rampant overlap there. Trump is done the nice Trade Council because he says he wants to revolutionize trade policy and he created a new organization. But I think the cost is Evo, suggests is going to be either one of these advisors establishes clear primacy and the other differs. Or alternatively that there's, there's chaos. That's one, that's Bob. You mentioned that it was important for the National Security Adviser not to be cases where he is. Let's assume for the moment that the that the National Security Advisor has primacy among these people, at least on the issues that we're talking about in terms of national security. General Flynn has been named as the National Security Advisor. Very distinguished intelligence officer, threw out his military career, former head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, where he ran into some problems both with the Pentagon and the and the White House. So some concerns have been raised that he in fact does have a reputation for being disputation. And someone who's whose focus at least through his career, has not necessarily been on a on a wide range of national security issues. How do you think his characteristics fit the ideal as you described it earlier? Why? I really don't want to speak to that because I've never met the man. So I I don't know. Washington reputations are formed in many different ways. And so I don't want to get, I do want though, to reinforce something has just been said about a national security advisors and economic issues. Just maybe. Not quite right about this, but I was just sitting here thinking, has there ever been a serious economist who's been in the National Security Advisor, and I guess Walt Rostow would qualify, but I don't think there's another one. Maybe there as I'm forgetting. And they tend to be national security types, generals, admirals, or people like Condi Rice who had spent her career on east-west and Soviet issues and so forth. And I think that inevitably downgrades the economic dimension. Now, mac bundy, deputy was Francis Bator who was very distinguished economists from Harvard. But usually there's not an economist who's the deputy either. So I think having a separate structure of, especially given the preoccupation of, of this President elects with economic issues, would seem to me that having that separate structure makes sense on the broad issue of temperament would just have to see what, but, but what I am confident haven't watched myself. A half a dozen national security advisors who successful and unsuccessful close up is a disputation. Personality gets the National Security Adviser in trouble. Because sooner or later the cabinet members, beginning with the Secretary of State, will be in having a one-on-one meeting with the President saying we have a problem here. And in most cases, if it, if the President has to choose between a Secretary of State and the National Security Adviser, they choose the Secretary of State. So, so we'll see this is a, an experiment which is about to occur. And we'll see how it turns out. Of course we have a lot of senior cabinet officials now who, who do not have experience in the executive branch or in government al, who are used to running their own shows. And so it'll be you can see the possibility of conflict on that level. And then when I had just just two points on what but just just amplify one, I'm the only person with some economic background who was National Security Advisor other than Walt Rostow will be Sandy Berger who did trait law, different perspective and but he was a bra, he was one of those very broad people. But I would agree fundamentally with the, the neglect of big economic and trade issues by the National Security System. The way this has been resolved, starting actually under Clinton, is that the key person doing international economic affairs on the NEC report is due will had it and reports to the NSC. Mike Froman was one of the more stronger and powerful people in that position. He was both, yeah. Deputy narrow bothered you guys are under Obama and he was a deputy at the end the NSC and merge that one other point on temperament and how to think about it. As Bob said at the outset, the key characteristic you want International Security Advisor is someone who can create the trust within his cabinet counterparts, particularly the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, that their views will be represented fairly on a day-to-day, minute-to-minute basis to the President, the National Security Advisor. Just because of the nature of the job, sees the president every hour. On the hour, almost at the beginning of the day and at the end of the day. And the Secretary of State and Secretary Defense and everybody else needs to know that their views are going to be presented fairly openly. And they need to trust that the moment that breaks down is the moment when the system breaks down and it happens. I don't know whether it's two-thirds of the time in the last 50 years, but it happens way too often. It was brands grow crops, a great skill to be able to be very, very close to the president, probably closer than almost any other National Security Adviser. Here's a guy who writes the memoirs together with the president. The president's memoirs writes it with the National Security Advisor. And yet there was never any doubt that he represent that Jim Bakker and decay and others fairly and fully. And that's going to be the key success. When vivo and I were doing our project, we organized a roundtable, a former National Security Adviser, which course Brett was a member of that group. And what the big point he made, he said, when you become National Security Advisor, you really have to spend the first year, year and a half establishing trust. And you have to get the, you have to get so the cabinet people believe in you. Otherwise they're going to go around you. And either you're going to have a big conflict like say Henry Kissinger had would William Rogers under the or, or Brzezinski with with Vance different administrations or you're going to anyway, it's not going to work, it's going to break down. And one very nice aphorism which even I used and I book from David Shire, long time veteran now no longer with us, but who is an expert on that? Said, trust is the coin of the realm. You have to do when a good organization. Policy and the George HW Bush administration was a wonderful, was a paragon of trust among the top people and bread Scowcroft made this happen. His sons administration, alas, at least in its first few years, was not such a paragon and problems arose from that. Well, I want to ask our members to join with your questions now to remind you, first of all that the meaning is on the record and I'll call on you and wait for the microphone. If you could state your name and your affiliation. And I know I don't have to ask you to speak concisely and to limit yourself to one question so that we can get as many as possible. Yes, sir. Back there. Hi, cam carry at the Brookings Institution on the Governance Studies side of the house, and formerly at the Commerce Department. I want to pick up on the theme of, you know, how you integrate economic issues into the National Security Council process. I did a paper at Brookings last fall which plug briefly addressing that question, drawing particularly on the experience of the Snowden disclosures and the response to that, which was initially treated as a national purely a national security issue, but had enormous reverberations beyond that. And I am one of the things that look at is the composition of the National Security Council. The Obama administration's PSD one says that if economic, international economic issues are on the agenda, been the the advisor for international economic affairs, the Secretary of Treasury, Secretary of Commerce, other economic advisors are at the table. But the proposal as you change that default, so that ordinarily the the those people are at the table unless those issues are not on the agenda of the presumption is that things have some some impact on those issues. And I think the notion that there's the, the economic counsels are a solution is certainly important, but you still need to integrate those issues. So I wonder if you comment a little bit more on how you make sure that the economic agencies and advisors have visibility into what's going on that may have an impact on those issues. That may not be seen by the people who make up the NSC. Who wants to take that. One Na, one thing that the Clinton administration did when it established the NEC was to have a staff of people who were do have had it and worked for both the NEC and the NSC in charge of international economic issues. So at the staff level, you had some integration. Then in the George W Bush administration, the elevated that to the point of having a deputy assistant to the president who was dual headed and did both national security. So this, this helps to do it, to integrate at the staff level that doesn't doesn't fully solve the problem, but it's, but it's, it's a useful step, I think. And as Evo pointed out, or Mike Froman, play this role strongly. And first Obama administration. Could I chime in the, I think that was an important point that was made and ensuring that the economic agencies are right at the center of White House deliberation. So foreign policy and especially in an era of geo-economics when around the world, China, Russia, the Gulf States, others aren't using economics for geopolitical purposes. But I would add that most Secretaries of the Treasury are not enthusiastic about involving their issues in an interagency process. That little mildest way to put it. And therefore don't come to those meetings. Let's their colleagues become interested in Treasury issues. And my experience at the White House was, was hard to get the Secretary of the Treasury over to the White House for issues. For the reasons. I said yesterday, just to amplify exactly what Bob says. It's sometimes isn't the question whether they're invited. It is often the question whether they show up at a certain moment, the invitation, and there's a lot of meetings that in fact they don't think they're their expertise is particularly important. So it gets downgraded to who shows up and ultimately nobody has I think that whether they have the idea that a deputy, often the case with the Obama administration, there were so many meetings at the White House and the more meaty like the level of people who attended started to go farther and farther down all the time. Don't you have a question? John Bollinger from Arnold and Porter and adjunct fellow in international law, the Council on Foreign Relations. I've got a question about the NSC staff coordination function. So obviously the staff's primary function is staffing the President. It's also pushing the President's priorities, but they also have to coordinate all of government. And so either you made the point which says, well, if the president doesn't care about it, then staff shouldn't worry about it. Let someone else do it, although you did say press, it, should care about it. But the president really does need to care about a coordinated government. And there is a tendency, I think maybe perhaps and Republican administrations in particular, I know it started when I moved to the NSC staff and 2000 one that well, let's hire strong cabinet secretaries, let them do their jobs. And the NSC staff just staffs the president and stay out of the way. The problem is you really just can't do that. We have a government that has got to coordinate with each other. Cia has got to coordinate with, with state and defense, defense. We saw what happened in the first term of the Bush administration, has got to coordinate with others. Justice now is doing things that have to be coordinated with the rest of government. So there has to be a coordination function, the NSC staff. The problem is there can also be too much coordination. This is if every single thing done by every department is sent to the NSC staff for crosshatch an approval. That's what drives people crazy. So what is the appropriate level of coordination across government that the NSC staff should do, which really largely goes on below the president's eye level. So I think it's an excellent question. It's a key it's a sort of a key driver why staffs get larger in the White House. Because the presupposition is that the White House is the only place that can, that can and does coordinate. And I think it's time to ask the question whether that's in fact true. Like others in this building. I was an ambassador and I coordinated by definition, because as chief of mission, you have everyone from every different agency part of your of your coordinating function. And it used to be the case. It's not like coordination, something new that we didn't have to do in the 1960s. It used to be the case that assistant secretaries were very powerful people in the State Department, of Defense department or justice. In fact, did much of that coordination at that level. And we, we, we, we want to go back, it seems to me to a system where political appointees who are Senate confirmed. That. So they stand at a, at a higher level, actually have more power to do the job they're supposed to be doing. And that includes the coordinating job. And the idea that it can only happen in the White House lead you to 23400 staff folks. Now information flow is one thing. You want to have as much information flow while it's happening. But the idea that the only person who can coordinate an interagency process is somebody who sits in the White House. Is it's just wrong. There's no reason why the Assistant Secretary for near, near, for, for, for, for Europe can't coordinate Russia policy with folks including the White House. And, but actually you go to the State Department's actually strange idea. But from the White House, the State Department, it's equally **** coming from the State Department or the White House. It's on the White House and the State Department. Just, just, just to think about that. So you can actually do coordination in a different way. And what you have to have if you do it that way is an informal, preferably informal group at the secondary level, that includes defense person, may include an intelligent person, may include an economic person depending on the issue. And who, who are congenial or one of the other mean they'll fight with each other about policy, but they'll also work together and they'll also realize there and administrations and had been able to establish effective informal coordination at the cabinet or near cabinet level also tend to be more effective. Establishing at the Assistant Secretary level what you have to give somebody convening authority. And I think the you mentioned evil about the IPCC's I think the Obama administration specifically in their initial directive, had a whole paragraph saying eyepieces will not be inner agency headed by a department. They will be in the White House headed by a person and the NSC stuff. So I think that the, the sort of control from the White House was in their heads from the start, in part because it tries to answer John's question of coordination. And there's the presupposition that the only person who doesn't have a stake in this is in the White House, and therefore is the only person who can convene and control. I'm not sure that's actually the person who coordinate with each other. Well, and if they die, if so, if there's no coordination, then you hit it and then you throw it back into into the NSC written process. But in many cases it does get coordinated. It doesn't country HIM. Often. Jump in when it's a little bit awkward having on the screen there, but temp, Yeah, that's fine. Fine. I'm Audrey Chris Cronin. I'm at American University. My question is, where do you think us longterm strategy is made beyond the interests of any department, agency, or policy area? Or is the concept simply anachronistic? Abi want to take that one? Well, if I can be personal when I've been with the White House the last time in George W Bush's administration, I was Deputy National Security Adviser for Strategic Planning. And so I started out as Condi had asked, try to do that. And the Secretary of State, Colin Powell said, forget it. There isn't going to be any strategic planning generated out of the White House. It will come from the agencies and presented to the White House and it can amalgamate that we'll use. And black will auto, become the envoy to Iraq because our policy in Iraq is such a mass and I spent much of the next year in Baghdad. So I'm putting it, I'm pretty skeptical of of strategic planning being generated by this small NSC staff. Separate from the National Security Advisor himself. I'm perhaps the best example of strategic planning coming out of this process we've been discussing was Henry Kissinger and break the opening to China and the creation of detente and all the rest. And that was basically out of Kissinger Nixon's head. And so we'll see whether this National Security Advisor has that capacity. But I don't think it's generated upward to any significant extent by the NSC staff. When Henry Kissinger was made national security advisor, he invited a distinguished political scientist named Bob Osgood to join his staff as basically to do long-term planning. He treated Osgood, unlike a lot of his other step as with the utmost respect and deference. And Osgood was more or less I remember interviewing him a couple of years into this. He was totally irrelevant. Me there was no. And I think the reason is really a process run that is very hard to overcome issues come the National Security Advisor yes, his or her leveraged from the day-to-day issues, managing them for the President. And the, these, these are urgent. And if you have a president who was deeply involved in foreign policy, as most though not all have been. That tends to the issues that are current and the day tend to drive. Or the Nixon administration was an interesting and impressive exception and being able to move strategically. But I think as you've said, Bob, absolutely right. It comes, came from Nixon and Kissinger as his not from a staff, not from an institutional procedure. If I'm Francisco mercenary, I work at the Boston Consulting Group to Bob's earlier point about the idea of international screw advisor should both be able to correlate policy from different agencies is presented to the President and then implement it. If you guys can briefly give us an example of when that process worked well, right. So what was a policy that you feel was well executed both from the beginning toward the end. I'll give an example. This is a really good book on this, by the way, on, on how we got to date. And so after a truly disastrous by two administrations figuring out what to do with Bosnia, tony lake lead in a process where he asked different agencies come up with their best ideas about how to resolve it. And it was a State Department effort and the Defense Department effort. And it was a man while rat was at the UN was Madeleine Albright effort. And it was a NSE effort. And those, those different efforts were put together in a series of meetings, in the series of discussions with the President over a number of days that led to a strategy for trying to get the issue resolved one way or the other in one way or the other was either through negotiation or through withdrawing the UN troops and lifting arms embargo and striking and providing airpower. And that was back using the military means in order to get the, the process that the peace process going that lead to date in. And then let to the implementation of the postnatal period, which maybe not as successful as at least getting to date and ending the war. But it ended the war. And its now that was in 1996, 995, it's now 20061617. And whilst situation in Bosnia isn't, in some ways not that much different from what it was in 995. 1 things different. Nobody's killing each other. And in that sense, it was a remarkably successful process, run out of, actually out of failure, which is usually what things happened and the surge of the Iraq, Syria interest. The other good example of a recognition that the policy wasn't working and then saying, how do we get new ideas together? And that's when the National Security Adviser, when they play the roles, right? Yeah. Really become, if you want to do strategists planners in order to resolve a particular issue that in case of Bosnia, it had to be resolved before the 1996 election. In the case of, of Iraq, a recognition by the President that it wasn't working and we needed a new policy and this was eating up everything that was going on domestically and in our foreign policy. And they did. And Steve, have they played a crucial role at is doing that, right? I think those are two good examples. And a third is the unification of Germany within nato from April 1989 when Eastern Europe started vibrating all the way through September of 990 amps, or when Germany was unified under in nato. And that was one not, that was born out of failure, which boy, out of an utterly unanticipated event, which was Gorbachev and the loosening of control over Eastern Europe and the consequences. And the president, in this case, the President and Brandt. In the spring of 1989, seeing these events basically created the policy of going as fast as one could toward German unification and involving Gorbachev deeply in that process. And Helmut Kohl. So it was really basically trilateral endeavor of, of Bush, the coal and Gorbachev opposed by, as we recall, Thatcher and mineral, but it was responding to events. So there are numbers of good examples when this works. But if you go back to stay well, I think at least in the case I'm most familiar with, which is the one I just mentioned. It was because of the trust and Baker and and Cheney and Brant and the President work their way through tactical disagreements without, without a bump. And That's what it takes to implement the kind of policy that they examples we've been using. And we'll see if the Trump administration is capable of them and amplify one other thing on this, which Bob, when when I mentioned that trust actually went down levels of the administration. So you have you Bob working with with Kim it and others and Alec and that team, equally trustworthy and worked as well. So you don't it's it's bringing that inter-agency process and the trust down through the levels of government. That is absolutely critical. I think that was one of the problems with the George W Bush administration. Certainly in the French term, you had the enmity among people. At the top level, went all the way down, all the way down with people. I sat in the Obama administration as it exists there, that, that, that level of confidence and cooperation and trust actually does go down front. And quite, quite far, there's always competition. There's always different views. But, but people work together at various different levels. And when that happens, things can, things can move. Let's try. We've only got about five more minutes, so let's try to get in two or three more questions Way in the back there. Thank you. Hi, I'm Astrid Kimball from Google. I was wondering, could you comment on the dynamic between regional organization in the NSC and functional? And that is it does it, is it preferred to have cyber as its own entity within the NSC or have cyber experts within the europe, euro or your directorate. Who wants to take that. Just as alert as a large, just as a larger issue. The competence in government is not in the White House. It just isn't. You can't have all of the experts in the White House. Because if you do, you will just take all the departments. That's where the expertise lies. And that's true for regional, It's true for functional, It's true for everything to the people that you want in the White House are the people who, who know where the expertise is and can bring it to bear to the decision-making process. But if you bring it all into the White House, then the White House becomes a US government. Why, why bother? And, and it's, it's, it's this, this constant tension, this belief that the only way you can coordinate is to have the expertise that leads to growing staffs when in fact, it's the ability. To think through where in the government as this expertise and how do we bring it to bear to the decision-making process and then let them implement it because you're not the ones that are supposed to be implementing. That is the question that Brent Scowcroft point as he once put it, is every morning when I wake up, I look in the in the in, in, in the mirror and says, how can I add one less staff person, not one more, but one less? What is it that we're doing? Then in fact, somebody else can do better? But it's the right question. The question you raised is sort of a basic dilemma of government. Do you go on the function, you give it to the functional expert or do give it to the regional expert and really depends on the nature of the issue. I mean, if you if it's predominantly, if you're each issues with China are predominantly economic and trade issues. You tend to give that issues to the, to the economic people if they are more security than you give them to the China people. So it's, but it's not, it's not automatic or easy. And I think cyber would be an example which in principle it's a functional issue. But then as Evo says, that doesn't mean you have to pull everything up into the White House, which is can create a mess. In the morning. My name is Brittany from George Washington University. Do you all have a view of the role of US Mission to the United Nations and how that ought to be coordinated or folded into the security apparatus obviously sets The Ambassadors been elevated to a cabinet level position is essentially created. Another poll of US foreign policy making is a functional matter. I'd be grateful for your views. I think the I think the UN ambassador should reports as Secretary of State like every other ambassador. And that's where it belongs. And it should be an instrument of American foreign policy writ large and not a separate entity. So I would I would move it in the direction of reintegrating it back into I'm sure that it's ambassador to the African Union, Reuben, he would've loved to have been a cabinet members. Hi, As Ambassador to nato would've loved to have been a cabinet member. I don't think either of us would have been as effective if we had been in every principal's meeting as an independent actor as opposed to people who were part of this state or in my case, state and defense apparatus. And so the idea that the UN ambassador somehow as a separate standing. I know my great friends and colleagues who have been une ambassadors will violently disagree, but I do believe integrating it back into the place where it belongs, which is the State Department is probably the right place. I wonder if you're here. If you look if I look at the history of this and you look at starting with Jeane Kirkpatrick, who was a person of great stature, who was brought in the Reagan administration. And I, I think they wanted to have her and her views in the cabinet. And, and I would dare to suggest that since many of the UN ambassador since then have been women, that it allows, also allows the President to have another woman and the Cadillac write it out. And so for them that's been left with that I'm all for having women are in-state and Secretary of Defense, so I don't think that's the issue the way to solve it. Yeah. My name is Courtney Rajan with the Committee to Protect Journalists than as we're talking about downsizing the NSC. I have a question about where you believe human rights belongs and whether it belongs in the NSC. One of the ways that we've participated in consultations is that there are these global engagement centers. There are these consultations held with civil society organizations broadly. Lots and lots of consultations on many issues. So can you talk a little bit about what happens then to the ability to integrate civil society into policymaking processes and where you believe human rights blogs should all at the NSC. Problem with human rights because it tends to be practice with country issue. It tends to be taken abuses that are taken by national governments. And yet there's a strong pressure and the State Department has an often effective or organization dealing with human rights. But it's, it's a real dilemma because how do you feed that? How do you make that cross that line between the function and concern of human rights and the contrary relationship which has multiple interests. And I don't I don't know that there's a clear organizational answer. I think if a president is very concerned about human rights and is willing to give it priority in certain cases and to advertise the priority that would probably make some difference. I think creating but creating specialized offices often does not make you do. This was of course, came up in the Jimmy Carter Administration, where President Carter was very preoccupied with human rights during the campaign and set up a special office in the White House on that subject. But discovered that he had essentially two different policies toward every country than one of these areas. And the one of the Human Rights person in his on his own staff. And after a while. The human rights person left and was the position was downgraded. But that brings me to this final point about coordination that we've been talking about throughout. Which is, if you're not careful, you're going. Any administration faces the danger of having several policies at the same time being articulated do other governments. And that gets back to the crucial function of the NSC advisor to try to be sure on behalf of the President that the President's policy as the president has decided, is implemented. There's only one I was in the Reagan administration and especially in the early years on any given Monday, there were four or five different foreign policies on any particular issue being pursued by various agencies of the US government. And re basically until Colin Powell took over as National Security Advisor. So this is absolutely crucial and it's very hard to do. I think that's a good note to end where I was trying to get everybody out on time. So thank you all so much for being here. Thank you to our panelists. I said, yeah. I can't comment on that. Because I meant to be not just sound like all that much. Yeah. I mean, I think certainly there's a problem. Have you ever thought about that? Okay. I felt I had my lines are yeah. Yeah. I think that's what happens. Actually. Yes, it can actually present. It sounds like, for instance, who our lessons, right?

5. Watch: What does it take to be a U.S. ambassador?

Next crop of recent ambassadorial nominees, several of them big money Obama supporters have raised fresh questions about who gets to represent the United States abroad. For a moment, have you been to Argentina center? I haven't had the opportunity yet to be there. I've sat response from noaa mom it President Obama's choice to be ambassador to Argentina, raised eyebrows, had a Senate confirmation hearing this month. Mom, it generated more than $500 thousand for the president's re-election. And he's one of a handful of key supporters rewarded with overseas posts. Another is calling bell, the soap opera produce your tapped to be envoy to Hungary. In January. She struggled to respond to Senator John McCain and her own confirmation hearing. Do you think, what are our strategic interests and hungry? Well, we have an extra ticket chick interests. In terms of what are our key priorities in Hungary? Think our key priorities are to improve upon, as I mentioned, the security relationship and also the law enforcement and to promote business opportunities, increased trade. I'd like to ask again what our strategic interests in Hungary are. The ambassador designate to Norway chart well, hold on. Oh George. Soon as we also ran into trouble when McCain asked about Norway's anti-immigration reached progress part is that you get some fringe elements that have a microphone that spew their hatred. And although I will tell you, Norway has been very quick to denounce them. We're going to continue to work with Norway to make sure government has denounced them. That the coalition gum they part of the coalition and the government. Well, I would say, you know what, a ivory infrared and corrected. I have no more questions for this incredibly highly qualified group of nominees. The gaffs, every bad questions about what it takes to become a US ambassador. According to the American Foreign Service Association, 37 percent of President Obama's ambassador pigs had been political. That's the highest proportion since Ronald Reagan's figure up 38%. And it's well over the percentages during the Bush and Clinton presidencies. In fact, and Mr. Obama second term, the figure tops 50%. But White House Press Secretary Jay Carney depends. The decision, being a donor to the presence campaign does not guarantee you a job in administration, but it does not prevent you from getting. And the fact of the matter is the President has made nominations to ambassadorial post and other posts from the ranks of the private sector, from government service, and has put in place qualified nominees. Across-the-board. The Foreign Service Association says it plans to make recommendations this month, unsetting qualification requirements for future nominees. For more on this, I'm joined now by Nicholas Burns, a career Foreign Service Officer and former Ambassador to nato, and Walter Russell Mead, editor at large of the American interests magazine and a professor of Foreign Affairs and Humanities at Bard College. Nick Burns, I believe I can call you by your former title, Ambassador Burns. People purchasing Ambassador ships. Well, I think in recent decades, the big question that White Houses of both parties have asked is how much of this person raised from my campaign where they Bundler is, did they raise money from other people? And it seems that that's now one of the major criterion to select ambassadors are presidents have done bass when they've asked another question, Is this person qualified? Do they have some experience in the country? Do they speak the language of the country? Had they done business in that country? And there are plenty of very good political ambassadors from the past, from April Harriman, who is FDR's linked to Stalin as ambassador of the Soviet Union, Edwin know right shower the great Japan next better at Harvard whom President Kennedy appointed to be ambassador to Japan. We have tremendously qualified people in our country, but we ought to be looking at the skills required to be successful in the job. And that's language and experience and a deep knowledge of history and economics. And that increasingly is not the question that a lot of our presidents are asking. Walter wrestle made it. Are those questions being asked enough in your opinion? Well, I think we you can look at the last group of people being confirmed and you can say at least they weren't very well prepared for their confirmation hearings. I do think that there are a lot of different qualities that make for good ambassadors. A Shirley Temple black was an example of someone who actually contributed to Richard Nixon's campaign and got an ambassadorship. A lot of eyes were raised. But by the end of her career in diplomacy, she was pretty well-regarded. Carolyn Kennedy, who is our ambassador to Japan at the moment, is somebody who doesn't have all the qualifications you might want, ideally an ambassador to have on paper. But the Japanese were very, very happy to have her and saw her as a, you know, as, as a sign of Japan's importance in American eyes. Next, I think we have to look flexibly at what the qualifications are, but I think there is a real question of qualification. Well, let me ask that burns about that. I wonder whether there's any value that's inherent in being close to the President, having raised money for him that carries it with you into a foreign capital. What people think, hey, he knows the big guy. Well, you know, we have a lot of embassies. We have, we have diplomatic relations with about a 180 countries in the world. And the President doesn't have a 180 best friends. It's sometimes can be helpful. But frankly, ambassadors are really reporting. They report to the president, but they're reporting through the State Department, through the Secretary of State. That's really the place where they're getting their instructions are where they have to work to get things done. I do think that the presence also have the Foreign Service. I was a member that service, but we have tremendously qualified women and men who train their entire adult lives to be ambassadors. They do speak the language they have lived in these countries. They've got the skills to be effective in government, which is sometimes a very different atmosphere than being effective in business. So I'm not against political appointees. And I would agree very much, for instance, that Caroline Kennedy was an excellent choice by President Obama. But in the main, we ought to have, the great majority of our ambassadors ought to be career foreign service officers. The historic average is about 70 percent. I'd like to see that at 80%. But we need to take care and not gamble with people from the private sector and outside the government who may not be qualified and the presence need to do their homework before they select their ambassadorial nominees. And Walter wrestle made it, is the balance, right, in your opinion, when you say that 70 percent of the ambassadors are career foreign service officers, should they? Are they bright to be frustrated when they see political friends or political allies going to these plum posts. Being an American diplomat working in the American Foreign Service is actually quite frustrating in a lot of different ways. And people like Ambassador Burns who certainly earned all of his advancement and appointments by just really superb work in the Foreign Service are aware of this that in many countries the Foreign Services almost autonomous. And when there's a change of government, maybe two or three people at the very top change in the US. It isn't just the ambassadors where we bring in political appointees, but to all kinds of levels, even deep inside the State Department. In some ways that's a defect because at key decision-making positions in the State Department are being filled by people who were appointed for political reasons. Don't know how the department works. And sort of every four to eight years there's a kind of a seizure of the government and it takes a long time for people to be confirmed. On the other hand, that system does allow, in a sense, for our our State Department, our foreign policy is closer to, is in closer touch with what's going on inside the country. There are advantages and disadvantages. But I do think whatever the number of ambassadors is, we do have to give. The great thing about a political ambassador, political appointment is this is somebody who in theory is close to the President. When the President has dozens of Bundler, a bundler is not necessarily the President's best friend, has it wasn't the college room maters or something like that. And so I think the real question for me is not a numerical quota system, but it's fundamentally one of quality. We do need very, very intelligent, thoughtful people as ambassadors. I don't think in every case we've had them. Nick Burns, does this ever come up in less sought after a diplomat, hardship posts for diplomats? Do they ever sen, prime political appointees to, I don't want to name a name because I'll get in trouble. But to a tough country, very rarely. In fact, if you look at where we send politically appointed ambassadors, it's mainly wealthy countries, nice places to be. If you want to be a tourist. Western Europe. But the toughest assignments, countries experiencing civil war, countries with which we're at war it when we went to Iraq and Afghanistan, invariably going to the career Foreign Service in the Foreign Service is ready for anything. These are people who spend their entire lives working for this opportunity and rising through the ranks. So I really think it's time that our president is turn back to the American foreign, foreign service in the Congress would fully fund the service because we just don't have enough career diplomats to do the job. We're the greatest power in the world. We have enormous influence in the world. We ought to want to have our best people. Yeah, as ambassadors for the United States of America, Nicholas Burns and Walter Russell. Me. Thank you both very much. Yeah. Thank you.

6. Watch: Defending the Nation with Secretary of Defense James Mattis

And ascendant China, a bellicose Russia, hostile regimes in North Korea and Iran. This past January, the Pentagon published its plans for protecting the United States against these threats. Here today to discuss the national defense strategy. The man over whose signature it appeared. The Secretary of Defense, James Man is on uncommon knowledge. Now. Welcome to the Hoover Institutions, Uncommon Knowledge filming today at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington DC. I'm Peter Robinson, born in Pullman, Washington. James Madison enlisted in the Marine Corps Reserve at the age of 19. He would spend more than four decades in the Marines, retiring with four-stars in 2013, James Madison commanded in combat in the Persian Gulf War, in Afghanistan and in Iraq. He served as Supreme Allied Commander of nato for transformation, as commander of the US joint forces command and its commander of the US Central Command. Decorations include defense Distinguished Service Medal, the Legion of Merit, and the Bronze Star with valor. On January 20th, 2017, the Senate confirm Mr. matters as Secretary of Defense with 98 voting in favor. Earlier this year, Secretary Matt has published the national defense strategy, the first such document in a decade. Ladies and gentlemen, the 26th Secretary of Defense, James Madison. The attacks of 9 11 took place more than 16 years ago. And ever since our armed forces have found themselves combating terrorism in Afghanistan, the Taliban in Iraq, Al-Qaeda, and then an array of insurgence in Syria, isis that is, over the course of three administrations, six congresses, and now a whole generation of troops and officers for that matter, a whole generation of the American people have come of age thinking that what our armed forces do is combat terrorism. The National Defense Strategy, page one, quote, interstate strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern of US national security. Close quote, explain that secretary. Well, I think for those of you at Hoover Institution, I know there's some of my old colleagues out here. You'll remember George Shultz, Secretary Shultz saying over the last several years, we have a world that's a wash should change. And any strategy you have must adapt to the world as it exists, not the one that used to exist. In this case. We had not had a defense strategy laid in Java. And in 10 years, this is the first defense strategy and 10 year this is your defense strategy is not the Pentagon to US Department Defense or the United States Department of Defense where you own US and we're accountable to you. We get an awful lot of the nation's treasure and we needed something to guide us. Because without a strategy, without a sound strategy fit for its time, the most brilliant generals, the, the most well-equipped proof with the most high-tech equipment. Find tactics. None of that works unless your strategy, your framework for what they're doing, can actually tie and Ways and Means together. So what we did, we looked at why out of nine out of the last ten years have we been getting at what's called a continuing resolution? Why were we underfund? But we never had a strategy where we could go to the Congress, the people you elect to represent you and say here's the rationale. So we put this strategy together and we add new assess what are the dangers and what are the dangers in the world and what is the primary danger, secondary, tertiary. The normal things that we all do in our lives at various points. In this case, we had to look at the attack on the state system. And if you look at China today and the way it is shredding trust in the South China Sea. The way it's using predatory economics. If you look at Russia trying to get a veto authority over the economic security and diplomatic to secant of concrete around its periphery and mucking around in other people's elections. If you look at even the terrorists and how in one case I anxious, they bulldoze the boundary line between Syria and Iraq. What you're looking at is a variety of forms of attacks on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state system. That's the bottom line. So we had to step back and say which of these stretch can be most depth to change our way of life. And very clearly, China and Russia loom large in that. I've chosen to be strategic competitors. But you and I will ten years from now, look back on this administration and judge at most, for it whether or not it established a productive, positive, workable relationship with China. That is number one, when we look back at these times. So we had to have a strategy that allowed us to move forwards or a diplomat and our president moved from a position of strength when they engage with the world. Where they people want to engage with our diplomat because they speak with a military backing them up and that's what you see going on in this document. But the bigger issue, there is a bigger issue here, Peter. Back in 2004, I'm a two-star general panel, 20-some thousand sailors moraine them are out in the western Euphrates River Valley. And I got 29 guys with me and we're traveling and we get slowed down. We have flat tires and stuff to very terrible place. 17 out of those 29 lad will be killed or wounded. Over the succeeding four month, we pull into one of the camps in the middle of nowhere. And I would reminder, reminded that next morning that America, you've got two fundamental source of power, power of inspiration and the power of intimidation. Now many times our military, actually the power of intimidation, sometime power of inspiration as well. But when the sun came up, the lieutenant with those 40 sailors, marines came and said, Would you like to meet a guy would dig in a whole lot here, put a bomb in on the road you came in last night. That gets low. Perfect. That yeah, I'd like to me. And he said that, well, educate, educate Europe. He speaks perfect English. Said really bring him on over. So they bring him over. He obviously a little uncomfortable. There he was with its wheelbarrow night before a couple of artillery rounds, car battery, you know, detonator. You've got a shovel and dig in and look up. There's five guys carrying them. 16s. Look anatomy, not looking good for him and for 01 k. So they cut his handcuffs off and he's shaking like a leaf, of course. Guy, I'm a cup of coffee and rank and agile. What do you do in this for in a year, Sunni, where marine were the only friend she gotten his town in this country. It all you do is you Zionists, you, this one that I did. Okay. You're here to steal the oil and all this. I didn't go away at edX area obviously and educate, Man, if you're going to run your rant like that, just go 80. He said, Well, can I sit here for a minute? And I said sure. And he sat there and he asked for a cigarette. If you don't give him is given Miami cancer lecture right now it's planar. But I'm not too concerned with that. As I gave mistake, I had a light appointment. Are they and what are your family to live in a place called alkyne about an hour away and had a wife and two daughters and she can be tough on them. And he said, yea, yea, I just don't like having foreign soldiers here. Y respect that. I wouldn't want foreign folder mica, that I could never get into a conversation and will go on on at some length and talking about our lives and everything. Moist, curious about p1. He's I guess I'm going to be going to jail. And I said, Oh yeah, you're going to Abu Ghraib, you and me, we're in an orange jumpsuit for good, long time for this little stunt. Now listen to this. He said, general, do you think we kinda warmed each other? You'd like to human beings can, when the gig's up for him, eat it. If I'm a model prisoner, do you think I could someday emigrate to America? Now think about what he said. Halfway around the world, America's power of inspiration reached all the way to the Western you fade group to a guy who hated so much. He would try and kill it. He would love to be sitting where you and I are today. But don't ever think that it's just a matter of how many dollars are spent on defense and who's got the latest gizmo? And by the way, i've, I've got people in right now who are going to find the latest gizmos. They're all from industry, they're coming in there. We're going to do fine on the technology. Just remember, power of inspiration, power of intimidation, some time to need both in an imperfect world, we're never going to buy and girls were property and they don't get to go to school. It's never going to happen. We're never going to buy into, there's only one way to deal with your spiritual side. It our way or the highway we're never going to buy that. Were Americans most revolutionary forth on this planet will remember that and regain our fundamental friendliness toward one another. But I will tell you there's a power of inspiration that you and I, we live it so much that we even forget it. You know, that that is a real source of power. China questions too, about China. You just mentioned the South China Sea. You're the strategists, not me, but as I understand it, or forward line in the Pacific runs from Okinawa down through the Philippines. And the Chinese have over the last couple of years taken a number of atolls and turn them in his military bases, runways, deepwater ports. We already bent back our force first line of defense. In the point about China right now, I think is that they have chosen to be a strategic competitor yet we're still in a position where we can cooperate with China in some areas even while we confront them and others. Obviously, we're going to sale and fly it through international waters and international airspace and militarizing these features that told you called them these features in the South China Sea. That doesn't change or international status. One bit, show Kitchen admittedly strategically uncomfortable position to be cooperating with someone on the one hand and confining them on the other. But when you look at the vote in the United Nations Security Council, reference North Korea and that threat. And you see Russia and China, and France, the United Kingdom, United States, all voting and others voted unanimously to sanction North Korea. You actually see in effect what's going on as we try to work with China, not being bent back, we're going to engage with China. We're going to try to turn it into a productive engagement. But at the same time, we have to recognize that predatory economic and knowledge variety in these features are, are aspects of an international system that they're trying to put together that we disagree with. And we're we're probably not going to change on that our meetings with the Chinese are counterpart between State Department and myself. And our counterparts have been businesslike. They have generally been productive. You see that with where we're at right now on DPRK. And so we'll continue to cooperate where we can. We'll confront where we must. But at the same time, we've got to figure this out. There's no rush to some kind of military confrontation. There's no need for that theater choices that need to be made. We need to make the right one because we breed this relationship. Bread, one we want to turn over to the next generation in good shape. Let me ask you about one other. One other place where it's uncomfortable. I'm sure the Wall Street Journal late last month quote, Chinese bombers and worships conducted exercises near taiwan this month is April. And last year, the number of Chinese air patrols of Taiwan's East Coast quadruple. Mainland People's Liberation Army is deploying new jets, ships, and other weapons in such numbers that the islands defenses are in danger of being overwhelmed. To which the United States of America responds. How? First of all, where there are these kinds of issues that have been around for a long time. Peacefully settling these is the right way to go. And so we were talking about that law part. We're talking with them about that all the time. It comes up okay, routinely. But the bottom line is, by international law provided a framework for addressing these kinds of issues. I think that our policy is appropriate. I won't go into details on it right here. Take too long, but I think our policy is appropriate and we will continue to support international legal frameworks for the way we go forward in our relations and the Pacific or anywhere else for that matter. But specifically here, we need to make sure that we do things that keep the world stable and keep the relationship productive. And so far, I think that working, we do register what they're doing with their military. But there had been no offense of action. And so I think it's going to wreck direct Russia, the National Defense Strategy. This document, Russia seeks veto authority over nations on its periphery and to shatter the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and change European and Middle East security and economic structures to its favorite, close quote, Russia has a declining population, an economy smaller than that of Italy. And of course, it's completely exposed to energy prices. In particular, the long-term trend to falling energy prices as the United States produces more and more oil. How worried do we need to be? Or we simply containing an aging power? Or are we can't containing something that's newly aggressive in Russia. Back probably 15 years ago, somewhere around there, 20 years ago, 12 years ago. I still remember Russian moraines training with us moraines and North Carolina, preparing for deployments together as UN peacekeeping troops. And those days are unfortunately, farm view mirror at Russia has chosen to muck around and democracies elections. They violated the territorial integrity and huge enforced a barn for the first time since World War II in Europe. You look at what they're occupying right now in Georgia, what they're doing in Crimea, what they're doing that Don't touch base and the Donbass out there in Eastern Ukraine. And when you put all this together, It's something that's got to be addressed and addressed. By democratic nation standing together, there's no bottom line. At some point, Russia will have to come back for all the region do you just outlined and more, they will have to come back. And she nato is something other than a threat to them. Nato is not a threat. I have too much regard for the professionalism of the Russian army officers. They know it is not a threat to them. They may have to say it is for public reasons or for for political reasons, domestic political read. And in fact, they know nato is not a threat. But they also see nato because it's growing in numbers. As democratic nations want to be part of nato, the primary military alliance, and the world of democratic nation. They also believe that it is in some way going to produce a bad outcome for, for Russia in the long-term. And we need to get a philosophical high level strategic discussion going again with Russia. In the long-term, Russia had more, I think, more in common with Europe, more in common with America, them with anyone else for their long-term survival energies and our best interests of the Russian Federation does not collapse. We do not want to see it collapse. So at some point, I believe that America is their best hope in turn to their long-term future. Nobody can be more helpful to Russia. So as we go through this very difficult time, and it is difficult, we've had to change our nuclear deterrent posture. It is, I'm not trying to downplay the challenges that we face right now, but I'm more optimistic in the longer term does as I am with China in the longer term, to a lot of decisions are going to have to be taken. And in that regard, the strategy that we put together means that our diplomat will be negotiating from a position of strength through the Russian position in Syria. We've twice struck the forces of President Assad in response to the use of chemical weapons. Gideon Rachman writing The Financial Times, the airstrikes were intended to send a message of Western relevance and resolve while minimizing the risk of getting involved in a wider war. That mixed message means that none of the bigger issues in Syria are closer to resolution. Mixed message. We didn't share it as a mixed message at all. And I think that I can objectively defend what we did. Our troops in Eastern Scheria are there in a advise and assist role. In other words, the Syrian Democratic Forces made up of the y PG and the Kurdish people there. And the Arab forces together compose the SDF and with them, and they've taken a lot of casualties that tell we're going after isis. And that's the authority we have from here in town to have those troops there. We have purposely stayed out of fighting in the Civil War. That is a policy decision. However, at the same time, That's a civil wars going on. And our goal there is to force that piece over to the Geneva process. And the United Nation brokered way that we're going to try to return to some degree of stability and peace to Syria. At the same time, if someone violates the chemical warfare prohibition than that, such a vital interest. And we cannot get to the point where you and I simply read the morning newspaper and say, Well, someone use chemical weapons again, they were not used in World War II battlefields. They were huge, as we all know, in the killing camps. They were not used on the battlefield from World War two. They have actually not been, you'd about a 100 year since World War one end. Except my Assad's father town called Hama. And then by this element of the regime in there, Syrian civil war. So where we had evidence and remember it's a gas, it, it, it goes away. It's not easy to get the evidence and we won't speculate. It is the most complex security situation I've ever seen and 40 odd years of doing this line of work. But where we get evidence of it, where we can attribute it to someone, then that the President made very clear that we are going to act on it. A separate issue, violation of the chemical warfare prohibition. We're not going to use that with mission creep to now jump into the sharing Civil War that for the UN to shuttle. Unfortunately, russia vetoed in the UN Security Council several times or the UN's involvement there. And as a result, the war and the tragedy of it goes on. I've seen refugees in the Balkans, I've seen them and Southeast Asia, I've seen a MAN, Africa, the refugees, and I've been in the camp. The refugees I've seen coming out of Syria or more traumatized. Than any refugees I've seen anywhere in the world. It is a tragedy much worse than anything. Bbc or CNN can show it that much worse. But that is something we're going to work with the international community on. Also in the international economy, we're working with 74 nations and international organizations that be in nato, Arab League, European Union, an inner Paul to defeat isis. Separately, we will also watch for any chemical weapon. Three separate, distinct issues that we're trying to bring forward to a political rapprochement in some kind of solution. You know, it's quite a job you have because every question I have here is about bad news someplace in the world. That's kinda my port, that's 300 portfolio. All right, North Korea in November, North Korea, we already know they have nuclear devices. In November, they tested a new ballistic missile. I'm sure I'll mispronounce this, but it's the Hua Song 15, which at least in theory has a range that covers the entire continental United States. Not just a Why, not just the Aleutians? The entire continental United States. Analyst Michael element, who's at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, quote, two or three test firings over the next four to six months. All that is required before Kim Jong own declares the US on 15 Combat Ready? Yeah, purely military question. Are we truly only a few test firings of a ballistic missile away from having the continental United States exposed to nuclear weapons from North Korea. Yeah, is it that close? I don't know. Things go wrong and test programs, we sometimes credit other people's programs are going to go smoothly while our own, we know how they go in reality. But at the same time, we're paid by all of you to be the sentinels, to be the guardian. So this great big experiment you and I call America, and we have got to assume the worst. Now General Laurie Robinson, who commands Northern Command, she is quite certain that we can take down using the interceptor. She's got between California and Alaska. A small and that would be a small attack and an X, so weird. But from the very beginning, when we first came into office about 15 months ago, we were told this will be the immediate crisis you have to deal with the outgoing administration with very candid. The president, President Obama told President Trump that, and of course I heard that and the CIA briefing, I got ready for confirmation hearings. My first trip went out to Tokyo and Seoul as a result, going overseas. And I would tell you, ladies gentleman, that it has been a diplomatically led effort from the very beginning to try to address this problem. Presidents, very blunt language had been part of the pressure campaign, but it's principally been led by State Department. And that goes over many, many months. And you see this again with what Ambassador Haley is done leading up and the United Nations, the UN Security Council resolutions that impose sanctions. I think those sanction to Ben effect. But at the same time, it's been the unity of the allies of Japan, of the Republic of Korea, and so many others. In January, stack trace state it with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada, pulled together the sending state in Vancouver, British Columbia. And that was the ministers of foreign affairs, not the ministers of defense. I went into British Columbia, I gave a brief the first night on the military situation, the sending state for those under the UN Charter, that it sent troops to fight there. And 950, this is Columbia and Thailand. In Sweden, other states came to United Kingdom, obviously Turkey. And it was interesting to see to India and Italy were not part of the UN and 950 they were present. We did it purposely in Canada. It's not known as bellicose nation. It's to keep it in the Minister of Foreign Affairs portfolio. I briefed in the evening, flew out, and the next day they met all day. And it's one of the European said, this weapon is located closer from North Korea to my country in Europe than it is to Seattle or Washington DC, was a reminder of the world doesn't orient around one nation alone on this planet. So what we saw with this combined effort with the Chinese and my dad to bring this to a diplomatic solution. And in fact, that's where we've got it now there's reason for hope that this has on the right track. But again, my job is to stay quietly behind our diplomats, making certain that they have options and the President has options. You're optimistic about the coming Sunday. And I'm, I'm not paid to be optimistic or pessimistic, of course. But I would just say realistically, who would have imagined this three months ago, six months ago. Nine months ago, 12 months ago. I remember reading the doom and gloom and every newspaper that was going to go wrong. And so we'll have to take it one day at a time. I wouldn't get out in front of anything that she what experience tells us, not what forecasts predict when Nochlin it took fundamentally less than predictable circumstance. Iran, Bret Stephens in the New York Times, less Today's for I guess it was earlier this week, Bret Stephens, the New York Time. Now that the President has withdrawn the United States from the Iran nuclear deal, Iran has a choice. Iran me have any economy or nuclear weapons. But not both. Fair assessment. Iran. I would, I would break it every time you think of Iran into two pieces. There's the regime that holds the Iranian people in check. They have proven during the Green Revolution here a few years ago, they are quite willing to use force against their own people. And so don't ever say Iran without identifying with part of a runtime, is that the regime, a revolutionary regime? Or is it the young people, especially who've had enough of this? The Iranian regime is basically not a country, it is, or it is a revolutionary group. And everywhere you see them acting over throughout the region or elsewhere, you see what they're up to with formerly a nuclear weapons program and what a nuclear weapon prime, not a nuclear program. They've got a ballistic missile program, they've got a cyber attack program, they've got a counter maritime program. Then you see these surrogates, proxies terrorists that they have Lebanese, Hezbollah, people like that less than two miles from where you're sitting right now, without a nuclear weapon in their arsenal. Iran Shan't have had a plan basically to kill the Saudi ambassador to miles from here, right over and Georgetown on a Saturday night at a restaurant. You can imagine those of you go out on Saturday night, guard down what that would've done. So we have very little region to trust to the denial and deceit of that regime as they tried to hide things. So what did we do when we came in with what was admittedly imperfect arms control agreement? Well, he tried for many munch. It wasn't something we did in the first month of the second month of the administration, tried to find a way to address the sunset provisions on some elements of it and look at the inspection regimes so that the inspection, if we're going to trust but verify or disk trust but verify. And I've read the agreement three times and that's clearly the intent of it. We want to change it. We were unable to get those changes, so we're going to come up with a new agreement, what it would look like, and work towards that at this point. Again, you gotta, you've gotta wonder about a country that everywhere they go, Yemen, Lebanon, Syria. The only reason Assad Dylan power today after Russia's regrettable veto in the UN, it, because Iran has kept him in power. That's the bottom line. So we're going to have to address that aggregate problem, that five threat, just one. And we're going to have to do it in such a manner that we maintain stability in the Middle East. And nutshell out our French Caribbean, Israeli. We've been through China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran, which are the four principles, state threats. The national defense strategy identifies. We have about 15 minutes left to talk about what you're going to do about them. That ought to be plenty of time. Don't you think? You identify three main winds, this three distinct lines of effort in this document obviously were only have time to touch on them. One is building a more lethal force. You became Secretary of Defense after the budget control act of 2011 had imposed caps on defense spending, cutting outlays from 691 billion in 2010 to a low of 560 billion in 2015. Before they rebounded a little bit. The budget the budget deal that was just agreed to, gives you a budget for fiscal year 2018 of 700 billion, roughly, that's about a $61 billion increase over last year. Without going into accounting details which I imagine are endless with a budget, with an operation, the size of the operation you run. Have you got enough? The short answer is yes. And it was due to bipartisan congressional support. It wasn't perfect. I'm very concerned about the level of debt we are passing to the younger generation. But at this point, I had to look the portfolio I had, and this was the best way to reverse the damage. That it occurred over years of combat, not replacing, whether it be ships or airplanes or equipment. At the rate we should have not maintaining it and eventually munition stocks going down and this has been reversed and then reverse several times. That the fundamental I like using touchstones and I'm enlarge organizations because laid gel and allows done it what we call the where the rubber meets the road are at the deck plate level, the youngest soldier, sailor, airman, Marine, they understand what you're trying to do. We need solvency and we need security. Because no nation can maintain its military security if it doesn't keep its fiscal house in order. So part of what I have to do is make certain we spend this money. Well, so then I go to my next lines of effort and it's only three. I'm a formerly a Marine infantry, um, and it's hard to keep track more than three things at once, okay? First of all, it's to build a more lethal force. If it does not contribute to the lethality of the military battlefield. Whether it be a personnel policy, a piece of equipment, or radio, doesn't matter what it is. If it doesn't contribute to that, then it's probably not fit for us. Now you look at lethality widely. Part of lethality it may concern, for example, I have access to good education for the sons and daughters of military members. So they feel like their family has got a way to move forward in life even as they're going off to fight the nation war. So it's not a narrow view of lethality, but it is still going to contribute to what we do as a military on the battlefield. Number one thing I can do for the military on a battlefield and bring him home alive and in one piece mentally, physically. Second line of effort is to build more and stronger alliances and partnerships. It's very simple in history, nations with allies thrive. Nations without allies do not survive. And our strongest suit right now is our allies. That is one of the major regions when the greatest generation came home from World War II that they built the world we inhabit today with say an after the depression, many grew up hungry or certainly skinny little runts when they went into the military after a war that cost, I don't know. 40, 50, 60 said, we don't even know within 10 million how many people died in that war. They said it to crummy world as George Shultz puts it. But we're in it, whether we like it or not, we're part of it. So they created nato, they created Bretton Wood, IMF, international Monetary Fund, the World Bank. They created the Marshall Plan. I can go on. You get the drip. Those things stood the test of time. We're going to have to adapt them to Today Show. We're going to also go out and build, strengthen our current relationship to those allies. But we're also going to expect them to carry their fair share as a grown richer. Recovering from the costly victories of World War Two that destroyed much of the much a Europe, for example. But we also want to create new allies. So first 1, first line of effort is we're going to make a more lethal. Four of them are going to have more allies and partners. Right now in Afghanistan, 41 nations, we were down to 39, would drop from 50 to 39 when you're pulling out. Under the last administration. We're now at 41. And the two nations that have joined us are both Muslim nations, by the way, that are fighting alongside Astaire. And after we reinforced our effort there in Afghanistan, we also add 12 more nations reinforce their effort, they're responding to our leadership. Third line of effort is going to be that we reform the business practices of the Pentagon. I've been told I have the 17th largest economy in the world. That is sobering. That is very sobering. When I realized all of you are sacrificing for us to have that. So what we're going to do is we're going to audit for the first time in 70 years, DOD is going to an audit. I hope we find a lot of problems that every time I find one, I'm going to slap the back to the auger and Teller. Well done. We're going to fix it and the money we save is going to go into lethality. We're going to turn it back in at way we're going to work. I'm not going to kill people for the problem unless I find that they they did it with intent. And then you again, I don't have stress I created okay. I'll just leave it at that. And then as we audit this, we're going to make certain we reform the business practices to ensure that we're getting the most bang for the buck, affordability and accountability. That what we're going, what's going to guide us on our budget, affordability and accountability. And now I know you're impatient. Ask you another question. No, no. I want on the on the reforming that the third distinct line of effort, as you call it in the national defense strategies, reforming the way you do business. So here's what occurs to me. A correct the premise. If I've got the premise wrong, we think in terms of a long-term competition with China. We can't count on having more troops or more sailors. There are bigger country. They already spent 35 percent as much as we do on defense figures I've seen suggest that by within 10 years it'll be 60 percent. They themselves say they want to have the strongest military in the world. In time for the 100th anniversary of the Chinese of the communist revolution in 2049. So we can't count on outspending them. My prep. What occurs to me? This is my little mind. I'm putting it up against your big mind. And you're a huge experience. Is that man. I'll stop there. That over the long-term are only sustainable advantage is going to be tied to our freedoms and our dynamism and our ability to innovate. And in the old days, when the military needed something, we had what Dwight Eisenhower called the military industrial complex. Contract relationships were tight. If the Air Force was planning out a decade and needed a certain kind of aircraft. There were the boat, the engineers from McDonald, Douglas, and Boeing and they're talking all that. And now you've got the innovation taking place in these little start-ups scattered around the country. But especially in Silicon Valley. How do you ensure that this gigantic organization that you run incorporates that ability to innovate. That's so is the premise correct? It if it's shiny, I know where you're going with fish and an inch exciting because you live in Silicon Valley. And I would just tell you laid gentleman, that not all the good ideas to come from inside the Department of Defense, you know, that way, but also not all the good ideas come only from America. I tell my ushers the country the most aircraft carriers didn't have all the good ideas. So when you look at other democracies around the world, and can we draw together from American industry, from Silicon Valley and the other areas, all the good ideas, that sort of thing. But also because of our allies, we don't have to carry the full burden ourselves. There's no need for that. And so we will continue to be a power of inspiration that draws the best out of our people. And I thinks it as so long as we can continue to get the eye watering quality of the troops that we have today. We'll be in good shape. Thanks for a minute. I know if we're out of time or I guess I got to let it go. Oh, no, no, no, no. I got I got two last questions for her. And they're pretty serious actually. And here's here's one of them. China, I feel this out. And Silicon Valley, this gets talked about a lot of a Silicon Valley. They're four times as big as we are very soon now, some single digit number of years, their GDP will be bigger than ours. They're ramping up their defense spending. And so the, what you hear a lot is look after the Second World War, we displaced the British and now the Chinese are about to displace us. It's the same pattern, little country because it had a temporary technological advantage. Britain was able to rule the seas. We came along bigger country, shove them to one side. And there's a real Fitbit people talk about that. And it bothers people at a level that they don't. It's not an agony, but it's in the back of people's minds. How do you address this kind of background feeling? That something is slipping away, that we're not really going to be able to hold our own this decade. It'll be fine. Next decade, decade after that trouble. How do you address that? If there's something slipping away, I think it's internal. It's not external. My do I say that I travel all around the world now and I meet with head to State, Minister of Defense and ministers of foreign affairs. We created in the world something after World War II that looked like our internal landscape. An open society, one with respect for human dignity. 1 with respect for law. The internal landscape of China is one of authoritarianism. It's one they are trying to promote outwardly. How many people are going to sign up for that new world. China really outnumber the world. I think not. So it's going to be whether or not we and the democracies can actually govern ourselves. Can we come together to work together and school districts and in countries to solve problems. Can the European Union address the Euro crisis? The crisis they've got? Can democracies do their job as government and, and fix problems? And if we can that model, that open model will survive and the free competition of ideas in the world. If instead the bonfire to the vanity, you decide to consume every buddy. And we all begin walling ourselves off from each other in our country or from other democracies. Then perhaps from authoritarian regime can, internal authoritarian regime can be exported in and put in a commanding position? Frankly, I bet on the open, open construct. I'd bet on what a members, the human mind and the spirit and allows people to work together. And so I think there's a way for us also to work with China as we go forward, I think the competition can be channeled correctly if we step that relationship correctly, if we go back to have in philosophical discussion about the strategic relationship, each of us watch for our shelf and for each other. So maybe that means I'm an optimist. That's probably going to ruin my Embry treat their last question. Last question. I think you'll remember this. You and I are chatting over a cup of coffee up in my upstairs office one afternoon at the Hoover Institution. And I had began receiving phone calls from various companies in Silicon Valley that wanted you on their board. And I said, Forgive me, you're now Mr. Secretary, but then you were Jim. I said Jim, you know, you still Joe. You've, you've, um, from the way you've, you've, you've lived your life on a soldier's income and you can do pretty well out here in Silicon Valley. And you replied, Peter, all it takes to make me happy is two pairs of jeans and a full tank of gas. And yet here you are not a driven man in that sense. Here you are in what is surely one of the small handful of the most demanding, exhausting, frustrating jobs on the planet. Jim, if I may, what keeps you add it? Why are you back here? In our lane gel and when you're brought up in the military and I won't say that as the most willing volunteer is 960 NIH came in. I'd actually 18 years old when I came in and met, but I felt I had to go and do my duty. That what you did in the days when we had conscript had the draft. But then I stuck around, I didn't stick around for the job. They actually grew to hate minefield for the passion by age 21 and, and ever since. But I loved being around sailors and marines to sum them would bite or lip all the way through what they would crawl forward. They were they looking for something with a coat hanger they didn't want to find and lead their buddies through. And so I just stuck around for the people. But what happened over those years was the MCOs, the young that was in the infantry, its name for infant soldier Young sort of get their name. Okay. Most of the buggers who are in assault units could not go in and buy a beer legally. Okay, the little buggers figure out how to do it. Okay. But my point is, over the year that grew exceedingly fond of the very shelf, plus young folks who sign a blank check to all of you payable with their lives. And so I stuck around long enough that I learned that when the President, United States, Republican or Democrat asked you to do something, you do it to the best of your ability. You don't get in the hot political rhetoric or anything else. You go in, roll up your sleeves and go to work. And I just say to you, young people in a room, we owe you the same. You know, you and I were born in this country but a complete accident who had no say in it. We chose to live in the country that our choice, we have a responsibility to the young people to turn over as good a shape as we inherited it when we got it. And that pie, the, the thing that keeps me on her institution and Uncommon Knowledge. I'm Peter Robinson. Ladies and gentlemen join me in thanking James Madison, the 26 Secretary of Defense of the United States.