Government The U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations Assignment

Deil Wright's Overlapping Model of Intergovernmental Relations: The Basis for Contemporary Intergovernmental Relationships Author(s): Robert Agranoff and Beryl A. Radin Source: Publius, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Winter 2015), pp. 139-159 Published by: Oxford University Press Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/24734653 Accessed: 20-07-2025 12:46 UTC

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Deil Wright's Overlapping Model of Intergovernmental Relations: The Basis for Contemporary Intergovernmental Relationships

Robert Agranoff* and Beryl A. Radin+

* Indiana University

f Georgetown University; bar58@georgetown.edu

Deil Wright provided three models of intergovernmental relations in Understanding

Intergovernmental Relations. The third model—the overlapping authority model—was essentially

a new way of depicting those relationships. It provided the conceptual basis for moving beyond

static views of the field. This article reviews the influence of the overlapping model on policy

development, program relationships, and administrative practice. It reaches beyond the three

institutional levels to include the proliferation of public and private players. It discusses the ways

that decision-making processes and theories have absorbed that model. It concludes with a

discussion of the current and future state of intergovernmental management.

In his first edition of Understanding Intergovernmental Relations published in 1978,

Deil Wright provided three models of intergovernmental relations (IGR). Two of the models were very familiar to students of the field. The coordinate authority

model depicted the clear separation between national and state/local relationships

and the distinct boundaries separating the levels of government. The inclusive authority model, by contrast, presented a system in which IGRs were based on essentially a hierarchical set of relationships and emphasized the predominant role

of the national level (figure 1).

But it is the overlapping authority model—the third model that Wright presented in that book and its succeeding two editions—that was essentially a new

way of depicting intergovernmental relationships. The Venn diagram that Wright

used to describe intergovernmental relationships in this model presented IGR as a

set of overlaps among national, state, and local units simultaneously. It also

Publius: The Journal of Federalism volume 45 number 1, pp. 139-159

doi:10.1093/publius/pju036

Advance Access publication September 9,2014

©The Author 2014. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of CSF Associates: Publius, Inc.

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©The Author 2014.

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140

Designation: Realtionship: Authority Pattern:

Coordinate Authority Independent Autonomy

R. Agranoff and B. A. Radin

Overlapping Authority Interdependent Bargaining

Inclusive Authority Dependent Hierarchy

State \

\Governmenr

/ National Government

National, State, and l Local ,

Local Government.

Designation: Coordinate Authority Realtionship: Independent Authority Pattern: Autonomy

Overlapping Authority Interdependent Bargaining

Inclusive Authority Dependent Hierarchy

Figure 1 Models of national, state, and local relationships

Source-, Wright 1988: 40.

presented the relationships as ones in which autonomy and discretion in a single

jurisdiction are constrained and, hence, the power and influence available to any one level is significantly limited (Wright 1988, 49). Wright emphasized the role of

bargaining between actors in that model (Burke 2014).

As one looks back on this model, it seems to lay the foundation for the developments of IGR since the third edition of that book was published in 1988. It

provides the conceptual basis for moving beyond static views of IGR and federalism

that pose the field as an either/or situation. It moves us to think about differences

in relationships by program area, differences between states, and differences between state and local relationships. In fact, it seems much more consistent with

the dynamism and complexity of the U.S. system of shared powers than either of the other two views. 1

This article discusses a number of issues within the U.S. system that flow from

the overlapping authority model. It examines the historical and developmental antecedents of the model and the way it fits into issues considered by several past

scholars of the intergovernmental field. It reviews Wright's influence on policy development, program relationships, and administrative practices. The discussion

moves to examine the model's relevance in the contemporary environment of IGRs

characterized by a proliferation of actors and a movement beyond the traditional

three institutional levels. It then examines the impact of the model on current

decision-making processes and theories, particularly its impact on networks and efforts at performance assessment. These have led to contemporary changes in

governmental organizations. Finally it concludes with suggestions for future research that extend Wright's basic model and applies it to specific policy areas.

Examples of policies are provided throughout the article, illustrating evidence of

the potential and current benefits of applying the overlapping authority model. It

concludes with a discussion of the current state of intergovernmental management

and possible directions for the future.

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Deil Wright's Overlapping Model 141

Historical and Developmental Antecedents

Wright made clear in his explication of the overlapping model of IGR that this protracted complex process moves beyond classic views of federalism. "IGR includes a range of activities and meanings that are neither explicit nor implicit in

federalism" (Wright 1988, 37). Such actions involve complex multiunit interactions

beyond nation-state relationships which are nonhierarchical in nature and form a

core concern for policy development. In this respect, while not always recognized as

such, they are important.

First thought to be identified by William Anderson in the 1930s, the topic was

crystallized in Anderson's 1960 book, Intergovernmental Relations in Review (1960, 3). Around the same time, Morton Grodzins (1960, 265) introduced his well

known "marble cake" federalism imagery, describing the inseparable mingling of

functions throughout the system. This perspective was documented around the same time in the historical patterns examined by Daniel Elazar (1962). Elazar concluded that "In a sense, a substantial share of the history of American government has been a search for methods to provide for the necessary collaboration of the various units of the federal system while at the same time

preserving and strengthening those units as separate bases for such collaboration."

(1962, 305). He called this cooperative federalism, designed to both maintain the

federal balance while providing needed governmental services.

The most notable contemporary historian's support for the overlapping authority model was a study of the early role of the federal government in Brian

Balogh's A Government Out of Sight: The Mystery of National Authority in Nineteenth-Century America (2009). He demonstrated that the United States governed differently but less visibly than other developing bureaucratic states,

noting that the United States had a national government that was capable of mobilizing comparable resources in the private and voluntary sectors. This often

yielded more impressive results than the use of unilateral state power.

The founding fathers' suspicions about traditional, active, and powerful centralized national government continued in subsequent decades through federal

efforts to avoid direct taxation, regulate individual behavior, or erect far-reaching

hierarchical organizations to administer national programs. Meanwhile, the federal

government was purchasing and distributing land, supporting infrastructure provision, and otherwise subventing funds to state and local governments. For

Balogh, the federal government role was defined as that of an "enabling state."

The evolution of this national system (or what Samuel Beer (1993) identified as

"national theory") unfolded in the practice of four waves of IGR emphasis. Each

contributes to understanding the overlapping model. Each existed from the beginning but at different periods their predominance and focus highlighted the

underlying complexity and growth of the system (Agranoff 2012).

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142 R. Agranoff and B. A. Radin

The first period of emphasis, law and politics, emerged with the building of the

integral nation-state, primarily in the nineteenth century, when legal distinctions of

government were initially defined. The most prominent feature was perhaps the

dual federalism doctrine that held that the national government and the states each

were sovereign in their respective spheres and that between them existed areas of

activity into which neither could enter.

From the early twentieth century to roughly the 1960s, welfare state development

and expansion ushered in the second phase. It marked a time of a growing and more professional national government that also included a growing interdepen dency that linked subnational and state/federal governments (Skowronek 1982). In

particular, the welfare state in the United States was very much a top-down effort

(similar to developments across the globe) that enhanced the fiscal and program

strength of national governments (Loughlin 2007, 389; Watts 1999). In the United

States, however, implementation was left to subnational governments with varying

requirements on their action.

Governments in the United States then began to recognize the growing involvement of organized actors outside the government in public programming.

These nongovernment organizations (NGOs) gradually became recognized as the third phase: agents and partners of governments. Through some grants but predominantly through contracts, government linked with nonprofit service agencies and for-profit vendors of services (Smith and Lipsky 1993, 5). As a result, both the direct service and support sectors led to new sets of alliances between governments at all levels and a host of public and private entities including service

delivery nonprofits and private businesses, law firms, finance management firms,

banks, and insurance companies as "the public administration problem has spread

well beyond the borders of the government agency" (Salamon 1995, 2). A fourth, and currently developing, IGR network phase of emphasis emerged out

of the welfare state and NGO partnership expansions and became fully acknowledged in the first decade of the twenty-first century. Public agencies and

NGOs network to exchange information, enhance one another's capabilities, smooth services interactions, and solve policy/program problems (Agranoff 2007).

In some ways, intergovernmental networking began as a parallel activity to that of

contracting when funders and their agents began to build on preexisting contractor-government networks (Brown, Potoski, and Van Slyke 2008). Also, networks comprising local governments, business associations, and economic development agents have worked among themselves at the community level for four or five decades, and these entities have had extensive links with higher level

governments to secure support to promote local economies (Agranoff and McGuire 2003; McGuire 2002).

Today's networking involves officials from the federal government, state governments, local governments, public and private universities, and NGOs

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Deil Wright's Overlapping Model 143

representing the nonprofit sectors sitting down with one another at the same table

to discuss, explore, negotiate, and solve issues interactively (Agranoff 2014; Radin

et al. 1996). The network approach is clearly multilateral and collaborative, and attacks issues that transcend bilateral intergovernmental concerns. At this point it is

a matter of "contingent collaboration" that Wright's overlapping authority model

extended beyond governments to include NGOs and other third parties in IGR (Wright 2003).

Wright's Influence on Program Relationships and Administrative Practices

Wright's depiction of the overlapping model can be understood within the backdrop of these historical developments. His original description of the overlapping authority model focused on six "chief characteristics" (Wright 2003,

57). These are:

• Limited and dispersed power • Modest and uncertain areas of autonomy • High degree of potential or actual interdependence • Simultaneous competition and cooperation • Bargaining-exchange relationships

• Negotiation as a strategy for reaching agreement

The examples he provided tended to highlight specific relationships between the

three levels of government in individual states or examined the behaviors in specific

program areas, particularly as they reflected fiscal behaviors in programs which

required matching state dollars to federal funds.

In the years that have elapsed, however, programs and policies that reflect the

overlapping model illustrate a number of additional characteristics. They have created patterns that indicate real differences among and between states. These include different roles of specialized agencies in states and localities in dealing with

the federal government, particularly differences between specialized agencies and

general purpose government. They illustrate differences in the structures of

government including diverse relationships between state legislatures and governors

as well as significant differences in the authorities provided to counties and local

governments by state constitutional systems. Perhaps most strikingly, they illustrate

differences in specific program areas, reflecting both the policy design of the effort

as well as the political imperatives of the initiative. These differences often make it

difficult to separate the operations of a specific program from other efforts at all

three levels of government. And these programs have devised new sets of partners

that move beyond public sector players to the private and nonprofit sectors.

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144 R. Agranoff and B. A. Radin

The diversity of responses that illustrate the overlapping authority model can be

seen in a number of contemporary policy and program areas. The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP)—formerly known as Food Stamps—provides

federal money through state-operated programs. Although this program appears to

be fairly straightforward, states have varied in their efforts to increase program

access and participation. They have made a variety of changes in policy, procedures, and organization. According to a study by the Urban Institute and issued by the Food and Nutrition Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture:

Most states view SNAP modernization as a fluid process over a broad range of activities that are not easily pinpointed, classified, or even separated from

the modernization of other mainstream benefit programs... It is clear that at

both the state and local level, the majority of offices are approaching modernization activities from a broad perspective—not limited to SNAP operations—and with widely different levels of administrative flexibility and views of what constitutes modernization (USDA, ii).

Another program that illustrates overlapping authority relationships is the National Network of Fusion Centers (Regan and Monahan 2014). The effort is run

by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Created between 2003 and 2006, these centers are designed to promote information sharing at the federal level

between a number of federal agencies and state- and local-level agencies. As of July

2009, the DHS recognized at least seventy-two fusion centers, each of which is designed to respond to unique security issues in the specific area. According to DHS, the centers are:

Located in states and major urban areas throughout the country, fusion centers are uniquely situated to empower front-line law enforcement, public

safety, fire service, emergency response, public health, critical infrastructure

protection, and private sector security personnel to understand local implications of national intelligence, thus enabling local officials to better

protect their communities. Fusion centers provide interdisciplinary expertise

and situational awareness to inform decision-making at all levels of government. They conduct analysis and facilitate information sharing while

assisting law enforcement and homeland security partners in preventing,

protecting against, and responding to crime and terrorism. Fusion centers are

owned and operated by state and local entities with support from federal partners in the form of deployed personnel, training, technical assistance,

exercise support, security clearances, and connectivity to federal systems,

technology, and grant funding (DHS).

The Help America Vote Act (HAVA) was passed by Congress in 2002 and instituted sweeping new federal standards with new funding that regulated some

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Deil Wright's Overlapping Model 145

features of state and local election processes. This legislation followed the 2000 Florida election crisis and attempted to establish a federal role in this policy area.

Despite this, states retain substantial discretion in interpreting and applying federal requirements.

As a result of HAVA, the states gained significant new roles in the election process and some local governments viewed the requirements as an increase in the

state role, superseding traditional discretion for this function by local governments

(Liebschutz and Palazzolo 2005). State and local government positions in controlling the election administration process provided them with significant leverage in making changes and in bargaining with federal officials over the shape of the mandate (Radin and Posner 2010).

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), signed by the White House in 2010, was viewed as federal health reform and was intended to

expand access to insurance, increase consumer protections, emphasize prevention and wellness, improve quality and system performance, and curb rising health-care costs (Joondeph 2009). According to the National Conference of State Legislatures, the legislation that was enacted provided states

with "numerous roles" and "various responsibilities" under the ACA, "ranging from implementing new health insurance requirements to expanding their Medicaid programs by January 1, 2014. In some cases, states may implement provisions—or defer to the federal government to do so—such as establishing a temporary high-risk pool or creating and administering health benefit exchanges... Many provisions of the ACA were first implemented by states in their efforts to expand access to care and improve overall health system performance" (NCSL 2011).

These four examples indicate the great variety of both designs and response by

state and local agencies to federal policies and illustrate the backdrop to the Wright

perspective. Although state and local governments are responding to what seems to

be a clear federal policy, the diversity of situations across the nation makes it very difficult to establish a consistent response that would make sense in the face of that

diversity.

Applying the Wright model framework to two other examples illustrates the

ability of that perspective to provide insight into the complexity that faces policy makers. Figure 2 examines the attributes found in the Medicaid Home and Community Based Services Waiver in the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (Thompson and Burke 2009; Thompson 2012; Weissert and Weissert

2008) and the Race to the Top Program in the U.S. Department of Education (Manna and Ryan 2011). Asking the questions that emerge from Wright's six characteristics of the overlapping authority model provides both decision makers

and analysts a clear picture of the obstacles found in the contemporary world of intergovernmental management.

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146 R. Agranoff and B. A. Radin

WRIGHT'S SIX

CHARACTERISTICS

MEDICAID HOME AND

COMMUNITY BASED

SERVICES WAIVER (HHS)

RACE TO THE TOP

(US Department of Education)

Limited and dispersed power Involves federal government, states,

NGO providers, other agencies dealing with the aged, blind, and disabled.

States have authority to define type of

services, the target population, and

eligibility requirements.

Aimed at limiting nursing home growth.

States apply for the waiver.

Involves federal government, states,

(both general purpose governments and

educations ector), local government. States vie for large grants. States vary in terms of level of state control over locals

and past experience with educational reform. Aimed at improving

educational performance of childern.

Modest and uncertain areas of

autonomy Local agencies deal with the advocacy community. Performance requirements

defined by specific agencies. Quality assurance systems developed by states. Not clear which program system is superior.

Decentralized nature of educational

system makes it difficult to deal with issues at the state level. Performance

measurement requirements relied on

through standardized tests. Federal role

continually challenged.

High degree of potential or actual

interdependence Many programs intertwined that serve the same client. Federal requirements

recognize strong interdependence between this program and many others.

Little agreement on what leads to

improved educational achievement. Role of teachers disputed. Role of community and parents also in dispute.

Simultaneous competition and

cooperation

Battles over the years between states,

HHS, and the Congress. States are expected to interact with state level

interest groups, families and NGO

providers.

Appropriate role of states, federal

government, Congress in dispute. Criteria for selection involved teachers

and leaders, state's activity, standards

and assessments, innovative activity,

focus on lowest achieving schools.

Bargaining-exchange relationships Parties expected to enter into bargaining

and exchange relationships among actors to build networks. States vary in

terms of leadership roles, expectations

about types of facilities providing

service. Diverse bargains struct at planning, operations, and assessment levels.

Lack of agreement on venue most

appropriate for change. Lack of agreement on level of targeting of children most in need of assistance.

Resistance to nationally defined standards.

Negotiation as a strategy for reaching

agreement

Agreements on policy, rules and services made through negotiations.

Negotiations are extensive and sometimes exhaustive. Agreements affect NGOs delivering services.

Negotiated settings not agreed on. Little indication of agreement emerging from the actors.

WRIGHT'S SIX

CHARACTERISTICS

MEDICAID HOME AND

COMMUNITY BASED

SERVICES WAIVER (HHS)

RACE TO THE TOP

(US Department of Education)

Limited and dispersed power Involves federal government, states,

NGO providers, other agencies dealing with the aged, blind, and disabled.

States have authority to define type of

services, the target population, and

eligibility requirements.

Aimed at limiting nursing home growth.

States apply for the waiver.

Involves federal government, states,

(both general purpose governments and

educations ector), local government. States vie for large grants. States vary in terms of level of state control over locals

and past experience with educational reform. Aimed at improving

educational performance of childern.

Modest and uncertain areas of

autonomy Local agencies deal with the advocacy community. Performance requirements

defined by specific agencies. Quality assurance systems developed by states. Not clear which program system is superior.

Decentralized nature of educational

system makes it difficult to deal with issues at the state level. Performance

measurement requirements relied on

through standardized tests. Federal role

continually challenged.

High degree of potential or actual

interdependence Many programs intertwined that serve the same client. Federal requirements

recognize strong interdependence between this program and many others.

Little agreement on what leads to

improved educational achievement. Role of teachers disputed. Role of community and parents also in dispute.

Simultaneous competition and

cooperation

Battles over the years between states,

HHS, and the Congress. States are expected to interact with state level

interest groups, families and NGO

providers.

Appropriate role of states, federal

government, Congress in dispute. Criteria for selection involved teachers

and leaders, state's activity, standards

and assessments, innovative activity,

focus on lowest achieving schools.

Bargaining-exchange relationships Parties expected to enter into bargaining

and exchange relationships among actors to build networks. States vary in

terms of leadership roles, expectations

about types of facilities providing

service. Diverse bargains struct at planning, operations, and assessment levels.

Lack of agreement on venue most

appropriate for change. Lack of agreement on level of targeting of children most in need of assistance.

Resistance to nationally defined standards.

Negotiation as a strategy for reaching

agreement

Agreements on policy, rules and services made through negotiations.

Negotiations are extensive and sometimes exhaustive. Agreements affect NGOs delivering services.

Negotiated settings not agreed on. Little indication of agreement emerging from the actors.

Figure 2 Two Programs and Wright's Characteristics.

Expansion of Actors in an Externalized World

A myriad of actors are now involved and even go beyond governmental units and the NGOs themselves. An IGR score card would have to include more than federal

agencies and the fifty-six states and territories, over eighty thousand units of

government and over five hundred thousand elected officials. Clearly, broadening

and externalizing programs have expanded the number and types of individuals and organizations who are involved in the IGR game. Their identities emerge everywhere and they are present in local, state, and national coalitions. Through

contracting out, NGO partnerships and the quest for networking brings in considerably more actors to the game, many who are not governmental actors but

are deeply involved in the work of government. Their role is built into the design

of programs (especially block grants) and is evidence of their important position.

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Deil Wright's Overlapping Model 147

It is clear that this proliferation of actors has been "engendered" by federal

action that began in the 1960s expansion of urban and social welfare programs. For

example, Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs) under the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) of 1991 and its successor, Transportation Enhancement Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21), are charged with developing long-range (twenty-year) transportation plans, short-range (four

year) transportation improvement programs, annual work programs, and public

participation plans.

An MPO—which comprises local elected officials (policy committees), local planning and engineering staff (technical support committees), and advisory bodies—must develop these plans in cooperation with its state transportation department, local mass transit and airport operators, land use entities, and the state

environmental agency. Its planning and funding processes also require constant

interaction with two entities within the U.S. Department of Transportation, the

Federal Highway Administration, and the Federal Transit Authority (GAO 2009, 5

7). As a result, the MPO process involves multiple levels and layers of officials, both

public and NGO, as actors in the process.

This set of relationships moves beyond the earliest set of coalition groups devised in IGR: the so-called PIGs, or public interest groups. This began with the

National Governors' Association (NGA), the Council of State Governments, the

National Conference of State Legislatures, the U.S. Conference of Mayors, the International City and County Managers Association (ICMA), and the National

Association of Counties (NACO). All but ICMA are directly involved in lobbying

and all but NGA have state-level affiliate organizations. Also, other state-elected officials, such as attorneys general and auditors have their own associations, some of which are associated with the Council of State Governments. There are even

more organizations of program heads. Finally, many of these programs at the federal level are related to advocacy associations.

In intellectual and developmental disabilities (I/DDs), for example, there is the

American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities, the national Arc (formerly Association for Retarded Citizens), and the National Association of

Rehabilitation Facilities (the latter two with state-organized affiliates also). More

actors in the overlapping I/DD system have yet to be identified. Some operate

independently as "associations," whereas others are in more emergent and informal

relationships. These include federal-state I/DD planning councils, federally funded

state protection and advocacy commissions, state government legislative study commissions, state licensing boards and third-party accreditation commissions, and

federally funded state university research institutes. Also important for the evolution of I/DD programs is the consumer movement, organized in each state as

client and client self-advocacy groups, the most prominent of which involve the

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148 R. Agranoff and B. A. Radin

national and state Arcs. As this example illustrates, intergovernmental now means

much more than the standard government bodies.

Impact on Decision-Making Processes and Theories

Wright acknowledged that the overlapping authority model required a bargaining

decision-making process—a decision-making process that was different from either a

hierarchical or market approach. Yet, both the legal and formal requirements attached

to federal program implementation have tended to revert to those two traditional

modes. Rules and regulations are established that rarely create an appropriate method

of devising venues and processes for bargaining relationships. This is particularly

problematic since there has been an increase in the number of actors involved in the

policy and program implementation process. As such, it is more common for federal officials to revert to an inclusive

authority model where federal authority is predominant and for state officials to

fall back on the coordinate authority model where state and federal players operate

quite separately. This creates a confused situation where mixed messages are transmitted throughout the intergovernmental system and all three levels of government as well as other players—particularly third-party players—have confused expectations about their colleagues in the process.

A number of attempts have been made to establish decision-making processes that

are more appropriate for overlapping authority situations. These include performance

partnerships where players are viewed as co-equal players in the process and not

conceptualized as a relationship between a principal and agents. They also include incentive schemes where attempts are made to induce behavior rather than command

it. In still other cases, attempts have been made to establish venues for the negotiation

of performance measures or to find a way to establish standards for the use of the

federal money. Attempts have also been made to establish waivers of formal requirements because the situation in a location seems to warrant a different approach.

Waiver authority is often limited to specific aspects of program requirements and is

established formally in law or regulation. Somewhat different approaches have been

developed in attempts to employ research and capacity-building instruments that

provide a somewhat more indirect way of influencing policy implementation (Radin

2012b, 742-743). In all of these cases, the more complex the set of actors (moving

beyond the three jurisdictions), the more difficult it is to find ways to deal with the

different perspectives of the players (Radin 2006, Chapter 7; Radin 2012a).

The Impact on Networks

Network is now a widely used term in many contexts, ranging from informal networks of associates to formal structures. However, more precision is needed to

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Deil Wright's Overlapping Model 149

understand the contemporary dimensions of the overlapping model of IGR. O'Toole (1997, 45) provides a useful starting point: "Networks are structures of interdependence involving multiple organizations or parts thereof, where one unit

is not merely the formal subordinate of others in some hierarchical arrangement."

The proliferation of these governing networks in many respects reflects not only the

expansion of intergovernmental programs to reach deeply across jurisdictions but

also to capture important activities of the previously identified multiple actors.

Some of these networks are explicitly intergovernmental in the sense that they

primarily involve governmental bodies; they are established under federal-state legislation or programs that carry federal funding incentives, whereas others emerge

as a result of the complexities of problems and of programs. One such example of

the former was the Federal-State Rural Development Council movement; it emerged as a result of federal multiagency funding encouragement, led by the U.S.

Department of Agriculture and involving a host of state agencies, tribal governments, NGOs, regional development agencies, and the private sector (Radin et al. 1996). Another federally established set of networks includes local

One-Stop Career Centers, part of a system established under the 2000 Workforce

Investment Act to coordinate and work to integrate existing federal employment

and training programs. Others emerge as a result of federal-state-local-NGO overlap and complexity. For example, the Ohio Small Communities Environmental

Infrastructure Group (SCEIG) is devoted to helping small towns acquire technical

assistance and federal and state financing (Agranoff 2007, 67-72).

Within the overlapping IGR model, these networks can either be chartered or

nonchartered. Chartered networks are formally established as organized entities,

often by intergovernmental agreement registration as a 501c(3) nonprofit organization, by act or resolution of a state legislature, a governor's executive order, and/or through corporate registration with state government, such as the

secretary of state. Nonchartered networks have no such formal legal status, but their continuing presence and operations, regular meetings, concrete problem solving actions, websites, newsletters, and the like are testimony to their existence.

While nonhierarchical, both types of networks share some characteristics: permanent status, regular formal meetings, a definable communication system, leaders and participants, taskforces or work groups, an identifiable governance

structure, identifiable partners, and some form of division of labor/task allocation.

Not all such IGR networks perform the same functions. Indeed, many do not make the heady program decisions that are sometimes ascribed to them. One study

of some fourteen different chartered and nonchartered intergovernmental networks

revealed four prevailing patterns (Agranoff 2007). Some were limited to voluntary

decisions to exchange agency policies and program information, technologies, and

potential solutions. Others combined exchange with educational and service capacity. Still others expanded exchange to include new programming avenues.

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150 R. Agranoff and B. A. Radin

And finally, the last type moved to develop negotiated collaborative courses of action and/or delivered services.

While networks in IGR have become essential components of the unfolding of

the increasingly complicated overlapping model they must be understood as having

notable limitations. McGuire and AgranofF (2010, 2011) conclude that whereas networks can and do find reasonable solution approaches, they often run into operational, performance, or legal barriers that make action difficult or even impossible. As a result, networks face challenges in converting solutions into policy

energy, assessing internal effectiveness, surmounting inevitable process barriers, mission drift, and more (O'Toole 1997, 45).

Finally, networks are clearly not the only collaborative game in town. Other mechanisms (such as limited agreements between players) arise because of the weak

scope of network authority, the existence of power asymmetries, and the reality of

who actually makes the decisions (Agranoff 2012, 14, McGuire and Agranoff, 2014).

IGR networks are nevertheless governing mechanisms that add to the public

undertaking and help to sort out the "seeming mess" of overlapping authority. One

list of network contributions to governance in a complicated world includes: problem identification and information exchange, identification of extant technologies, enhancement/development of emerging technologies, improving knowledge infrastructures, mutual capacity building, reciprocal strategies and

programming, and joint policymaking/programming (Agranoff 2007, 222-229). They appear to work best when multiple agencies, programs, stakeholders represented by administrators, specialists, and citizens work together to find workable courses of action between policies and programs that call for multiparty collaboration.

The Overlapping Model arid Performance Assessment

For more than twenty years, the U.S. federal government has relied on various

forms of performance assessment processes to devise accountability mechanisms

that balance two competing imperatives. They attempt to hold third parties accountable for the use of federal dollars and at the same time they deal with

structures of programs that provide discretion for third parties in the way they use those federal monies.

Ironically, when the original performance measurement efforts were put in place

they were welcomed by state and local governments because the new requirements

focused on achievement of program outcomes rather than the federal government

specifying requirements dealing with program inputs or measuring program outputs. States in particular believed that focusing on outcomes would provide them with the ability to define different pathways to achieving the program goals.

But the experience during those 20 years has actually minimized the ability of state

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Deil Wright's Overlapping Model 151

and local (and other third-party actors involved in program implementation) to play a role in the determination of program goals, specify program measures, and

determine the appropriate information source to assess the program implemen tation. Indeed, two of the major efforts during that period—the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) enacted in 1993 and the Program Assessment

Rating Tool (PART) put in place by President George W. Bush in 2001—both emphasized the primacy of the federal role in the performance measurement process.2 In fact, one could argue that both of these efforts actually ignored two of

Wright's models (the coordinate authority and the overlapping authority models)

and actually moved to the inclusive authority that emphasized the predominant

role of the national government. As a result, it not only clashed with advocates of

state and local primacy but also ignored the increasingly important role of other

third-party actors in the implementation process (Posner 2002, 523-551; Saint Onge and Armstrong 2004). Third-party perspectives can create significant problems in determining the outcomes that are expected (Radin 2008, Chapter 11).

This problem is illustrated by the way that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) dealt with block grant programs in its enforcement of the PART program. Block grants are explicitly designed to deal with legitimate differences

between states and localities and thus provide various levels of discretion in implementation to the nonfederal levels of government as well as other actors in

the system. Yet in a number of block grant programs OMB explicitly defined the

goals, specified program measures, and determined what kind of data would be used to assess performance.

The most public example of the limits of this strong federal role came in the

assessment of the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG). Congress explicitly acknowledged in the program law that there are many ways to achieve

community development goals, including programs involving infrastructure, housing, public services, property acquisition, employment, and economic development. But OMB decided that the only appropriate goal to use to measure performance was economic development and thus gave the program a low rating

(Housing Finance 2007). The resistance to the OMB rating moved across political lines and the rating was relatively quickly modified.

Changes in Governmental Organizations

It is not surprising that the overlapping model of IGR has changed the role of administering government agencies. Government agencies have both retained some

of their main line functions and also have felt the need to operate outside of their

bureaucratic structures in classic boundary spanning fashion (Thompson 1967). The overlapping model has required federal, state, and local bureaucratic agencies enmeshed in intergovernmental programming to retain their forms and

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152 R. Agranoff and B. A. Radin

functions but nevertheless are challenged to operate in what can be called relational modes. That involves engaging with a host of external players as they are

engaged in collaborative/network activity. While some view this as a problem (Rhodes 1997, 15) or term it being "hollowed out" (Milward, Provan, and Else 1993), it has resulted in a situation where agencies cast more of their operational

features externally while maintaining important largely internal functions. IGR interdependence clearly demands more "outside" work with other govern ments and with the NGO sector but not at the expense of all of the tasks of government as the various means of collaborative management arise and proliferate

(Agranoff 2012).

Several distinct public agency dimensions have emerged from these changes. First, bureaucratic agents must engage in interorganizational conductivity, that is

direct or joint work with other governments. Saint-Onge and Armstrong (2004) identify these boundary spanning activities as the "conductive" aspects of organization and management, which is the need to "manage complex partnerships" (26). Conductivity clearly raises the external organizing quotient on an inside-outside basis. The second dimension involves governmental and nongovernmental actors in networking activity. Involvement in intergovernmental

networks has not only moved bureaucrats out of their offices to cross boundaries

but have brought on higher, more engaged levels of conductivity. Virtually all of

the identified networks bring government officials at all levels of general and special

purpose governments to the same table to engage in the kinds of previously identified networking activities (Jenkins 2006). Moreover, in this role as network

participants government officials have proved to be more than one among many at

the table and to do more than convene and facilitate. Instead, they have often played leadershiproles in these activities (Wondolleck and Jaffee 2000). This network role was identified by Hartley (2005, 30) as requiring governments "to steer action within complex social systems rather than to control solely through

hierarchy or market mechanisms."

Third, collaborative management and network involvement does not limit government agency roles to these two functions. Agencies clearly remain directly

involved in core administrative processes. These functions play out in a variety of

structures at all levels of government, leading to the highly variegated patterns

across the U.S. Bureaucracy lives but it has evolved to deal with the overlapping model.

The tendency to emphasize external relationships has brought on a host of new

challenges to public management via bureaucracy as it is "decentered" (Bevir and Rhodes 2007; Moore and Hartley 2010), leading to the need for "new organizational capacities" (Kilduff and Tsai 2003, 93). A public administration literature on these newer and interactive approaches is emerging. However, it is not

yet clear whether the traditional practices have the ability to move from behaviors

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Deil Wright's Overlapping Model 153

that are embedded in Wright's other two models. Networks are not organizations;

they are distinct organized structures that emerge out of the interactions of organizations as government structures evolve and network actors work on issues

(Fernandez and Rainey 2006). As in the case of other aspects of management reform, scholars and practitioners must not avoid respect for the importance of

structure (Radin 2012a, 41), as existing organizations manage outwardly and new

structures emerge in multiple relational respects (Goss 2001).

Conclusions

The evolving nature of IGR in the quarter-century since Wright's third edition was

published has done little to disparage the power of the overlapping model. Indeed,

it is even more appropriate as a place to begin to look for developments. Near the

end of the 1988 volume Wright commented that part of system change was the

"spread of privatization in a variety of forms and types" (456). Yet Deil Wright himself did not explicitly apply the model to specific situations despite his very

productive research contribution.

Today multiple governments, NGOs, associations, and clients work within complex adaptive systems looking for knowledge and solutions designed to solve

problems that go beyond one organization, framing and reciprocally forging courses of action in a world of interdependent laws/regulations, governments, and NGOs.

The complexities of the current era have clearly compounded the overlapping

model. Expanded federal-state-local-NGO programming has moved the field beyond the quotient of actors, broadened the venues of decision-making, brought

on more networks and collaborating activity, and increased performance concerns

with third-party involvement. In short, these developments have changed government organizations.

Contemporary issues are very likely to experience widely dispersed power relationships.These can range from the federal government to the states, to local

governments, NGOs, subcontractors, and on to the service clients or their advocates. Autonomy remains limited but it is ever harder to define with so many

actors and interests. Interdependence is more readily recognized but increasingly

problematic in practical terms. While cooperation is now in widespread demand,

the competitive nature of NGO organizations (along with government agencies) as

a force is increasingly encountered. Bargaining and exchange relationships remain

but are now understood to extend beyond concerns of program responsibility to

include information, knowledge, resources, and a host of legal issues. And negotiation remains a primary interactive tool, but it often follows other IGR processes, ranging from two-party regulatory and fiscal parameters to the endpoints

of multiparty network processes.

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154 R. Agranoff and B. A. Radin

Despite some contemporary research that deals with many of the issues that emerge from the overlapping authority model, there have been few efforts to

apply the model explicitly and to develop research that may lead to prescriptions for

change as well as modification of existing strategies. Possibilities for such research

are numerous and involve questions that have either been overlooked or for which

the surface has been barely scratched. There have been few if any efforts to apply

the model to specific policy areas, tracing the decision process in areas of concern

to decision makers. Among the questions that could be considered by those interested in future research are the following:

• What are the ways that decision makers have dealt with the world of overlapping

authorities? What are the patterns of use? Are there specific policy areas that

have given more attention to these issues? How have executives adapted program

design to the realities of multiparty involvement? Can a typology be devised of

such responses? What are the instruments that have emerged related to overlapping authority realities?

• What seem to be the obstacles to confronting these realities? How have decision makers dealt with the political shifts that often surround these issues?

• What appears to be the result of new processes? Does the time spent in these efforts result in more agreement between players?

• Do multiparty networks or other collaborative structures result in appreciation

by players for the perspectives of others? Do they become instruments for managing conflict between participants? Do these efforts contribute to the understanding of the complexity of overlapping authority by political figures as

well as the citizenry?

• Is it possible to construct performance measurement requirements that balance requirements for accountability with opportunities for third-party discretion?

As the Wright analysis (49) suggests, neither governmental hierarchy nor exclusive authority prevails today. It is an ever expanding overlapping authority

model that is the useful point of departure.

Notes

1 It is interesting that the constitution developed by the State of India upon independence

presents that federal system as one which involves three types of relationships: one that

is clearly within the authority of the national government, one that provides the

authority to the states, and one that involves what is called concurrent powers (similar

to Wright's overlapping model).

2 It is not clear whether any changes have occurred as a result of the passage of the GPRA Modernization Act in 2010.

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Deil Wright's Overlapping Model 155

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