What are four important tactical tasks for a negotiator in a distributive situation to consider?

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Are integrative or distributive outcomes more satisfactory? The effects of interest- based versus value-based issues on negotiator satisfaction

PETER LUCAS STÖCKLI1* AND CARMEN TANNER2 1 Department of Military Psychology and Military Pedagogy, Military Academy at ETH Zurich, Birmensdorf,

Switzerland; 2 Department of Banking and Finance, University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland

Abstract

Negotiation research usually distinguishes between integrative and distributive outcomes. Integrative outcomes satisfy the nego- tiation parties’ most important interests (by trading off less important for more important issues). In contrast, distributive out- comes require negotiators to give up their most important interests (as they make concessions on both less and more important issues). Integrative outcomes are more beneficial, but do they offer greater satisfaction? In this research, we hypothesized that satisfaction with integrative versus distributive outcomes depends on whether people negotiate interest-based or value-based issues. Three experiments consistently revealed that people in interest-based negotiations were more satisfied with integrative outcomes, whereas those in value-based negotiations tended to be more satisfied with distributive outcomes. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

The negotiation literature usually recommends aiming for integrative rather than distributive outcomes (e.g., Brett, 2007; Fisher & Ury, 1991; Lewicki, Saunders, & Minton, 1997; Thompson, 2008). Distributive outcomes are agreements in which ne- gotiators make concessions on all negotiation issues. Such 50/50 or “split down the middle” outcomes (Neale & Fragale, 2006, p. 37) are suboptimal because they require both negotiators to concede on their most important issues (Thompson, 2006). In contrast, integrative or win-win out- comes are agreements in which negotiators obtain mutually better outcomes by making concessions on issues less impor- tant to them, while gaining something that is more important (i.e., logrolling; Froman & Cohen, 1970). Integrative out- comes are more beneficial than distributive outcomes, but are benefits equivalent to negotiator satisfaction?

Intuitively, one would think that negotiators who gain more should also be more satisfied (Gillespie, Brett, & Weingart, 2000). However, objectively better outcomes are not necessarily more satisfactory (e.g., Medvec & Savitsky, 1997). Negotia- tion research has shown that negotiator satisfaction depends on more than the actual outcome, such as on how favorable the negotiator’s outcome is as compared with the other party’s outcome (i.e., social comparison, e.g., Gillespie et al., 2000; Loewenstein, Thompson, & Bazerman, 1989; Novemsky & Schweitzer, 2004) or whether the negotiator’s outcome meets his or her expectations (e.g., Oliver, Balakrishnan, & Barry, 1994). Furthermore, negotiators have been found to be less satisfied when the other party accepted their offer immediately versus some time later (Galinsky, Seiden, Kim, & Medvec,

2002b), and when they had focused on the aspiration rather than the reservation price (Galinsky, Mussweiler, & Medvec, 2002a; see also Thompson, 1995), or when more, rather than less, negotiation issues were at stake (Naquin, 2003). This is because people may be more apt to engage in coun- terfactual thinking (i.e., consider whether other, possibly better, outcomes might have been possible) when (i) the other party’s acceptance was immediate, (ii) they focused on the aspiration price, or (iii) there were many negotiation issues (for reviews on negotiator satisfaction, see Barry, Fulmer, & Goates, 2006; Neale & Fragale, 2006; Thompson, Wang, & Gunia, 2010).

Without a doubt, negotiator satisfaction with the outcome has important implications. Unsatisfied negotiators may feel less desire to meet the same counterpart again (Oliver et al., 1994) or committed to implementing the negotiated contract (Barry & Oliver, 1996), whereas satisfied parties may even cooperate on issues that were not part of the original deal (Novemsky & Schweitzer, 2004). In agreement, more recent findings suggest that the subjective evaluation of negotiations have a greater and longer-lasting impact on a negotiator’s future behavior than actual economic outcomes (Curhan, Elfenbein, & Kilduff, 2009).

In this paper, we aim to further this important line of research by examining how the nature of conflict issues (i.e., interests versus values) affects negotiator satisfaction. Past research has shown that negotiations on value-based rather than interest-based issues lead to less desirable outcomes (Harinck & De Dreu, 2004; Tenbrunsel et al., 2009) and more

*Correspondence to: Peter Lucas Stöckli, Department of Military Psychology and Military Pedagogy, Military Academy at ETH Zurich, Birmensdorf, Switzerland. E-mail: peter.stoeckli@milak.ethz.ch

European Journal of Social Psychology, Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 44, 202–208 (2014) Published online 30 January 2014 in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/ejsp.2003

impasses (Tenbrunsel et al., 2009), but none has examined its influence on outcome satisfaction. We propose that the negotia- tion content is another essential determinant of negotiator satisfaction. More precisely, whether integrative or distributive outcomes are experienced as more satisfactory depends on whether negotiators are dealing with interest-based or value- based negotiation issues.

Negotiations are interest-based when involving the alloca- tion of scarce resources, such as money or other benefits. Here, the negotiators bargain over who gets how much (e.g., price of a product). Negotiations are value-based when the parties focus on personal norms, deeper beliefs, or ideological worldviews. Here, the negotiators focus on what is (morally) right or wrong (e.g., is the product price fair or unfair and is torture acceptable or not in a given situation) (e.g., Deutsch, 1973; Druckman, Broome, & Korper, 1977; Harinck & De Dreu, 2004). In general, values can refer to abstract and strong beliefs about desirable states or behavioral conduct (i.e., freedom, justness, honesty, love, or honor; Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992), entities of the human or nonhuman world that are valued “for their own sake” (such as human or animal lives, endangered species, and environment; e.g., Hargrove, 1989; Tanner, 2009; Taylor, 1986) or rights (e.g., human rights).

Recent findings suggest that people in value-based negotiations are very reluctant to make concessions (e.g., Tenbrunsel et al., 2009) and unwilling to make trade-offs among the issues (e.g., Harinck & De Dreu, 2004; Harinck, De Dreu, & Van Vianen, 2000). To stimulate interest-based versus value-based negotiations, one group of participants was instructed to aim for outcomes that would be advanta- geous for their career (interest-based) while another aimed for the most just outcomes (value-based) (Harinck & De Dreu, 2004; Harinck et al., 2000). The authors found that participants in value-based negotiations had lower tendencies to make trade-offs among the issues (thus were less likely to reach integrative agreements) than those in interest-based negotiations.

Thus, it appears that in value-based negotiations, people are reluctant to forsake one issue to obtain another. To avoid such trade-offs, negotiators may make concessions on both issues, resulting in distributive agreements. Accordingly, and although distributive outcomes are suboptimal from an objective perspec- tive, we propose that parties in value-based negotiations would achieve greater satisfaction with distributive than integrative outcomes (because the former do not require any trade-offs among the issues). In contrast, negotiators pursuing interest- based issues would focus on obtaining the maximum benefit. They would therefore be more satisfied with integrative rather than distributive outcomes.

Even though the abovementioned results (Harinck & De Dreu, 2004; Harinck et al., 2000) could be related to negotia- tor satisfaction as hypothesized earlier, their purpose was not to measure satisfaction. We therefore conducted three experiments whereby participants indicated the degree of satisfaction with an integrative and distributive outcome. In all experiments, we expected to identify an interaction effect between negotiation content and outcome. Negotiators in interest-based negotiations would prefer integrative to distributive, but those in value-based negotiations would prefer distributive to integrative outcomes.

EXPERIMENT 1

Method

Design and Participants

The first experiment used a 2 × 2 mixed factorial design, with conflict issue (interest-based versus value-based) as the between-subjects factor, negotiation outcome (integrative versus distributive) as the within-subject factor and negotiator satisfac- tion as the dependent variable. Fifty-seven students (31 female, 26 male; M age = 24.7 years) participated and received CHF 30 (approximately USD 36) as compensation for their time. They were randomly assigned to the interest or value condition and one of two orders of negotiation outcome. The order of negotia- tion outcome had no effect on the results.

Procedure

After participants engaged in a simulated negotiation (which is irrelevant to the present paper), they were given an additional task and a questionnaire. In a first attempt to test our hypothe- sis, we provided participants a scenario where a good friend who desires to purchase a used car had requested their assis- tance with negotiations to bargain for a low price and an extended warranty (participants were given a representative negotiator role, i.e., they were to negotiate on behalf of some- one else, to enable simpler manipulations of the interest versus value conditions). The introduction to the questionnaire provided information about the scenario and a payoff chart, revealing that the friend considered the duration of the warranty more important than the price (as they had engaged in a nego- tiation before, they were familiar with such payoff charts). The manipulation approach was adapted from Harinck and De Dreu (2004). Participants in the value condition were informed that their friend aimed for both a fair price and a fair warranty duration. The payoff chart consisted of corresponding verbal labels, such as “unfair” and “fair” (Table 1). In the interest condition, participants learned that their friend aimed for both a favorable price and a warranty duration. The payoff chart consisted of points (Table 1).

Participants were then presented with two possible negotia- tion results: an integrative (a trade-off between the two issues,

Table 1. Negotiator payoff charts in Experiment 1

Price Duration of guarantee

Interest condition CHF 30 000 80 points 2.5 years 100 points CHF 32 500 60 points 2 years 75 points CHF 35 000 40 points 1.5 years 50 points CHF 37 500 20 points 1 years 25 points CHF 40 000 0 points 0.5 years 0 points

Value condition CHF 30 000 Fair 2.5 years Very fair CHF 32 500 Rather fair 2 years Fair CHF 35 000 Neither fair

nor unfair 1.5 years Neither fair

nor unfair CHF 37 500 Rather unfair 1 years Unfair CHF 40 000 Unfair 0.5 years Very unfair

Negotiator satisfaction 203

thus no concessions on the high-priority and large concessions on the low-priority issue; i.e., CHF 40 000, 2.5 years) and a distributive outcome (a “classic” 50/50 outcome; i.e., CHF 35 000, 1.5 years). For each outcome, they would rate their level of satisfaction from a scale of 1 (very unsatisfied) to 7 (very satisfied).

Results

A 2 × 2 repeated measures ANOVA showed the predicted interaction effect between conflict issue and negotiation outcome, F(1,55) = 21.12, p < .001, η2 = .28. Participants in the interest condition displayed greater satisfaction with the integrative (M = 5.03) than the distributive (M = 4.07) outcome, F(1,55) = 16.49, p < .001, η2 = .23. In contrast, those in the value condition were more satisfied with the dis- tributive (M = 4.04) than the integrative (M = 3.39) outcome, F(1,55) = 6.31, p = .015, η2 = .10 (Figure 1). The analysis also revealed a significant main effect for negotiation content. Participants in the value condition generally reported lower satisfaction (M = 3.71) than those in the interest condition (M = 4.55), F(1,55) = 10.13, p = .002, η2 = .16. This unpredicted finding could suggest that making concessions on value-based issues is experienced more aversively than making concessions on interest-based issues.

EXPERIMENT 2

The first experiment provided preliminary evidence that the nature of the conflict issues affects whether distributive or integrative outcomes are more satisfactory. However, the use of different payoff charts in the different conditions could have potentially influenced our results. The verbal labels (value condition) may not correspond exactly to the points (interest condition) in terms of their subjective utility to the partici- pants. Thus, participants may have perceived the contrast between the high-priority and low-priority issues differently. To account for this drawback in Experiment 2, we employed the same payoff chart (consisting of points) in both conditions.

Method

Design and Participants

This experiment used a 2 × 2 mixed factorial design, with conflict issue (interest-based versus value-based) as the between-subjects factor, negotiation outcome (integrative versus distributive) as the within-subject factor and negotiator satisfaction as the dependent variable. Another sample of 32 students (19 female, 13 male; M age = 23.9 years) partici- pated for monetary compensation (CHF 30). Participants engaged in two succeeding negotiations tasks, one leading to an integrative and the other to a distributive outcome. The allocation of participants to the interest or value condition and the order of negotiation tasks and outcomes were randomized. Neither variation of negotiation task order nor outcome order affected the results and will therefore not be reported in the succeeding text.

Materials and Procedure

Upon arrival, participants were seated in separate rooms and informed that the experiment purported to investigate how people proceed in negotiations when they are only allowed to make two offers and whether people learn from experiences with such short negotiations (cover story). They were instructed to play the role of a lawyer and to perform two pen-and-paper negotiation tasks involving penalties for differ- ent criminal cases (adapted after Harinck & De Dreu, 2004; Harinck et al., 2000) with a district attorney played by another participant. Upon failure in reaching an agreement, the judge, also played by another participant, would determine the out- comes on the basis of the negotiation process.

In reality, the actions of the other participants (district attorney and judges) were pre-prepared written arguments. The district attorney’s final negotiation offers were designed in a way that the actual participants were likely to refuse them, thus the need to employ judges for decision-making. The judge’s decision was designed to be an integrative outcome after one negotiation task and a distributive outcome after the other task.

One negotiation task concerned a case involving pickpocketing (high-priority issue) and another involving a domestic peace disturbance (low-priority issue). The other task concerned a case involving clothes theft (high-priority issue) and another involving minor assault (low-priority issue). For each case, there were five possible levels of penalties, yielding different numbers of points for participants (as an example, see the payoff chart depicted in Table 2). Participants in the inter- est condition were instructed to aim for monetary fines for their clients because this would help their career. Those in the value condition were asked to aim for monetary fines because this penalty was most just (see Harinck & De Dreu, 2004).

Prior to the first negotiation, participants were tested to ensure that they understood the payoff chart. They then began to ex- change offers by filling out forms that the investigator carried back and forth between the rooms. The simulated counterpart consistently utilized the predetermined concession-making strat- egy. For both negotiations, the opponent’s first counteroffer was “two weeks jail penalty” on the participant’s high-priority issue and “one month jail penalty” on the participant’s low-priority

Figure 1. Negotiator satisfaction in Experiment 1 as a function of negotiation content and outcome

204 Peter Lucas Stöckli and Carmen Tanner

issue (see Table 2). The final counteroffer was “community service” (high-priority issue) and “one month jail penalty” (low-priority issue) in the first negotiation (when the participant refused this offer, the judge’s decision was an integrative out- come: a “small monetary fine” on the high-priority issue and a “one month jail penalty” on the low-priority issue, yielding 50 points) and “two weeks jail penalty” on both issues in the second (after which the judge’s decision was a distributive outcome: “community service” on both issues, yielding 40 points). All but one participant (who was excluded from the analysis) refused the second counteroffers and decided to let the judge determine the penalties. A few minutes after the negotiation, they received the judges’ decisions. Two participants who suspected that the op- ponent or the judge was not real were excluded from the analyses.

After each negotiation, participants rated two items on a scale of 1 (very unsatisfied) to 7 (very satisfied). Specifically, participants were asked (i) how satisfied they were with the judge’s decision and (ii) how satisfied they would have been if they had agreed with their counterpart on this outcome. These ratings were averaged to measure satisfaction (r = .562, p < .001).

As a manipulation check, participants rated the extent to which they wanted monetary penalties for fairness (“because monetary penalties are most fair”) or career reasons (“because monetary penalties are good for my career”) on two 7-point scales (1 = not at all, 7 = very much) after the second negotiation.

Results

Manipulation Check

A repeated measures ANOVA with conflict issue as the inde- pendent variable and the two questions checking the manipu- lation of interest-based versus value-based conflict issues as the dependent variables revealed a significant interaction between conflict issue and reasons to aim for a monetary penalty (career versus fairness), F(1,29)=37.48, p < .001, η2 =.56. Participants in the interest condition indicated that they had aimed for monetary penalties because this would be good for their career (M = 6.59) rather than it being most fair (M = 2.18), F(1,29) = 46.22, p < .001, η2 = .61. In contrast, participants in the value condition stated that they had aimed for monetary penalties because they were most fair (M = 5.36) rather than being good for their career (M = 3.86), F(1,29) = 4.40, p = .045, η2 = .13. This result pattern suggests that the manipulation was successful.

Negotiator Satisfaction

A repeated measures ANOVA revealed the predicted interac- tion between conflict issue and outcome, F(1,30) = 27.65,

p < .001, η2 = .48. Negotiators in the interest condition were more satisfied with integrative (M = 5.59) than distributive (M = 4.21) outcomes, F(1,30) = 25.18, p < .001, η2 = .46. In contrast, those negotiating values were more satisfied with distributive (M = 5.27) than integrative (M = 4.53) outcomes, F(1,30) = 6.25, p = .018, η2 = .17 (Figure 2). No other effects were significant.

It appears unlikely that the negotiator satisfaction measure is confounded with an evaluation of the negotiation process itself or an evaluation of the purported counterpart: The ques- tionnaire employed after the two negotiations also included two questions designed to assess (i) the participant’s satisfac- tion with the negotiation process itself and (ii) the participant’s willingness to negotiate with the same counterpart again. None of these items correlated significantly with the satisfaction with the judge’s decision (r’s < .22, p’s > .20), neither were there differences between the two conflict issue conditions (F’s < 0.29, p’s > .59) nor were there any significant interaction effects between the conflict issue and outcome (F’s < 2.64, p’s > .11).

EXPERIMENT 3

Findings from Experiments 1 and 2 provided consistent evidence that people are more satisfied with integrative out- comes in interest-based negotiations but more satisfied with distributive outcomes in value-based negotiations. However, in both studies, we employed the same value (“fairness”) to induce value-based negotiations. Our third experiment there- fore aims to examine whether the effects of conflict issue on

Table 2. Negotiator payoff chart in Experiment 2

Pickpocketing Disturbance of public peace

Jail penalty (1 month) 0 points Jail penalty (1 month) 0 points Jail penalty (2 weeks) 0 points Jail penalty (2 weeks) 0 points Community service 20 points Community service 20 points Monetary fine, big (CHF 3000) 35 points Monetary fine, big (CHF 3000) 30 points Monetary fine, small (CHF 1500) 50 points Monetary fine, small (CHF 1500) 40 points

Figure 2. Negotiator satisfaction in Experiment 2 as a function of negotiation content and outcome

Negotiator satisfaction 205

negotiator satisfaction also apply with another value, namely, environmental protection.

Method

Design and Participants

The third experiment also used a 2 × 2 mixed factorial design, with conflict issue (interest-based versus value-based) as the between-subjects factor, negotiation outcome (integrative versus distributive) as the within-subject factor and negotiator satisfaction as the dependent variable. Fifty-one students (21 female, 30 male; M age = 24.1 years) voluntarily partici- pated in this study and were randomly assigned to the interest or value condition. Again, the order of outcomes was varied with no significant impact on the results.

Procedure

As in Experiment 1, participants read a negotiation scenario (adapted after Ryf, Tanner, & Binder, 2007) and were then asked to indicate how satisfied they would be with an integra- tive and with a distributive outcome. However, this time, the study was conducted online where participants were sent e-mails containing a link to a website providing all informa- tion and questions. On this website, participants were asked to imagine that they were a representative of a winter sports resort and that they were negotiating about how many acres of two different forests (Forest 1 and 2) should be logged for the construction of two additional ski slopes. A payoff chart was provided, revealing that they could earn more points on Forest 1 than Forest 2 (Table 3).

Participants in the interest condition were asked to oppose deforestation to prevent financial loss. Because the forests were highly popular for their nice hiking and biking trails, cutting it down would potentially reduce resort guests during summer. Also, they learned that Forest 1 was slightly more popular than Forest 2. Participants in the value condition were asked to oppose deforestation to protect the environment. Because the forests were environmentally valuable and rich in flora and fauna, cutting down the forest would destroy animal habitats. Forest 1 had a slightly greater species variety than Forest 2.

Participants were then checked for payoff chart understanding. Those who failed the test were excluded from subsequent analyses, which was the case for two participants. Successful participants were presented with the integrative outcome (i.e., “0 m2” of forest cut down on the high-priority issue Forest 1, but “200 000 m2” of forest cut down on the low-priority issue Forest 2, yielding 80 points) and the distributive outcome (i.e., “100 000 m2” of both forests cut down, yielding 70 points) on two consecutive webpages. On each of these two pages,

participants answered the question “If you had reached this outcome, how satisfied would you be?” on a scale from 1 (very unsatisfied) to 7 (very satisfied). Lastly, participants com- pleted a similar manipulation check as in Experiment 2.

Results

Manipulation Check

A repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant interac- tion between conflict issue and reasons to oppose deforestation (decline in guest nights versus protecting animal habitats), F(1,49) = 73.78, p < .001, η2 = .60. Participants in the interest condition indicated that they opposed deforestation to avoid declines in guest nights (M = 6.08) rather than protect animal habitats (M = 4.83), F(1,49) = 7.47, p = .009, η2 = .13, whereas those in the value condition stated that they opposed deforestation to protect animal habitats (M = 6.63) rather than avoid declines in guest nights (M = 2.48), F(1,49) = 92.58, p < .001, η2 = .65.

Negotiator Satisfaction

The repeated measures ANOVA revealed the predicted inter- action between conflict issue and outcome, F(1,49) = 13.11, p = .001, η2 = .21. Participants in the interest condition were more satisfied with integrative (M = 3.46) than distributive (M = 2.75) outcomes, F(1,49) = 10.68, p = .002, η2 = .18, whereas those in the value condition were more satisfied with distributive (M = 3.41) than integrative (M = 3.04) outcomes, F(1,49) = 3.28, p = .076, η2 = .06. Nevertheless, the latter difference was only marginally significant (Figure 3).

DISCUSSION

Across three experiments, we found consistent evidence for an interaction effect between conflict issue and negotiation out- come on negotiator satisfaction. Integrative outcomes were more satisfactory in interest-based negotiations, whereas

Table 3. Negotiator payoff chart in Experiment 3

Forest 1 Forest 2

0 m2 80 points 0 m2 60 points 50 000 m2 60 points 50 000 m2 45 points 100 000 m2 40 points 100 000 m2 30 points 150 000 m2 20 points 150 000 m2 15 points 200 000 m2 0 points 200 000 m2 0 points Figure 3. Negotiator satisfaction in Experiment 3 as a function of

negotiation content and outcome

206 Peter Lucas Stöckli and Carmen Tanner

distributive agreements tended to be more satisfactory in value-based negotiations. This suggests that gaining more via integrative trade-offs is appealing in interest-based but not value-based negotiations.

But why would people in value-based negotiations prefer suboptimal 50/50 outcomes to more beneficial win-win out- comes? It is possible that people reject trading off value-based issues and consider integrative trade-offs unacceptable because this “would undercut their self-images and social identities as moral beings” (Fiske & Tetlock, 1997, p. 256; Harinck & De Dreu, 2004). Such a view is in line with Curhan, Elfenbein, and Xu (2006) who found that evaluations of nego- tiations involve multiple dimensions; negotiations are not just evaluated in terms of their instrumental quality, but for instance, also in terms of implications for the negotiators’ self- understanding. Besides that, studies have shown that people confronted with “tragic trade-offs” (pitting two so-called sacred values—values which people hold to be absolute and not exchangeable for anything else—against each other; Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000) experienced high levels of negative emotions and stress when contemplating which sacred value to protect at the expense of the other (Hanselmann & Tanner, 2008). In accordance, negotiators would not want to settle on one value issue at the expense of the other, thus the preference for agreements which allow them to attain some “balance” between the issues: Instead of making large concessions on one issue and low concessions on the other, negotiators may opt for a (fair) compromise by making similar concessions on both issues, thus greater satisfaction with distributive outcomes.

An alternative explanation could be that the manipulation of the negotiation content (interest-based versus value-based) has led to different subjective utilities across conditions.1 In the first experiment, the payoff chart’s verbal labels in the value condition may not have corresponded exactly to the chart’s points in the interest condition, which could lead to dif- ferent negotiator priorities. Also, in the second and third exper- iment, even when points were used in both conditions, such different utilities could be influential. For instance, people in interest-based negotiations may tend to be profit-oriented, whereas those in value-based negotiations may be more loss- aversive. Because participants in the interest condition priori- tize more on gaining profits or winning, they report greater satisfaction with integrative outcomes (because they won one issue and more points) than distributive outcomes (because they won less points). On the other hand, participants in the value condition prioritize on preventing losses, thus reporting less satisfaction with integrative outcomes (because they lost one issue) than distributive outcomes (because they did not lose the issues but agree on a compromise).

This alternative explanation is consistent with the finding of Tenbrunsel et al. (2009) that negotiators are more reluctant to make concessions on value-based issues than on interest-based issues. Our results from Experiment 1 show that participants in the value condition generally reported being less satisfied than those in the interest condition. Even though we did not predict this finding, it compliments the findings of Tenbrunsel et al.

and could reflect the loss-aversive focus of negotiators in the value-based condition.

In sum, two mechanisms could account for our findings: trade-off reluctance or loss avoidance. The former posits that distributive outcomes are more appealing because it is not necessary to make trade-offs among the issues, whereas the latter posits that distributive outcomes are more satisfactory because none of the two issues were lost. Nevertheless, it is also plausible that both of the mechanisms interact. Exploring such underlying mechanisms could be an interesting avenue for future research. Thus, whereas previous research showed that objectively better outcomes are not necessarily more satis- factory due to counterfactual thinking (e.g., Galinsky et al., 2002a, 2002b; Naquin, 2003) or social comparison (e.g., Gillespie et al., 2000; Loewenstein et al., 1989; Novemsky & Schweitzer, 2004), our findings suggest that the negotiation content itself can be influential.

One limitation to our experiments is that we linked both ne- gotiation issues to the same value (fairness in Experiments 1 and 2 and environmental concerns in Experiment 3). It thus remains unclear what would happen if one issue was linked to fairness and the other to loyalty, for instance. Furthermore, we are not able to say how negotiations involving both inter- est-based and value-based issues (“mixed cases”; see Harinck & De Dreu, 2004) are related to negotiator satisfaction. We presume that appropriate integrative outcomes, which occur when negotiators make concessions on interest-based issues in order to gain on value-based issues, may be associated with greater satisfaction. It should also be highlighted again, that we utilized only one item to measure negotiator satisfaction in Experiments 1 and 3, and two items in Experiment 2. Future research should address this issue with the use of a more elaborate measure.

Another potential limitation concerns our negotiation sce- narios. More precisely, all of our participants assumed the role of a representative negotiator (negotiating on behalf of one’s friend in Experiment 1, negotiating on behalf of one’s clients in Experiment 2, and negotiating on behalf of a winter sports resort in Experiment 3). We chose such negotiator roles (i) because it is easier to successfully manipulate interest-based versus value-based negotiation content (a participant would probably be more willing to overtake the view that an issue is value-based when the actual outcome affects someone else) and (ii) because the scenarios in the second (Harinck et al., 2000; Harinck & De Dreu, 2004) and third experiments (Ryf et al., 2007) have been used successfully in past studies. However, representative negotiators may generally be more motivated to achieve a desirable outcome in order to make a good impression on those that they are negotiating on behalf of (e.g., Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). Thus, it is possible that par- ticipants in the second experiment’s value condition preferred the distributive option simply because they do not leave a bad impression on their clients due to an unfair outcome (rather than because the participants view the distributive outcome as the fairer option). One could argue that the results may differ, if the participants’ very own outcome would be affected. In such cases, the participants may be less reluctant to pursue integra- tive outcomes rather than distributive ones. Future research should therefore develop a scenario in which the participant’s very own outcome is at stake.1We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.

Negotiator satisfaction 207

Notwithstanding the limitations and beyond contributing to negotiation research, we believe that this work has important practical implications. In fact, our findings present a certain dilemma. When aiming for optimal outcomes, negotiation literature typically recommends aiming for integrative agree- ments as they are more beneficial for all parties. However, when the negotiation goal includes the achievement of negotia- tor satisfaction, following this advice could sometimes backfire, as suggested by our findings. Integrative outcomes may be perceived as more satisfactory than distributive outcomes in interest-based negotiations but, in value-based negotiations, distributive outcomes tend to be more satisfactory than integra- tive outcomes. We thus conclude that win-win outcomes may not be generalized to greater satisfaction as this may be dependent on the nature of the negotiation itself.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This research was supported by a research grant from the University of Zurich (no. 56232603) to the first author.

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208 Peter Lucas Stöckli and Carmen Tanner

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