Question
Article
Narrowband Influencers and Global Icons: Universality and Media Compatibility in the Communication Patterns of Political Leaders Worldwide
Renana Peres, Sunali Talwar, Liav Alter, Michal Elhanan, and Yuval Friedmann
Abstract This article analyzes how political leaders communicate with their target audiences and examines whether they adopt a country- specific communication persona, or react to the global media-intensive environment by offering more universal communication. Politicians communicate through presentational (e.g., social media) and representational (e.g., press) outlets, and the compatibility between these outlets represents the leader’s effectiveness in transmitting the desired messages to the audience. The authors of this study suggest a theoretical framework that classifies public figures’ communication along two dimensions: universality (particular–universal) and media compatibility (low–high). The authors used language processing tools to study the sentiment, topic mixture, and use of pronouns by 61 global world leaders in more than 300,000 messages from the leaders’ Twitter accounts and press articles. The results show a high level of universality across political leaders in sentiment, topic mixture, and pronoun usage. The media compatibility is high, with Twitter being slightly more positive. Most leaders fall within the categories of Cosmopolitan Antagonist (high universality, low media compatibility) and Global Icon (high universality, high media compatibility). Overall, the sentiment of their communications is positive. Popular topics include diplomacy, economy, corruption, and the Arab world. No significant relationship was found between the sentiment or communication topics and country characteristics.
Keywords political marketing, social media, press, politicians, presentational media, representational media, universality, media compatibility, globalization, content analysis, topic analysis, LDA, sentiment analysis, communication of political leaders
Much of the brand building of political leaders is done through
communication with their audiences (Bennet and Iyengar
2008; Dahlgren 2009). The current age of global communica-
tion platforms, access to information, and global press cover-
age poses new challenges to political leaders who want to
design, develop, manage, and control their public persona.
We examine these challenges using two communication
dimensions. The first dimension is the level of universality.
On one hand, the political leader of a country can be perceived
as a salient, visible national icon. In branding terminology, a
country’s leader, at least while in office, can be viewed as a
distinct national brand or as a recognizable brand element of
the country, similar to the flag, major monuments, and famous
citizens (French and Smith 2010). A leader’s communication is
mainly with the local population. Therefore, one would expect
country leaders to adopt a country-specific communication
persona that reflects the interests and characteristics of their
country and people. On the other hand, many current topics of
interest are related to global issues. Moreover, politicians oper-
ate in a multichannel, media-intensive environment, which, as
suggested by recent trends in communication theory, is a strong
driver in enhancing globalization (Krotz 2007) and influences
public figures (Van Aelst et al. 2008) to take a more global
view of their media identity and adopt a more universal com-
munication style.
Renana Peres is an Associate Professor of Marketing, Hebrew University of
Jerusalem, Israel (email: renana.peres@mail.huji.ac.il). Sunali Talwar is an
independent researcher working in Germany (email: sunalitalwar@gmail.
com). Liav Alter is a research student, Hebrew University of Jerusalem,
Israel (email: liav.alter@mail.huji.ac.il). Michal Elhanan is a research student,
Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel (email: michal.elhanan@mail.huji.ac.il).
Yuval Friedmann is a research student, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel
(email: yuval.friedmann@mail.huji.ac.il).
Journal of International Marketing 2020, Vol. 28(1) 48-65
ª American Marketing Association 2020 Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions DOI: 10.1177/1069031X19897893
journals.sagepub.com/home/jig
The other dimension is the extent to which the leaders
can communicate the identity they selected. Politicians com-
municate with their audiences through a mix of presentational
channels (e.g., social media), where the leader has the full
freedom of self-presentation, and representational channels
(e.g., press, television), which are based on journalism and are
supposed to be more objective (Hepp, Breiter, and Hasebrink
2018). High compatibility in information and sentiment
between these two types of channels implies that the represen-
tational media generally reflects the leader’s self-presentational
goals. Low media compatibility indicates a high level of inde-
pendence and investigative motivation by the press.
We organize these two dimensions into a 2 � 2 matrix (Figure 1) to suggest the following prototypical communication
patterns. In this article we focus on political leaders, but the
classification can apply to any public figure.
� The Peculiar Notorious communicates about specific topics that deviate from the average distribution of cur-
rent affairs. The media coverage of the leader is not
compatible with the leader’s own discussion of these
topics on social media. An example (from the nonpoli-
tical world) is Bill Cosby, who is connected to the spe-
cific subject of TV shows and has received negative
media coverage recently (i.e., large gap between his
representation and self-presentation).
� The Narrowband Influencer is interested in uncom- mon, specialized subjects, and the press coverage of
his/her ideas is highly compatible with his/her opinion.
Thus, the leader controls the message and leads public
opinion in the subject of interest. Examples are Kate
Middleton, whose media coverage deals mostly with
fashion and royal family activity and is generally posi-
tive, and Greta Thunberg, a climate activist whose
media coverage usually agrees with her opinions.
� The Cosmopolitan Antagonist talks about diverse topics resembling the topics generally discussed, but the
media’s view of these topics is incompatible with the
leader’s. Examples are Kim Jong Un, who as a head of
state speaks about common topics such as economy,
diplomacy, and military, but the media (outside North
Korea) is critical of his opinions and claims, and Rush
Limbaugh, who expresses strong right-wing opinions on
many topics and is not regarded positively by many
other media outlets.
� The Global Icon communicates about topics that are commonly discussed by others, and the media’s opinion
and perception of the leader are highly aligned with the
leader’s opinion. Examples are Michelle Obama, who as
the first lady of the United States advocated for poverty
awareness, education, and healthy lifestyles and
received positive coverage from the media, and Emma
Watson, an actress who is also a women’s rights activist
and was named a UN Women Goodwill Ambassador.
Studying these two dimensions is interesting for three rea-
sons. First, brand researchers have long wondered how globali-
zation processes affect brand perceptions (Cayla and Arnould
2008; Diamantopoulos et al. 2019; Gürhan-Canli, Sarıal-Abi,
and Hayran 2018; Steenkamp 2019). Because political leaders
are salient national brands, their globalization process might
provide early insights as to what one can expect for commercial
brands. Second, the citizens of the world’s nations are increas-
ingly facing challenges of a global nature, such as immigration,
environmental issues, and the future of the European Union and
other regional treaties. More than ever, these issues influence the
lives of individual citizens. Coping with these challenges
requires world leaders to create a communication infrastructure
that goes beyond national boundaries, and therefore it is of inter-
est to determine whether such infrastructure has already been
created. Third, one of the outcomes of intensive, multichannel
media usage is the continuous spillover of contents between
media platforms. Specifically, the presentational and repre-
sentational channels increasingly overlap. Still, politicians
often complain about media bias (Brants et al. 2010; D’Ales-
sio and Allen 2000; Geis 1987). Hence, studying the compat-
ibility in communication styles between presentational and
representational communication outlets is important to under-
stand the real variety and objectivity in the information that
citizens receive on their leaders (Shapiro and Hemphill 2017).
From an international branding perspective, political leaders
are an interesting case of personal branding in a media-
intensive environment. Similar to commercial brands, they
cope with the interplay of their local and international identi-
ties. However, they are people, and as personal brands, they use
communication in ways that are much more elaborate than the
communication methods of commercial brands. In addition,
their ability to communicate their identity depends not only
on their own marketing communications, but also strongly on
their press coverage. As personal branding gains an increasing
importance in art, entertainment, sports (Chadwick and Burton
Universality
Par�cular Universal
M ad
ia c
o m
p a�
b ili
ty
H ig
h Lo
w Peculiar Notorious e.g. Bill Cosby
Cosmopolitan Antagonist
e.g. Kim Jong Un, Rush Limbaugh
Narrowband Influencer
e.g. Kate Middleton, Greta Thunberg
Global icon e.g. Michelle Obama, Emma Watson
Figure 1. Four prototypical patterns of public communication.
Peres et al. 49
2008), high tech (Anderson 2013), and the organizational envi-
ronment (Ulrich and Smallwood 2007), insights on communi-
cation patterns are of importance.
The goal of this article is to provide a first data-intensive,
systematic, and comparative investigation of universality in
the communication styles of the world’s major political
leaders. We classify the leaders into the four quadrants of
the universality–compatibility matrix and ask how univers-
ality and media compatibility relate to the leader’s country
characteristics. To do so, we collected a massive data set of
the communications of 61 major political leaders. We
extracted the entire Twitter communication from their Twit-
ter accounts, and retrieved from the LexisNexis database the
press articles in which they were mentioned between Janu-
ary 2018 and July 2019. Thus, we captured the leader’s
communication in a presentational social media outlet
(Twitter) and in a representational media outlet (printed
press), which is supposed to be a more objective,
journalism-based medium. We used text processing tools,
such as translation, elimination of stop words, and cleaning
to preprocess the data, and we implemented automated lan-
guage processing tools to analyze the sentiment, topic mix-
ture, and usage of “I,” “we,” “you,” and “they” messages.
We tested the dependence of these elements on country
characteristics, such as the gross domestic product (GDP)
per capita, the continent, and Hofstede’s cultural dimensions
(Hofstede 2011).
Our results indicate a striking universality among political
leaders. Leaders are similar to each other in their sentiment,
topic mixture, and usage of pronouns. Overall, the sentiment is
positive, and the discussed topics are mainly diplomacy, econ-
omy, corruption, and the Arab world. “We” messages are used
the most, followed by “I” messages. The results are robust
across communication channels, with Twitter being slightly
more positive on sentiment score than the press articles. With
a few exceptions, we saw almost no significant dependence on
country characteristics. Relative to Africa, leaders from Asia,
Europe, and Central America use first-person messages more
than second- and third-person messages while tweeting. In
addition, leaders from countries with shorter-term orientation
were found to use first-person pronouns, relative to second- or
third-person pronouns, more often on Twitter than leaders from
countries with longer-term orientations do, but these effects are
small. Of the four quadrants on the universality–compatibility
matrix, most leaders were classified into the rightmost quad-
rants: Cosmopolitan Antagonists (topics similar to those of the
average leader, with relatively low media compatibility) and
Global Icons (topics similar to those of the average leader, with
high media compatibility).
The rest of the article is organized as follows. First, we
present the conceptual background. Then we describe the
data, explain the preprocessing, and describe the sentiment
and content analysis procedures. Finally, we discuss the
results of the sentiment, topic mixture, and pronoun fre-
quency analysis and present the leaders’ classification on
the communication matrix.
Conceptual Background
Politicians as Brands
Research in political marketing relates to political candidates
as one component in a trinity consisting of the party as the
brand, the politician as its tangible characteristics, and policy
as core service offerings (Henneberg and O’Shaughnessy
2007). Recently, voters’ consideration has shifted from focus-
ing on parties to focusing on the candidates (Guzman and
Sierra 2009), and, consequentially, researchers have started to
study political candidates as standalone brands (Guzman and
Sierra 2009; Hockett 2005; Phipps, Brace-Govan, and Jevons
2010; Smith 2009). This focus shift is in line with the increas-
ing interest in personal branding in other domains, such as art,
entertainment, social media, and high tech (Anderson 2013;
Chadwick and Burton 2008; Ulrich and Smallwood 2007).
The expansion and proliferation of communication outlets
in the past decades has created profound changes in the way
people, especially politicians, manage their personal brand.
The main concept in this discussion is “mediatization” (Coul-
dry and Hepp 2017). The term relates to the omnipresence of
multiple communication channels, which interact with each
other and collectively transform (i.e., “mediatize”) many
aspects of our everyday lives (Hjarvard 2013; Krotz and Hepp
2013). In this article, we discuss two challenges faced by per-
sonal brands in general, and political leaders in particular, in a
mediatized world.
Particularism Versus Universalism
The increased complexity of the communication landscape in
the past decades is both an outcome and a driver of globaliza-
tion. In one direction, globalization facilitates the creation of
global communication infrastructures and digital communica-
tion platforms. For example, the availability of internet infra-
structures, usage of the English language, and communalities in
consumer tastes facilitate the operation of social media chan-
nels, such as Instagram and Twitter. However, a recent stream
of research focuses on the other direction to argue that the
variety and ubiquity of communication channels is not only
an outcome but also an important driver of globalization. The
main argument of this research stream is that mediatization is a
core driver of globalization (Krotz 2007): the exposure to mul-
tiple communication channels helps connect people, creates
ties that cross national boundaries, and helps to create a global
culture.
Political leaders depend heavily on communication with
their citizens. Therefore, mediatization processes have deeply
affected the political arena (Enli and Skogerbø 2013; Howard
and Parks 2012). Marshall (2015), shows how people change
many of their everyday behaviors to fit with their online per-
sona; Strömbäck and Van Aelst (2013) demonstrate how polit-
ical parties adapt their structure and organization to respond to
the increasing complexity of communication; Van Aelst et al.
(2008) claim, using the case study of the 2003 election cam-
paign in Belgium, that the media tend to promote certain
50 Journal of International Marketing 28(1)
politicians, and therefore politicians adapt their actions and
personality to follow the “media logic” in order to receive a
higher level of media attention.
The fact that political leaders operate in a global, mediatized
world raises an intriguing question pertaining to their commu-
nication styles. On one hand, the political leader of a country is
a brand that is strongly associated with the country and is
assumed to have a strong country-of-origin effect. Also, much
of their target audience is local. Therefore, we can expect
strong local flavor in the leader’s communication and, conse-
quently, large differences in the communication styles of lead-
ers. On the other hand, mediatization calls for globalization: the
intensive usage of communication outlets of all types, together
with the global nature of many of these outlets and the exposure
to new audiences, might drive leaders to adopt a more global
communication persona and therefore employ a more homo-
genous communication style that depends less on local
characteristics.
Commercial brands also cope with the particularism–uni-
versalism balance. Brand researchers have intensively studied
how globalization influences brand perceptions (Cayla and
Arnould 2008; Diamantopoulos et al. 2019; Gürhan-Canli,
Sarıal-Abi, and Hayran 2018; Steenkamp 2019). This influence
is intricate. On one hand, brands use global positioning to
appeal to their consumers (Diamantopoulos et al. 2019; Nijssen
and Douglas 2011), and consumers develop global orientation
that influences their brand perception (Guo 2013). However, on
the other hand, the country of origin of the brand has still an
effect on attitudes, preferences, and purchasing decisions
related to the brand (Herz and Diamantopoulos 2017; Kock,
Josiassen, and Assaf 2019), and cultural dimensions and coun-
try characteristics affect consumer-brand interactions (Cayla
and Arnould 2008; Özsomer 2012).
This intensive research done for commercial brands has not
yet extended to the study of personal brands. Specifically,
research on communication in political science is mostly con-
ceptual (e.g., Krotz and Hepp 2013) or uses case studies (e.g.,
Enli and Skogerbø 2013), and researchers have not system-
atically monitored leaders’ communication to estimate the
level of universality. Personal brands differ from commercial
brands in, among other things, the complexity of their com-
munication with the target audience. Their usage of commu-
nication is much more elaborate than that of commercial
brands, and their ability to communicate their identity
depends not only on their own marketing communication but
also strongly on their press coverage.
Compatibility of Media Outlets
Political leaders often complain that their ability to communi-
cate their identity, goals, and ideas is oppressed by the press,
which they often claim is biased against them. Brants et al.
(2010) surveyed politicians in the Netherlands and found that
politicians regard journalists as too sensationalist, too event
driven in their coverage, and too focused on power struggles
rather than substance. In the United States in the 1980s,
American conservatives founded watchdog groups to focus
attention on what they perceived as biased reporting by the
American press (Geis 1987), although proof of such bias is
difficult to find (D’Alessio and Allen 2000).
One of the outcomes of mediatization is the constant inter-
action and spillovers across communication channels and
media environments (Hepp, Breiter, and Hasebrink 2018). Tra-
ditionally, presentational media, meaning communication ini-
tiated directly by the transmitting party (e.g., social media,
announcements, press releases), was distinct from representa-
tional media, defined as reporting done by a third party (e.g.,
television or press). Presentational media typically differs from
representational media in that it is more interactive, is inexpen-
sive, and is generated by ordinary users instead of professionals
(e.g., journalists; Hepp, Hjarvard, and Lundby 2015).
The massive growth of social media has reduced depen-
dency on the press for information (Shang, Wu, and Li 2017)
and has enabled ongoing direct communication between pub-
lic figures and their audiences. Realizing the opportunities
offered by new media settings, politicians across the world
have eagerly adopted social media (Bennett and Iyengar 2008;
Bos, Van der Brug, and De Vreese 2011; Wattal et al. 2010)
and are using a mix of presentational and representational
media platforms to communicate with their citizens and vot-
ers (Chadwick 2006).
In mediatized environments, presentational and representa-
tional media are becoming increasingly interwoven. For exam-
ple, Twitter affects political news reporting (Shapiro and
Hemphill 2017), and, at the same time, user-generated commu-
nicative patterns on social media may involve references to
news articles. Strömbäck and Aelst (2013) claim that social
media affects actual political behaviors, which, in turn, are
reported by the press media. Thus, the boundaries between
media environments are blurred. Hence, a question of interest
is the extent to which the two media types differ and whether
leaders are able to communicate their identity consistently
across presentational and representational outlets.
Integrating the Dimensions: Four Communication Types
This paper aims to explore how political leaders operate in a
mediatized word, with respect to the two dimensions discussed
previously. As described in Figure 1, public figures (in our
case, political leaders) can be classified on a 2 � 2 matrix in which the horizontal dimension is the level of similarity of the
person to the “average” public figure in the same domain (par-
ticular–universal) and the vertical dimension is the level of
compatibility between the presentational and representational
media concerning the leader (low–high).
In what follows, we describe the data collection and the
analysis.
Data
We collected data on the presentational and representational
communication of 61 political leaders from January 2018
Peres et al. 51
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H e rn
án d e z
H o n d u ra
s 5 0
6 7
.3 7 6
3 ,1
7 9
1 ,7
5 2
2 ,4
8 2 .7
9 ,5
8 7 ,5
2 2
1 8 0
2 0
4 0
5 0
— —
Ju st
in T
ru d e au
C an
ad a
4 7
4 5
4 .5
5 3 ,2
2 5
9 7 6
4 6 ,1
2 4 .7
3 7 ,0
7 4 ,5
6 2
1 3 9
8 0
5 2
4 8
3 6
6 8
K h al
id b in
A h m
e d
B ah
ra in
5 9
1 6 7
.5 2 5
3 ,1
9 0
1 ,3
2 5
2 4 ,0
5 0 .8
1 ,5
6 9 ,4
4 6
0 —
— —
— —
— K
o n o
T ar
o Ja
p an
5 6
2 4
.7 5 2
3 ,2
2 7
2 ,3
2 3
3 9 ,2
8 6 .7
1 2 7 ,2
0 2 ,1
9 2
1 5 4
4 6
9 5
9 2
8 8
4 2
L e e
N ak
-y e o n
S o u th
K o re
a 6 7
2 6
.1 2 8
3 ,2
0 2
1 ,4
4 9
3 1 ,3
6 2 .8
5 1 ,1
7 1 ,7
0 6
1 6 0
1 8
3 9
8 5
1 0 0
2 9
M ah
at h ir
M o h am
ad M
al ay
si a
9 4
1 5
1 .0
7 3 ,1
9 8
2 ,0
1 6
1 1 ,2
3 9
3 1 ,5
2 8 ,0
3 3
0 1 0 4
2 6
5 0
3 6
4 1
5 7
M ah
m o o d
Q u re
sh i
P ak
is ta
n 6 3
1 2
2 .6
2 1 ,5
2 7
1 ,3
4 8
1 ,4
7 2 .9
2 1 2 ,2
2 8 ,2
8 6
1 5 5
1 4
5 0
7 0
5 0
0 M
ar ce
lo E b ra
rd M
e x ic
o 5 9
8 1 .6
2 3 ,2
1 4
1 ,1
2 9
9 ,6
9 8 .1
9 7 ,3
3 8 ,6
5 7
1 8 1
3 0
6 9
8 2
2 4
9 7
M ar
t́ı n
V iz
ca rr
a P e ru
5 6
1 7
.6 0 7
1 ,6
4 2
1 ,4
0 1
6 ,9
4 7 .3
3 1 ,9
8 9 ,2
6 0
1 6 4
1 6
4 2
8 7
2 5
4 6
M au
ri ci
o M
ac ri
A rg
e n ti n a
6 0
4 4
4 .9
1 3 ,2
4 0
3 ,6
7 5
1 1 ,6
5 2 .6
4 4 ,3
6 1 ,1
5 0
1 4 9
4 6
5 6
8 6
2 0
6 2
M e vl
ü t
Ç av
u şo
ğl u
T u rk
e y
5 1
4 5
1 .3
5 3 ,2
2 8
1 ,9
1 3
9 ,3
1 1 .4
8 2 ,3
4 0 ,0
8 8
1 6 6
3 7
4 5
8 5
4 6
4 9
M ig
u e l D
ı́a z-
C an
e l
C u b a
5 9
1 6
.1 5 6
7 7 6
2 ,0
0 0
8 ,5
4 1 .2
1 1 ,3
3 8 ,1
3 4
0 —
— —
— —
— M
ik e
P o m
p e o
U n it e d
S ta
te s
5 5
1 6
.7 6 6
9 4 2
1 ,6
8 7
6 2 ,6
4 1
3 2 7 ,0
9 6 ,2
6 5
1 4 0
9 1
6 2
4 6
2 6
6 8
M o h am
m e d
A l M
ak to
u m
U n it e d
A ra
b E m
ir at
e s
7 0
1 6 2
9 .7
7 3 ,2
3 9
1 ,8
9 7
4 3 ,0
0 4 .9
9 ,6
3 0 ,9
5 9
0 —
9 0
2 5
5 0
8 0
— M
o h am
m e d
b in
Z ay
e d
A l
N ah
ya n
U n it e d
A ra
b E m
ir at
e s
5 8
1 7 7
2 .5
6 3 ,2
0 9
4 ,1
3 7
4 3 ,0
0 4 .9
9 ,6
3 0 ,9
5 9
0 —
9 0
2 5
5 0
8 0
—
M o o n
Ja e -i n
S o u th
K o re
a 6 6
2 7
1 .7
7 3 ,0
7 4
1 ,7
3 8
3 1 ,3
6 2 .8
5 1 ,1
7 1 ,7
0 6
1 6 0
1 8
3 9
8 5
1 0 0
2 9
(c o n ti n u ed
)
52
T a b
le 1 .
(c o n ti n u e d )
N am
e C
o u n tr
y A
ge M
o n th
s in
P o si
ti o n
T w
it te
r F o llo
w e rs
(M ill
io n s)
T o ta
l T
w e e ts
Ja n u ar
y 2 0 1 8 –
Ju ly
2 0 1 9
T o ta
l P re
ss Ja
n u ar
y 2 0 1 8 –
Ju ly
2 0 1 9
G D
P P e r
C ap
it a
(U S D
) P o p u la
ti o n
D e m
o cr
ac y
P D
IN D
M A
S U
A L T
IN D
M u h am
m ad
u B u h ar
i N
ig e ri
a 7 6
5 1
2 .2
2 3 ,2
3 7
1 ,9
5 3
2 ,0
2 8 .2
1 9 5 ,8
7 4 ,6
8 3
1 8 0
3 0
6 0
5 5
1 3
8 4
N ar
e n d ra
M o d i
In d ia
6 8
6 3
4 9 .5
3 ,2
1 4
1 ,9
0 0
2 ,0
1 5 .6
1 ,3
5 2 ,6
4 2 ,2
8 0
1 7 7
4 8
5 6
4 0
5 1
2 6
N ic
o lá
s M
ad u ro
V e n e zu
e la
5 6
7 6
3 .6
5 3 ,2
2 4
1 ,6
3 7
1 6 ,0
5 4 .5
2 8 ,8
8 7 ,1
1 8
1 8 1
1 2
7 3
7 6
1 6
1 0 0
P au
l K
ag am
e R
w an
d a
6 1
2 3 2
1 .5
1 2 ,7
8 6
3 ,3
2 0
7 7 3
1 2 ,3
0 1 ,9
7 0
1 —
— —
— 1 8
3 7
P e d ro
S án
ch e z
S p ai
n 4 7
1 4
1 .0
7 3 ,2
4 8
9 8 9
3 0 ,5
2 3 .9
4 6 ,6
9 2 ,8
5 8
1 5 7
5 1
4 2
8 6
4 8
4 4
P e tr
o P o ro
sh e n k o
U k ra
in e
5 3
5 8
1 .2
3 ,2
4 8
1 ,8
2 5
3 ,0
9 5 .2
4 4 ,2
4 6 ,1
5 6
1 9 2
2 5
2 7
9 5
5 5
1 5
P o p e
F ra
n ci
s V
at ic
an 8 2
7 7
1 8 .1
2 ,0
0 7
1 ,7
6 7
— 8 0 1
0 —
— —
— —
— R
an ia
A l A
b d u lla
h Jo
rd an
4 8
2 4 6
1 0 .5
2 ,1
2 6
8 2 2
4 ,2
4 7 .8
9 ,9
6 5 ,3
1 8
0 7 0
3 0
4 5
6 5
1 6
4 3
R e ce
p T
ay yi
p E rd
o ğa
n T
u rk
e y
6 5
6 0
— 2 ,6
2 7
1 ,7
8 0
9 ,3
1 1 .4
8 2 ,3
4 0 ,0
8 8
1 6 6
3 7
4 5
8 5
4 6
4 9
R ic
ar d o
R o ss
e lló
P u e rt
o R
ic o
4 0
3 1
.1 6 1
3 ,2
1 1
2 ,8
5 3
3 1 ,6
5 1 .3
3 ,0
3 9 ,5
9 6
1 6 8
2 7
5 6
3 8
1 9
9 9
S aa
d H
ar ir
i L e b an
o n
4 9
3 2
1 .5
4 3 ,2
3 1
2 ,8
9 8
8 ,2
6 9 .8
6 ,8
5 9 ,4
0 8
1 7 5
4 0
6 5
5 0
1 4
2 5
S al
m an
b in
A b d u la
zi z
A l S au
d S au
d i A
ra b ia
8 3
5 5
7 .6
5 3 3 0
3 ,2
4 9
2 3 ,2
1 9 .1
3 3 ,7
0 2 ,7
5 6
0 9 5
2 5
6 0
8 0
3 6
5 2
S e b as
ti an
K u rz
A u st
ri a
3 2
1 7
.3 4 7
3 ,2
1 9
2 ,7
7 4
5 1 ,5
1 2 .9
8 ,8
9 1 ,3
8 8
1 1 1
5 5
7 9
7 0
6 0
6 3
S e b as
ti án
P iñ
e ra
C h ile
6 9
1 7
2 .2
4 3 ,2
2 0
1 ,7
7 8
1 5 ,9
2 3 .4
1 8 ,7
2 9 ,1
6 0
1 6 3
2 3
2 8
8 6
3 1
6 8
S h in
zo A
b e
Ja p an
6 4
7 9
1 .5
1 ,6
5 6
1 ,7
4 3
3 9 ,2
8 6 .7
1 2 7 ,2
0 2 ,1
9 2
1 5 4
4 6
9 5
9 2
8 8
4 2
S te
ff e n
S e ib
e rt
G e rm
an y
5 9
1 0 8
.9 2 2
2 ,8
9 5
1 ,5
5 4
4 8 ,1
9 5 .6
8 3 ,1
2 4 ,4
1 8
1 3 5
6 7
6 6
6 5
8 3
4 0
T am
im b in
H am
ad Q
at ar
3 9
2 6
.5 8
1 0 1
3 ,2
0 5
6 9 ,0
2 6 .5
2 ,7
8 1 ,6
8 2
0 9 3
2 5
5 5
8 0
— —
T e o d o ro
L o cs
in P h ili
p p in
e s
7 0
1 0
.6 5
3 ,2
0 3
6 4 9
3 ,1
0 2 .7
1 0 6 ,6
5 1 ,3
9 4
1 9 4
3 2
6 4
4 4
2 7
4 2
T h e re
sa M
ay U
n it e d
K in
gd o m
6 2
3 6
.8 9 2
1 ,6
1 4
1 ,6
1 4
4 2 ,4
9 1 .4
6 7 ,1
4 1 ,6
8 4
1 3 5
8 9
6 6
3 5
5 1
6 9
U h u ru
K e n ya
tt a
K e n ya
5 7
7 6
.0 0 5 5 4
1 6
1 ,8
4 3
1 ,7
1 0 .5
5 1 ,3
9 2 ,5
6 5
1 7 0
2 5
6 0
5 0
- V
la d im
ir P u ti n
R u ss
ia 6 6
8 7
.7 3
3 ,2
0 8
1 ,5
1 2
1 1 ,2
8 8 .9
1 4 5 ,7
3 4 ,0
3 8
1 9 3
3 9
3 6
9 5
8 1
2 0
N o te
s: P D ¼
H o fs
te d e
p o w
e r
d is
ta n ce
; ID
V ¼
H o fs
te d e
in d iv
id u al
is m
; M
A S ¼
H o fs
te d e
m as
cu lin
it y;
U A ¼
H o fs
te d e
u n ce
rt ai
n ty
av o id
an ce
; L T ¼
H o fs
te d e
lo n g-
te rm
o ri
e n ta
ti o n ; IN
D ¼
H o fs
te d e
in d u lg
e n ce
.
53
through July 2019. We constructed the list of leaders from
listings in the popular press and Twitter reports (e.g., Twiplo-
macy; https://twiplomacy.com/ranking/50-effective-world-
leaders/#). As illustrated in Table 1, the list contains leaders
from Europe, Asia, North, Central and South America, Africa,
and the Middle East, all of whom either held an active political
position or were politically active (e.g., Hillary Clinton) during
the data collection period. For each political leader, we col-
lected two types of communication data:
1. Social media: Twitter is a commonly used social media
communication outlet for political leaders (Golbeck
et al. 2010) and has been recently used in research on
political leaders (Bovet and Makse 2019; Bovet, Mor-
one, and Makse 2018). We used Twitter API to down-
load the tweets from each political leader’s public
account. We included everything posted under the lead-
er’s Twitter handle, including original tweets as well as
retweets, with the exception of Angela Merkel, for
whom we used her spokesman’s Twitter account
because her own Twitter account was not sufficiently
active. Altogether, we collected a total of 150,696 Twit-
ter posts. Note that although the political leaders often
employ people who do some of the actual tweeting on
their behalf, they mostly are personally involved in their
Twitter account, and the leaders’ tweets are regarded as
the closest approximation to direct communication with
their audience (Draper 2018).
2. Press articles: We mined the LexisNexis database
(using its API) to collect the entire press coverage of
the leaders on our list, resulting in a total of 120,689
press articles. The data set contains most of the world’s
press publications, including online and offline daily
newspapers and magazine articles as well as press
releases and newswire articles.
In addition, because we wanted to examine the communi-
cation style with respect to country and leader characteristics,
we collected, for each leader, a list of personal characteristics:
age, role, and tenure in position. For each country, we collected
data on the country’s GDP, social inequality (Gini index), and
its political regime. We also used, for each country, the latest
measures of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions (Hofstede 2011),
namely, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity versus femininity,
long-term orientation versus short-term orientation, individu-
alism versus collectivism, indulgence versus restraint, and
power distance.
Preprocessing of Communication Data
Conducting content analysis on Twitter and on press articles is
challenging, with each data source bearing its own challenges:
First, the Twitter accounts of most global leaders from non-
English-speaking countries are not in English, and press arti-
cles also come in many languages. Content analysis algorithms,
however, are mostly trained on English dictionaries; hence, the
entire data set needs to be translated. Second, while the press
articles are usually edited before publication and use standard
language, Twitter is characterized by a low degree of regula-
tion, and tweets use spoken language (Crystal 2006). Process-
ing Twitter data requires coping with contracted auxiliaries
(e.g., “I’ll,” “won’t,” “isn’t,” “ain’t,” “gotta,” “wanna”), slang
expressions (e.g., “lol”), exclamations (e.g., “oh,” “yay,”
“aww”), terms coined explicitly by Twitter (e.g., “retweet” or
“RT”), use of the “@” and “#” symbols to mention other users
and topics, and errors of spelling, capitalization, and
punctuation.
To prepare the data, all tweets were decoded to natural
language (some of them were coded as bytes) and were trans-
lated to English using Google translation libraries. All linguis-
tic characteristics of a tweet (i.e., @ usernames, hashtags,
retweet abbreviations) were retained. LexisNexis preproces-
sing included cleaning all the metadata (e.g., length, load date,
language, publication type, journal code, section, byline). Non-
English publications were translated to English as part of the
data corpus. The entire text from both sources was converted to
lowercase, and extra blank spaces were removed.
Content Analysis
We conducted two types of content analysis on the communi-
cation data:
1. Sentiment analysis: We applied sentiment analysis to
measure the level of positivity or negativity of the
tweets and the news articles (Pang and Lee 2004; Zhao,
Qin, and Liu 2010). We used two sentiment analysis
tools. The first is the polarity measure of the TextBlob
Python library, which returns a sentiment scaled from
�1 to 1. The second sentiment score (VADER of Python) returns four different scores: positive (0 to 1),
neutral (0 to 1), negative (0 to 1), and compound (�1 to 1). The first three are scores of positivity, neutrality, and
negativity, respectively, and the compound score is a
weighting of all three. We used the weighted score
(compound) as an alternate measure for the sentiment
analysis. Both measures (hereafter termed “polarity”
and “sentiment”) intend to capture the same construct
and are highly correlated; we use them both for robust-
ness purposes.
For the Twitter data, we used the entire text of the
post for the sentiment analysis. The news articles are
longer and in many cases only partially relate to the
political leader. Therefore, the overall sentiment of the
article might not represent the sentiment attached to the
political leader. To overcome this problem, we con-
ducted the sentiment analysis of news articles only on
paragraphs that include the name of political leader.
2. Topic analysis: We used latent Dirichlet allocation
(LDA) to elicit the topics of the Twitter and news posts.
This method is regarded as an effective way to identify
topics (i.e., subjects discussed in one or more
54 Journal of International Marketing 28(1)
documents) and topic categories (i.e., groups of topics
belonging to a common subject area) in large document
collections (Krippendorff 2004). It has been recently
applied in marketing research to analyze user-
generated content (e.g., Büschken and Allenby 2016;
Tirunillai and Tellis 2014). We trained the LDA model
on the Twitter data, where each tweet was considered as
a single document. In a standard preprocessing stage for
the LDA, we removed exclamation marks, emoticons,
common slang words, URLs, hashtags, and Twitter-
A: Sentiment Per Leader: Twitter Versus Press Articles
B: Polarity Per Leader: Twitter Versus Press Articles
−.40
−.20
.00
.20
.40
.60
.80
A bd
el F
at ta
h al
-S is
i A
bd ul
la h
bi n
Za ye
d A
l N ah
ya n
A de
lA lju
be ir
A le
ks an
da rV
uc ic
A nd
ré s
M an
ue lL
óp ez
O br
ad or
S te
ffe n
S ei
be rt
A rif
A lv
i B
en ja
m in
N et
an ya
hu D
an ilo
M ed
in a
D m
itr y
M ed
ve de
v D
on al
d T
ru m
p D
on al
d T
us k
M ah
a t hi
r M
oh am
ad E
dg ar
s R
in ke
v i c s
E m
ir Ta
m im
bi n
H am
ad E
m m
an ue
l M ac
ro n
E rn
e s to
A ra
új o
E vo
M or
al es
G i u
se pp
e C
o n te
H ill
a r y
C lin
to n
Im ra
n K
ha n
Iv án
D u q
ue Ja
ir B
ol so
na ro
Ja va
d Za
rif Jo
ko W
id od
o Jo
rg e
A rr
ea za
M on
t s er
ra t
Ju an
O rla
nd o
H er
ná nd
ez Ju
st in
Tr ud
ea u
K ha
lid bi
n A
hm e d
K in
g A
bd ul
la h
II K
in g
S al
m an
b i n
A bd
ul az
iz A
lS au
d K
on o
Ta ro
Le e
N ak
-y eo
n M
ar c e
lo E
br ar
d M
ar tín
V iz
ca rr
a M
au ric
io M
ac ri
M ev
lü t Ç
av uş
oğ lu
M ig
ue lD
í a z -
C an
el M
ik e
P om
p e o
M oh
am m
ed bi
n Za
ye d
A l N
ah ya
n M
oo n
Ja e-
in M
uh am
m ad
u B
uh ar
i N
ar en
dr a
M od
i N
ic ol
ás M
ad ur
o P
a u lK
ag am
e P
e d ro
S án
ch ez
P et
ro P
or o s
he nk
o P
op e
Fr an
ci s
R an
ia A
lA bd
ul la
h R
e c ep
T a yy
ip E
rd oğ
an R
ic ar
d o R
o s se
lló S
aa d
H ar
iri S
eb as
tia n
K ur
z S
e b as
tiá n
P iñ
e r a
S ha
h M
ah m
oo d
Q ur
es hi
S he
ik h
M oh
am m
ed A
lM ak
to um
S hi
nz o
A be
Te od
or o
Lo cs
in Th
er es
a M
ay U
h u ru
K en
ya tta
V la
di m
ir P
ut in
Twitter sentiment Press articles sentiment
−.05
.00
.05
.10
.15
.20
.25
.30
A bd
el F
at ta
h al
-S is
i A
bd ul
la h
bi n
Za ye
d A
l N ah
ya n
A de
lA lju
be ir
A le
ks an
da rV
uc ic
A nd
ré s
M an
ue lL
óp ez
O br
ad or
S te
ffe n
S ei
be rt
A rif
A lv
i B
en ja
m in
N et
an ya
hu D
an ilo
M ed
in a
D m
itr y
M ed
ve de
v D
on al
d T
ru m
p D
o n al
d T
us k
M ah
at hi
r M
oh a m
a d E
dg ar
s R
in k e
v i cs
E m
i r Ta
m im
bi n
H am
ad E
m m
an ue
l M ac
ro n
E rn
es to
A ra
új o
E vo
M or
al es
G iu
se pp
e C
on te
H ill
ar y
C lin
t o n
Im ra
n K
h a n
Iv án
D uq
ue Ja
ir B
ol so
n a ro
Ja va
d Za
rif J o
k o W
id o d
o J o
r g e
A rr
ea za
M on
ts er
ra t
Ju an
O rla
nd o
H er
ná nd
ez Ju
st in
Tr ud
ea u
K ha
lid bi
n A
hm ed
K in
g A
bd ul
la h
II K
in g
S a l
m an
bi n
A bd
u l az
i z A
l S au
d K
o n o
Ta ro
Le e
N ak
- y eo
n M
ar ce
lo E
br ar
d M
ar tín
V iz
ca rr
a M
au ri c
io M
ac ri
M ev
lü t Ç
av u ş
oğ lu
M ig
u e lD
ía z-
C an
e l M
ik e
P om
pe o
M oh
am m
e d bi
n Z a
y e d
A l N
ah ya
n M
oo n
J a e-
in M
uh am
m ad
u B
u h ar
i N
ar e n
dr a
M od
i N
ic ol
ás M
ad ur
o P
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ro P
or o s
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o P
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c i s
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ec ep
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os se
lló S
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ed A
l M a k
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in Th
er es
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ay U
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ir P
ut in
Twitter polarity Press articles polarity
Figure 2. Compound sentiment (Panel A) and polarity (Panel B) per leader for Twitter and press articles.
Peres et al. 55
specific notation (i.e., “b’,” “RT,” “b’RT”), although
we used them for the sentiment analysis. We also con-
ducted stemming (using NLTK Porter Stemmer) to exo-
genously force words with similar meanings, such as
“great,” “greatly,” “greatest,” and “greater,” to be
treated as a bundle. We filtered out tokens that appear
in less than 15 documents or in more than 50% of the documents (a token is a word or a short word combina-
tion). From the tokens left, we kept the 100,000 most
common speech tokens. The algorithm yielded its best
results for 15 topics (we manually looked through
results of different numbers of subjects to finalize the
number), and the different topics were manually named.
Then the chosen LDA model was applied on the Twitter
data and the LexisNexis data, with each document
being all the tweets or all the reports (respectively)
connected to each single leader. In this way, we
obtained the distribution of topics discussed in by each
political leader on Twitter, and in connection with the
leader in the press.
Results
Universality and Media Compatibility in Sentiment
Figure 2 illustrates the values of the sentiment/polarity mea-
sures per leader for Twitter and for press articles. In general,
the sentiment/polarity of leaders is neutral to positive, with the
Pakistani leader Shah Mahmood Qureshi being the most posi-
tive (.63, .231, .667, and .127 for Twitter sentiment, Twitter
polarity, press sentiment, and press polarity, respectively), and
politicians such as the British leader Theresa May and Abdul-
lah bin Zayed Al Nahyan from the United Arab Emirates being
at the bottom for positivity (note the relatively negative press
coverage of the latter). The average sentiment (using the com-
pound sentiment measure described previously) is .279 (SD ¼ .134) for Twitter and .272 (SD ¼ .196) for the press articles, meaning that they are not significantly different from each
other (p ¼ .62). The average polarity of the leaders in our data set is .13 (SD ¼ .054) for Twitter and .064 (SD ¼ .03) for the press articles. These numbers indicate that Twitter is signifi-
cantly more positive than the press articles, but the difference is
small and is not robust across different sentiment measurement
methods.
We further tested to what extent the sentiment of the polit-
ical leaders’ communication depends on their country and per-
sonal characteristics. Table 2 describes the results of four
regression models, where the dependent variables are the senti-
ment and polarity for Twitter and press articles and the depen-
dent variables are the country characteristics. None of the
variables were found to be significant. That is, the sentiment
and the polarity of communication do not depend on the lead-
ers’ individual country characteristics. We repeated this anal-
ysis with the leaders’ personal characteristics, as well as with
other country characteristics, such as level of happiness,
freedom of press, and social inequality. None of these variables
were found to be significant.
The results show a clear universality across leaders and also
similarity across communication types. The major political
leaders in our data set are similar in the sentiment of their
communication, and their sentiment, measured in terms of both
polarity and compound sentiment, does not show a clear depen-
dence on the country characteristics. This universality is also
expressed in the similarity of sentiment of Twitter and press
articles. The traditional notion of self-presentation as portray-
ing the individual in a positive manner and representation in
journalism as being more objective and therefore less posi-
tively biased has faint support in our data. Sentiment is gener-
ally neutral to positive, and Twitter is slightly more positive in
polarity, but this difference is not robust across the other senti-
ment measure we used.
Universality and Media Compatibility in Communication Topics
Tables 3 through 5 present the results of the content analysis.
The LDA procedure identified 15 topics that span the leaders’
communication: (1) the Arab world, (2) condolences, (3) con-
gratulations, (4) corruption, (5) diplomacy, (6) economy,
(7) education, (8) elections, (9) fighting terrorism, (10) global
relationships, (11) humanitarian crisis, (12) immigration,
(13) national holiday, (14) official thank-you messages, and
(15) parliamentary issues. Table 3 describes, for each topic,
the 15 words with the highest likelihood. Note that LDA clas-
sifies all the words on all the topics, providing for each word
the likelihood that it belongs to the topic. Table 4 presents the
average weights of the topic mixture over all the leaders, for
Twitter and for the press articles, and compares them using a
series of t-tests. The table indicates that diplomacy (i.e., words
Table 2. Regression of the Average Sentiment and Polarity of a Leader on Country Characteristics for Twitter and Press Articles.
Twitter Sentiment
Twitter Polarity
Press Articles
Sentiment
Press Articles Polarity
logGDP .045 �.014 �.014 .006 Continent
Asia .116 .073 .073 .002 Europe .035 .165 .165 �.019 Central America .144 �.059 �.059 �.016 South America .118 �.001 �.001 �.019 North America .098 .122 .122 �.010
Democracy .000 �.001 �.001 .000 Hofstede Dimensions
Power distance .066 �.039 �.039 .018 Individualism �.002 .001 .001 .000 Masculinity .000 .001 .001 .000 Uncertainty avoidance �.002 .003 .003 .000 Long-term orientation .000 .003 .003 .000 Indulgence �.001 .000 .000 .000
56 Journal of International Marketing 28(1)
T a b
le 3 .
L D
A R
e su
lt s:
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T o p
1 5
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s w
it h
th e
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h e st
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n o m
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h ti n g
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io n al
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to d ai
th an
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p e o p l
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lia m
e n ta
ry am
p p m
in te
rv ie
w co
n se
rv tu
rk e i
se n at
e u
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si d
tr u m
p u k
p e n si
o n
n e go
ti ti m
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o o n
sa i
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N o te
s: A
ll w
o rd
s w
e re
co n ve
rt e d
in to
lo w
e rc
as e
le tt
e rs
.W o rd
s m
ig h t b e
tr u n ca
te d
b e ca
u se
o f th
e st
e m
m in
g p ro
ce ss
(e .g
., “m
ig ra
t” st
an d s
fo r
“m ig
ra ti o n ,”
“i m
m ig
ra n ts
,” an
d o th
e r
w o rd
s) .T
h e
n u m
b e rs
ar e
th e
lik e lih
o o d
th at
th e
w o rd
b e lo
n gs
to th
e to
p ic
. *p <
.0 5 . In
th is
ca se
, n o
va ri
ab le
w as
fo u n d
si gn
if ic
an t.
57
related to meetings, conferences, discussions, etc.) is the most
popular topic for both communication outlets. Press articles
focus significantly more than Twitter on corruption, diplo-
macy, elections, and parliamentary issues, whereas Twitter,
relative to the press articles, deals more with personal mes-
sages, such as condolences, congratulations, and thank-you
messages, as well as economy. Many of the topics, such as the
Arab world, education, fighting terrorism, and global relation-
ships, receive similar emphasis both on Twitter and in the
press.
To what extent do communication topics depend on the
country characteristics? We tested, similarly to the sentiment
analysis, how the topic mixture depends on the country char-
acteristics. For each topic, we ran a regression model over the
61 leaders, in which the dependent variable is the weight of the
topic in the leader’s communication (for either Twitter or the
press articles) and the independent variables are the individual
and country characteristics. The results are presented in Table 5
(Panel A for Twitter and Panel B for press articles). The results
indicate that overall, the topic mixture does not seem to
strongly depend on the individual and country characteristics.
On Twitter, immigration is a prevalent topic for democracies
and for countries with high GDP. Interestingly, immigration
has more presence in the tweets of African leaders relative to
leaders from other continents. Immigration is also discussed in
countries with lower uncertainty avoidance, shorter-term orien-
tation, and lower indulgence. The Arab world is discussed less
in democracies (probably because it is discussed by Arab lead-
ers, who are mostly not democratic rulers). Being a democracy
is positively correlated with a country’s leader’s tweets on
corruption and education, and less with tweets on diplomacy.
For press articles, results are similar (although fewer variables
are significant). In addition to these variables, we tried a large
set of models with different variables, including individual
characteristics of the leaders and country characteristics, such
as level of happiness, freedom of press, and social inequality,
which did not lead to any results of interest.
What additional insights can we gain from the differences
between the topics discussed on Twitter and in the press
articles? As discussed, Table 4 indicates that although many
of the topics are discussed on average equally in both media,
some topics (e.g., congratulations, condolences, thank-you
messages) are more typical on Twitter, whereas topics such
as diplomacy and parliamentary issues are discussed more in
press articles. We wanted to analyze the differences between
the outlets at the individual leader’s level (in addition to the
aggregate comparison presented previously) and ask to what
extent a leader’s communication on Twitter is similar to or
different from the leader’s press coverage. To do so, we calcu-
lated the cosine similarity of the two topic mixture distribution
vectors for each leader. Cosine similarity treats the two topic
mixtures of a leader’s media as two vectors in a 15-dimensional
space and calculates their scalar (dot) product. Both the press
articles and Twitter topic distribution vectors of each leader
were normalized so that the sum of squares is 1 before the dot
product of the two vectors was calculated, so the similarity is
between 0 (lowest possible similarity; vectors are orthogonal)
and 1 (highest possible similarity). The cosine similarity values
of the leaders on our list range from .14 (Emir Tamim bin
Hamad) to .29 (Pope Francis), with an average of .22 (SD ¼ .03). Although these numbers may seem low, they represent
relatively high similarity, given the different structure and typ-
ical grammatical nature of the texts in these outlets. Hence, for
political leaders, the differences between Twitter and press
articles are no different than the typical difference between the
contents of these two channels, given their fundamentally dif-
ferent characteristics. In other words, we see no evidence that
differences in topic mixture between outlets are a result of an
outlet-specialized communication strategy.
We further checked whether the level of similarity depends
on the country characteristics. We ran a regression model in
which the dependent variable was the cosine similarity score
and the independent variables were the country characteristics
used in the previous regressions. The results, described in
Table 6, indicate that the higher the power distance and indi-
vidualism are, the higher is the topic similarity between Twitter
and press articles. Although the coefficients are significant, it is
hard to interpret them as representing a theoretically based,
fundamental mechanism.
Similarly to the sentiment analysis, the content analysis
implies universality across leaders in communication topics.
These results, grounded in the theoretical perspective of
the “mediatized communication as a meta process of
globalization” (Krotz 2007), imply that despite the distinct
differences between cultures, leaders generate a communica-
tion mix that is weakly dependent on the country characteris-
tics. In branding terminology, although political leaders are
brands that are strongly identified with their country, their
communication style does not reflect that. This is the case both
for their own generated content on Twitter and for the press
Table 4. The Average Topic Distribution over Leaders, for Twitter and Press Articles.
Topic p-Value of t-Test
Twitter Average
Press Articles (LexisNexis) Average
The Arab world .7951 .0736 .0790 Condolences .0000* .0624 .0372 Congratulations .0000* .1031 .0262 Corruption .0050* .0768 .0981 Diplomacy .0004* .1005 .1545 Economy .0345* .0816 .0615 Education .0686 .0491 .0595 Elections .0125* .0617 .0792 Fighting terrorism .2328 .0698 .0625 Global relationships .5576 .0681 .0629 Humanitarian crisis .8009 .0719 .0740 Immigration .4044 .0465 .0503 National holiday .3443 .0596 .0555 Official thank-you .0000* .0528 .0320 Parliamentary .0021* .0483 .0752
Notes: Each t-test compares the distance between the two average values, over all the leaders (N ¼ 61). *p < .05.
58 Journal of International Marketing 28(1)
T a b
le 5 .
R e gr
e ss
io n s
o f th
e T
o p ic
M ix
tu re
o f a
L e ad
e r
o n
C o u n tr
y C
h ar
ac te
ri st
ic s
fo r
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it te
r an
d P re
ss A
rt ic
le s.
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ia b le
lo gG
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te d e
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e n si
o n s
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p e
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al A
m e ri
ca S o u th
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e ri
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h A
m e ri
ca D
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o cr
ac y
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ta n ce
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cu lin
it y
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rt ai
n ty
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ce L o n g-
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e n ce
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it te
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59
articles, which are supposed to represent the spectrum of inter-
ests of the local readers.
The similarity exists not only among leaders, but also
between Twitter, which is a presentational social media chan-
nel, and press articles, which are a form of representational
media. The differences in sentiment between Twitter and press
articles are small. Although the two outlets differ in some
topics (Table 3), their topic mixtures have many similarities,
and the differences seem to result from the inherent nature of
these outlets, not from channel-specific communication strate-
gies. In this sense, our results are in line with previous findings
showing that journalists rely on social media as a source of
information while constructing their news articles (Shapiro and
Hemphill 2017).
Universality and Media Compatibility in “I,” “We,” “You,” and “They” Messages
As an additional analysis, we tested another linguistic charac-
teristic of the leaders’ communications: some language models
(Packard, Moore, and McFerran 2018) emphasized the use of
“I” or “we” versus “you” and “they” as a possible measure of
the amount of self-focus versus orientation toward others in
one’s communication.
We used the content analysis algorithm to count the pro-
portion of first-person, second-person, and third-person words
for Twitter and for the press articles. Words with similar
meanings were grouped together (e.g., the words “I,” “me,”
and “myself” were all counted as “I”). Figure 3 presents the
percentage of these pronouns. For both outlets, “we” mes-
sages are predominant, followed by “I” messages. While
“they” messages are more prevalent than “you” messages in
press articles, the opposite is true for Twitter. This finding is
understandable because of the more descriptive nature of
press items. Note that we did not count the use of “he” or
“she,” as these words are commonly used in press articles to
describe what the leader did and therefore are less indicative
of the leader’s communication style.
Pronoun usage is related to sentiment. Table 7 presents the
results of two regression models, where the independent variable
is the polarity for Twitter and press articles and the dependent
variables are the percentage of each pronoun type. We can see
that for both communication outlets, more positive sentiment is
associated with higher usage of “we” messages and lower usage
of “they” messages. We obtain similar results for the sentiment
measure. Note that both sentiment algorithms we use do not
consider pronoun usage as input for determining the sentiment,
so these two dimensions are not forced to be correlated.
We also tested the percentage of the four types of pronouns
versus the country characteristics. The results are presented in
Table 8. Similar to the results on sentiment and topic, the use of
“I,” “we,” “they,” or “you” messages seems to be independent
of country characteristics. The only significance we found is
that when tweeting, leaders from Asia, Europe, and Central
America use “we” messages more often than leaders from
Africa do. Also, leaders from countries with shorter-term orien-
tation were found to use first-person pronouns (“I” and “we”)
on Twitter more often than leaders from countries with longer-
term orientation. The rightmost two columns of Table 8
describe regression models in which the dependent variables
are the differences between the number of “I” or “we” mes-
sages and the number of “they” or “you” messages. This anal-
ysis indicates the use of first-person relative to second- and
third-person pronouns (the left columns relate to the overall
proportion of each type, irrespective of the others). In line with
the finding described earlier, relative to African leaders, leaders
from Asia, Europe, and Central America use first-person mes-
sages more than second- and third-person messages when
tweeting. Also, leaders from countries with shorter-term orien-
tation were found to use first-person pronouns more often than
second- and third-person pronouns on Twitter.
Mapping on the Universality–Compatibility Matrix
We combined the two dimensions to classify the leaders in our
sample on the universality–compatibility matrix. The matrix is
conceptual, and therefore, we had several options to operationa-
lize it. We chose the horizontal axis to represent the extent to
which the topic distribution of the focal leader is similar to the
average topic distribution across leaders. Our measure of simi-
larity is the cosine similarity (of the normalized vectors) between
the topic distribution vector of the focal leader’s tweets and the
average distribution vector of all leaders on Twitter. Recall that
cosine similarity ranges from 0 to 1, with 1 indicating identical
vectors. The vertical axis, representing media compatibility,
indicates the difference in average sentiment between the lead-
er’s Twitter account and the leader’s press articles. Since in our
sample the Twitter sentiment was always higher than the senti-
ment of the news articles, low compatibility means more nega-
tive press coverage, and high compatibility means that the press
articles are similar in sentiment to the Twitter account. Note that
we could have chosen this axis to be the topic similarity or a
Table 6. Average Topic Distribution over Leaders, for Twitter and Press Articles.
Coef. p-Value
GDP 4.86E-07 .882 Continent
Asia .1955 .133 Europe .1511 .271 Central America .1156 .406 South America .1664 .203 North America .0389 .835
Democracy .0434 .625 Hofstede Dimensions
Power distance .0035* .034 Individualism .0033* .048 Masculinity .0011 .533 Uncertainty avoidance .0016 .311 Long-term orientation .0002 .922 Indulgence .0017 .348
*p < .05.
60 Journal of International Marketing 28(1)
combined similarity, but sentiment seems to be the most appro-
priate for testing press bias.
Figure 4 presents the mapping of the 54 leaders who had
both press articles and Twitter data in our sample. We defined
the intersection between the four quadrants arbitrarily as the
middle point of the value range for each axis. Following the
classification in Figure 1, we see that the largest group is the
Global Icons (26 leaders), who have communication topics
similar to the average and have high media compatibility
(i.e., low differences in sentiment), such as the Russian Dmitry
Medvedev, Donald Trump from the United States, and Emma-
nuel Macron from France. The second largest group is the
Narrowband Influencers (13 leaders), with high media compat-
ibility but a more peculiar topic distribution. This group
includes Pope Francis, King Salman of Saudi Arabia, and
Mohammed bin Zayed from the United Arab Emirates. The
A: Twitter Pronoun Usage
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Figure 3. Pronoun usage frequency per leader for Twitter (Panel A) and press articles (Panel B).
Peres et al. 61
Cosmopolitan Antagonists (nine leaders), with generic topic
distribution and lower media compatibility, included Benjamin
Netanyahu from Israel and the Canadian leader Justin Trudeau.
Finally, the Peculiar Notorious are the least frequent in our
sample, with only six leaders, most of them near the borders
of the quadrant. Their salient member is King Abdullah II from
Jordan. To examine whether the four quadrants represent any
profiling with respect to country characteristics, we ran a set of
ANOVA tests on all the country characteristics used in the
Table 7. Average Leader Polarity for Twitter and Press Articles Versus Usage of Pronouns.
Twitter Polarity Press Articles Polarity
Intercept .0748* .0715* % of “I” 1.6114 �9.2876 % of “We” 1.759* 4.0929* % of “They” �9.8802* �7.5499* % of “You” 2.7287 18.9278
*p < .05.
Table 8. Average Leader Usage of Pronouns Versus Country Characteristics.
“I,” Twitter
“We,” Twitter
“They,” Twitter
“You,” Twitter
“I,” Press
Articles
“We,” Press
Articles
“They,” Press
Articles
“You,” Press
Articles
(“I” þ “We”) � (“They” þ “You”),
(“I” þ “We”) � (“They” þ “You”),
Press Articles
logGDP �.00005 .00033 �.00006 .00040 .00029 .00032 .00055 .00029 �.00006 �.00022 Continent
Asia .01186 .0241* .00261 .00369 �.00181 �.00122 �.00072 �.00051 .0002* �.00001 Europe .00750 .0268* .00199 �.00008 �.00036 .00058 �.00052 �.00062 �.0001* .00007 Central America .01525 .0276* .00093 .00452 �.00002 .00214 .00007 .00000 �.0004* .00002 South America .00494 .01031 .00153 .00037 .00063 .00251 �.00107 �.00024 �.00012 .00002 North America .00533 .01261 .00176 .00309 �.00044 .00035 �.00046 �.00014 .00019 �.00006
Democracy .00586 .0141* .00157 .00081 �.00098 �.00019 �.00047 �.00038 �.0002* .00004 Hofstede Dimensions
Power distance �.00002 �.00016 .00000 �.00003 .00002 .00002 .00000 .00000 .01759 �.00032 Individualism .00006 �.00008 .00002 .00007 .00000 �.00001 �.00003 �.00001 .02966 �.00180 Masculinity �.00003 �.00015 �.00001 �.00004 .00003 .00003 �.00001 .00001 .03742 .00205 Uncertainty avoidance .00005 .00019 �.00002 .00003 .00000 �.00001 .00001 .00000 .03239 .00136 Long-term orientation �.0001* �.0004* �.00003 �.00004 .00001 .00001 �.00001 .00000 .0131* .00050 Indulgence .00002 .00018 .00001 .00001 �.00004 �.00004 �.00001 �.00001 .01335 .00444
*p < .05.
A. Aljubeir
A. Vucic
S. Seibert
A. Alvi
B. Netanyahu
D. Medina
D. Medvedev
D. Trump
D.Tusk
M. Mohamad
E. Rinkevics
T. bin Hamad
E. Macron
E. Araújo E. Morales G. Conte
H. Clinton I. Khan
I. Duque J. Bolsonaro
J. Zarif J. Widodo
J. Montserrat
J. Hernández
J. Trudeau
K. bin Ahmed
Abdullah II
M. bin Salman
K. Taro
L. Nak-yeon
M. Vizcarra
M. MacriM. Díaz-CanelM. Pompeo
M. bin Zayed Moon Jae-in
M. Buhari
N. Modi
N. Maduro
P. Kagame
P. Sanchez
P. Poroshenko
Pope Francis
R. Al Abdullah
R. Erdoğan
R. Rosselló S. Hariri
S. Kurz
S. Piñera
M. Qureshi
M. Al Maktoum
S. Abe
T. Locsin
.00
.05
.10
.15
.20
.25
.50 .55 .60 .65 .70 .75 .80 .85 .90 .95 1.00
M ed
ia C
om pa
tib ili
ty :
itt er
a nd
P re
ss
( ig
h →
Universality: Topic Similarity to Other Political Leaders (Particular → Universal)
Cosmopolitan Antagonist
Narrowband Influencer
Global Icon
Peculiar Notorious
Figure 4. Mapping of the political leaders on the universality–compatibility matrix.
62 Journal of International Marketing 28(1)
previous regressions and did not see a significant difference.
We also tried to cluster the data using k-means clustering and
did not obtain meaningful insights. The results confirm the
pattern we observed in the previous analysis of the leaders’
communication: despite being strong national brands, their
topic distribution shows a generic, universal pattern, and they
have a relatively high level of media compatibility. However,
some of them talk about topics that deviate from the general
distribution, and some enjoy press coverage that reflects their
presentational media (which, interestingly, does not show
meaningful dependence on the political system of the country).
Discussion and Conclusions
The focus of this article is to study universality and media
compatibility in the communication of political leaders. One
would expect that leading politicians, being salient icons of
their countries, will adopt a country-specific communication
persona, and hence their communication will demonstrate
country-related characteristics. On the other hand, these leaders
operate in a mediatized environment. This environment is con-
sidered a driver of globalization and suggests the value of more
homogenous, universal communication.
Heavy mediatization also affects the relationship between
presentational and representational communication outlets,
which operate simultaneously and influence each other. While
variety suggests large differences between outlets, the mutual
influence might lead to high media compatibility.
Our study is the first, to the best of our knowledge, to study
these two dimensions systematically and quantitatively, using
large-scale data. We collected the communication data of 61
global world leaders from their Twitter accounts and press
coverage, and used language processing tools to study the sen-
timent, topic mixture, and use of pronouns.
Our results show a high level of universality and media
compatibility across political leaders. Leaders are similar to
each other in their sentiment, topic mixture, and use of mes-
sages. Overall, the sentiment is positive, and the discussed
topics are mainly diplomacy, economy, corruption, and the
Arab world. Of the pronouns, “we” messages are used the most,
followed by “I” messages. The results are robust across com-
munication channels, with Twitter being slightly more positive
than the press articles. Press articles focus significantly more
than Twitter on corruption, diplomacy, elections, and parlia-
mentary issues, whereas Twitter, relative to the press articles,
deals more with personal messages, such as condolences, con-
gratulations, and thank-you messages, as well as economy.
With a few exceptions, we saw almost no significant depen-
dence on country characteristics. Relative to Africa, leaders from
Asia, Europe, and Central America use first-person messages
more than second- and third-person messages when tweeting.
Also, leaders from countries with shorter-term orientation were
found to use first-person pronouns, relative to second- or third-
person pronouns, more often on Twitter, but the effects are small.
Classifying the leaders in the universality–compatibility
space, we saw that most of them fall in the universal–high
compatibility quadrant.
This research is not free of limitations. First, our selection of
leaders is biased toward leaders with high visibility in the global
arena. Local politicians, who deal less with international affairs,
might demonstrate more country-specific communication pat-
terns. Second, our choice of outlets is limited to press articles
and Twitter. However, political leaders are active on other social
platforms (e.g., Facebook, Instagram) and other representational
media, such as television, which were not studied here and could
demonstrate different patterns. Third, universality in communi-
cation can be measured in additional ways, such as by the pro-
portion of communication in English, The number of
international press conferences initiated by the leader, and the
leader’s choice of clothing. Fourth, at the technical level, lan-
guage processing, although continuously improving, does not
yet deal reliably with multilingual data sets, nonstandard lan-
guage, grammatical complexities, and meaning extraction.
Our results add to the understanding of globalization in
brands that are typically strongly associated with their country
of origin. The universalism we observe might add to the body
of results in brand research, showing the advantages of global
positioning (Diamantopoulos et al. 2019; Guo 2013; Nijssen
and Douglas 2011). Methodologically, we show how these
questions can be addressed quantitatively and systematically,
for a large number of countries, using publicly available data.
While these approaches are commonly used in marketing, our
paper suggests that they could be implemented to gain insights
in communication research and political studies.
Is the universalism we observed good or bad for the citizens
of the world? As stated in the introduction, the citizens of the
world’s nations are increasingly facing challenges of a global
nature, such as immigration, environmental issues, and the future
of the European Union and other regional treaties. Coping with
these challenges requires world leaders to create communication
infrastructures that go beyond national boundaries. Our results
provide an optimistic view that such infrastructures might exist.
Regarding media compatibility, the high compatibility level
observed between Twitter and the press articles is a reminder of
the costs that come with the mediatization that enables this
universality. Our results indicate that the continuous spillover
of content between presentational channels (e.g., social media)
and representational channels (e.g., press, television) makes
them similar to each other and raises concerns about the actual
variety of information sources available to citizens and voters,
the objectivity of these sources, and their reliability.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to
the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for
the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This article
Peres et al. 63
was supported by the Israeli National Foundation and the KMart
foundation.
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