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Ocean Development & International Law, 46:345–358, 2015 Copyright ! Taylor & Francis Group, LLC ISSN: 0090-8320 print / 1521-0642 online DOI: 10.1080/00908320.2015.1089748
The Sewol Ferry Disaster in Korea and Maritime Safety Management
SUK KYOON KIM
Korea Coast Guard (Ret.) Seoul, Korea
The sinking of the Sewol ferry on April 16, 2014, in Korea, the deadliest peacetime maritime accident in decades, was caused by a variety of factors, including human error and institutional and legal deficiencies. This article reviews the incident and its consequences.
Keywords: maritime accidents, maritime safety, Sewol/ferry disaster Introduction
The sinking of the Sewol ferry on April 16, 2014, was the deadliest peacetime maritime 1
accident in Korea since 1970. In the aftermath the Korean government established an agenda committed to advancing maritime safety standards, safety management gover- nance, practices, and institutions, as well as enhancing public awareness of maritime safety. Despite this commitment, challenges lie.
For Korea, which has a good safety record and a modern maritime safety infrastruc- ture, the 2014 disaster was a shock that affected the country as a whole. Many critics argued that the ferry accident was the outcome of a rapid economic development, referred to as “compressed growth,” where the poverty-stricken country in the 1950s and 1960s has risen to be one of the most developed countries in a few decades. They criticize that Korea sacrificed safety for a rapid economic development.
This article explores what caused the ferry accident and identifies the lessons learned from the disaster, and the challenges that exist to ensuring the maritime safety of passen- ger ships to prevent a future such disaster.
The Sinking of the Sewol Ferry Overview2
On April 16 2014, the Sewol ferry, a 6,825 ton-roll-on roll-off passenger ship, with 476 passengers and crew on board, was en route to Jeju Island when it sank off the coast of the Jindo Island. The passengers included 345 high school students on a field trip, 14
Received 9 June 2015; accepted 12 June 2015.
The opinions expressed are solely the author’s and are not intended to reflect the positions of the Korea Coast Guard nor those of the Korean government.
Address correspondence to Suk Kyoon Kim, former Commissioner General, Korea Coast Guard, Songdo Dong 3-8, Yeonsu Gu, Incheon, Korea 406-741. E-mail: sukkyoon2004@daum.net
345
346 S. K. Kim
teachers, 104 general passengers, and 33 crew members. The accident resulted in 295 dead, 9 missing, and 172 rescued.
The ship departed from the Incheon Port around 21:00 p.m. on April 15, after experiencing a two-hour delay due to a thick fog, which made visibility less than 1 km. The ferry arrived at Maengol Channel, off Jindo Island, around 08:27 a.m. on April 16. The weather conditions were wind speed of 4–7 m per sec, waves of 0.5 meters high, and good visibility.
Passing through the Maengol Strait,3 at 18 knots, the ferry, loaded with passengers and 2142.7 tons of cargo, began to list sharply to the left (port) when it made a left turn around 08:49 and capsized around 10:25 a.m.
Causes of the Disaster
The Korea Maritime Safety Tribunal (KMST) explored the causes of the sinking of the
Sewol ferry. The Prosecution Service4 and the Board of Audit and Inspection conducted
investigations to determine the causes in the context of criminal prosecution and adminis-
5 trativecharges. Thefollowingarethefindingsoftheseagencies.
First, unseaworthiness, as a result of a modification of the ferry, overloading of cargo, and drainage of required ballast water, were identified as the causes of the sinking. The vessel, built and commissioned in Japan in 1994, was purchased by Chunghaejin Marine Co. in 2012. Before the Sewol ferry was placed in service in Korea, the ferry’s upper decks were renovated, adding scores of cabins capable of carrying an additional 114 pas-
6
moving the ferry’s center of buoyance 51 cm upward, made it more prone to capsiz-
7 ing. When the Korea Register (KR), a nonprofit vessel classification agency respon-
sible for the inspection of the redesign of the ferry’s body,8 approved the modification, it set stability limits for the ferry respecting the maximum cargo weight that it could carry and on the minimum amount of ballast water needed when fully loaded. More specifically, the limits set after the modification were that the maximum weight of cargo to be loaded was 987 tons, a reduction of 1,450 tons from the original cargo capacity, and the amount of ballast needed was 1,703 tons,
sengers and an art gallery. According to the findings of KMST, the modifications made the ship top-heavy,
9 It was found that the Sewol ferry was loaded with 2,142 tons of cargo and 1,375.8
10
an increase of 1,333 tons from the original design.
tons of ballast water. draining the ferry’s ballast water to load more cargo.
30 degrees, which was irretrievable.
In this regard the Prosecution Service, citing the
The Prosecution Service accused the Company of deliberately 11
The Prosecution Service also discovered that the overloading of the Sewol ferry had
been a common practice and that the redesign of the ferry to carry more cargo and over-
loading were a way to address the worsening financial status of the Chunghaejin Marine
Co. The Prosecution Service indicated that the financial problems had been brought about
by constant embezzlement and fraud by the owner of the Sewol ferry company and his
12
the sharp tilting of the ferry. The poorly lashed and improperly secured 80 vehicles and 1,100 tons of shipping containers fell to one side and this led the ferry to tilt sharply by
13
family starting in 2005. Second, poor lashing of the vehicles and badly tied-down containers were blamed for
results of a simulation conducted by a research team at Seoul National University, found
that if the cargo had been properly secured, the ferry would have tilted less than 10
14
degrees.
The Sewol Ferry Disaster and Maritime Safety Management 347
Third, the poor steering by the vessel navigators who made a sharp turn without con- sidering the stability of the Sewol ferry was also problematic. The Prosecution Service discovered that when passing through Maengol Channel, the spot of the sinking, the cap- tain was not present on the bridge and neglected his duty to steer through the narrow, risky waterway. Instead, the captain arranged for a 25-year-old third mate to make their first navigation through the Channel from Incheon to the Jeju Island. The third mate and the helmsman made a sharp right turn, ignoring a recommendation not to make sharp
15
the stability issues of the ferry as a result of the modifications. It was found that a former captain of the ferry Sewol had advised crews not to make sudden turns
16
gency situations, which resulted in their fleeing the vessel when the ferry started to cap-
17
The captain and crew were all arrested and charged. The captain and three senior crew members, including the first and second mates and a chief engineer, were charged
turns due to the ferry’s instability. According to the KMST Report, the captain and the third mate were aware of
greater than 5 degrees. The KSMT Report also found that the captain and crew were poorly trained for emer-
size without taking possible actions to protect the passengers. to tilt, they repeatedly directed the passengers to “stay inside the ship.”18
19 the death penalty. The rest of the crew were charged with killing or injuring the passen-
20
ruled that the prosecution had failed to prove the murder charge. Instead, the captain was
21
The others were found guilty of similar charges. The first and the second mates were
25
Disaster Response
Concerning vessel traffic services in Korea, the Maritime Safety Act, the implemen-
tation of Chapter V, Safety of Navigation, of the International Convention for the
Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention,26 direct that Vessel Traffic Services
(VTS) are to be provided in the Special Areas for Maritime Safety and heavy traffic
27
with murder through wilful negligence.
The prosecutors asked that the captain receive
gers by leaving them at risk. In a trial on November 11, 2014, the captain was acquitted of murder. The judge
convicted of failing to take the steps required to save passengers in an emergency. captain was sentenced to 36 years in prison for deserting the ship and its passengers in the fatal crisis. The judge ruled that the captain “abandoned his passengers, knowing that they were waiting for instructions from the crew and that if they were not evacuated, their lives would be at risk.”22
23 rank were sentenced to 5–10 years in prison for shirking their duty to save passengers.
sentenced to 20 and 15 years in prison, respectively. In a subsequent appeal on April 28, 2015, the captain was found guilty of murder.
areas off the coasts.
The purposes of VTS are to provide information to prevent
marine accidents such as collision and grounding; to enhance the efficiency of port
management; and to provide advices, recommendations, and directions for maritime
28
The Jindo Coastal VTS, one of three coastal VTS centers and in charge of the waters
where the Sewol ferry sank, was monitoring the movement of the Sewol ferry on a volun-
tary reporting basis. When the Sewol ferry began to tilt, the crew first called for help, con-
29
safety. ies (MOF) had responsibility for the port VTS, while the Korean Coast Guard (KCG) had responsibility for the coastal VTS.
At the time of the Sewol ferry disaster, the Ministry of Oceans and Fisher-
tacting the Jeju Port VTS around 08:55 on April 16.
The distress call was relayed to the
When the ferry continued
Eleven crew members of lower 24
The
348 S. K. Kim
Jindo VTS via the situation room of the Mokpo District Coast Guard, which is in charge of these waters.
Contacting the Sewol ferry, the Jindo VTS kept advising the crew members to “give directions for the passengers to put on life jackets” and to “determine quickly the evacuation of passengers on the captain’s discretion.”30 The Jindo VTS directed vessels in the vicinity to “render assistance to rescue operations.”31 When the crew reported to the Jindo VTS that they were not able to confirm how much the ferry was flooded and that the ferry had listed by 60 degrees to the left, they evacuated,
32 Thirteen Coast Guard officers at the Jindo VTS Center were convicted of negligence
33
cue Act, the lead agency responsible for search and rescue operations for marine distress
incidents. Depending on the scale of maritime distress, central, regional, and district res-
cue headquarters are established in accordance with the organizational structure of
34
leaving passengers inside.
and the forgery of communication records. The Korea Coast Guard (KCG) is, in accordance with the Maritime Distress and Res-
KCG. cies involved from public and private sectors.
Their missions are to command, control, and coordinate rescue activities by agen-
When the Sewol ferry accident was reported to the KCG headquarters, the Central Rescue Coordination Headquarters was activated under the control of Com- mandant of the KCG. The Regional and District Rescue Headquarters were also activated. KCG rescue resources included the 122 Rescue Team, named after the emergency maritime distress call 122. These teams exist in all 17 district coast guard stations. Also activated was a Special Rescue Team at the South Sea Regional Command, which specializes in deep sea rescue operations. The KCG has four Maritime Commando Units in the Regional Commands, composed of res- cue officers mostly from Navy Special Forces. They are primarily responsible for maritime antiterrorism.
The above rescue forces were joined by the rescue forces from the Navy and civilian rescuers. A Coast Guard vessel, the 100 ton ship, Ship 123, was on routine surveillance duty 13.7 nm away from the accident and was dispatched to rescue the passengers on the Sewol ferry. Three helicopters on duty in the vicinity also were dispatched to rescue the passengers on the ferry.
The captain of Ship 123 was designated as the On-Scene Commander (OSC), in charge of the rescue operation. In collaboration with fishing boats, they rescued 172 pas- sengers mostly from the deck of the ferry.
The captain of Ship 123 testified at the National Assembly Inquiry that when the
35
vessel arrived on the scene, the Sewol ferry was tilting by 50 degrees.
The captain
of Ship 123 was charged with the botched rescue effort that wasted precious time
and delayed the evacuation of people from the vessel. The captain was found guilty
of professional negligence and sentenced to four years in prison. He was also
charged with falsely reporting that he had broadcast an evacuation order through
36
Passenger Ship Transport and Status of Maritime Accidents
Overview of Global Passenger Ship Accidents
Ferries are the safest form of transportation in North America and Europe. However, they are often the agents of catastrophe in some developing countries. Over the past decades
loudspeakers.
The Sewol Ferry Disaster and Maritime Safety Management 349
there have been numerous incidents in which thousands have died. In the first few years of the twenty-first century, there have been, on average, over 1,000 fatalities as a result of
37
primarily ferries, since 2000. Most notable is that over the latest decade all the deadliest
incidents, involving hundreds to thousands of fatalities, have occurred in developing
countries in Southeast Asia and Africa. Among them, Bangladesh, the Philippines, and
Indonesia are ranked as the most vulnerable countries for ferry accidents in Asia. These
three countries are each composed of archipelagic islands or rivers where ferry transport
is a major mode of transport for much of the population. In Bangladesh, for example, a
nation of 130 million people living on a coastal river delta interspersed with 250 north-
south rivers, approximately 20,000 ferries provide two distinctive types of transport ser-
vice: river crossing and long-distance travel. The latter is more likely to be involved in a
38
countries, died in ferry accidents. As illustrated in Table 1, this trend appears to have con- tinued despite endeavours to prevent ferry disasters and reduce fatalities.
When it comes to the causes of disastrous ferry accidents, the major contributing fac- tors include the poor quality of the vessels, overcrowding, sudden hazardous weather, and
39
2000 and 2014 (up to 60%– 86%, depending on how human error is defined).
Of particular note is the stark contrast in the number of fatalities from ferry accidents
between underdeveloped countries and highly developed countries. The U.S. ferry sys-
tem, for example, which transports 200 million passengers annually, had virtually no
fatalities between 1904, the General Slocom Ferry incident,41 and 2003, the Staten Island
42
(IMO), developed measures respecting the safety of large passenger ships, primarily
cruise ships and passenger ferries. This culminated in the adoption of a series of the
amendments of the SOLAS Convention in December 2006, which entered into force in
43
ferry sinkings. Table 1 shows the status of the most fatal accidents of passenger ships worldwide,
catastrophic accident. Between 2000 and 2004 more than 4,000 people globally, mostly from developing
the human factor. factors, none of which would be fatal on their own. According to a report to the World Ferry Safety Association, human error was a cause of most of the ferry accidents between
40
Most accidents are caused by the interaction of several contributing
Ferry incident. The international community has, through the International Maritime Organization
July 2010. in the design of future passenger ships. One is that the regulatory framework should place more emphasis on the prevention of a casualty from occurring. The other is that passenger ships should be designed for improved survivability so that in the event of a casualty, per-
The guiding philosophy of the amendments was based on the dual premises
44 The safety requirements of the SOLAS Convention do not apply to ferries that oper-
45
ways to increase ferry safety. Participants from both the government and private sector agreed to actions to provide
safer worldwide ferry operations through global cooperation47 in October 2013 by adopt-
ing the Nanjing Plan at the second regional meeting on the operational safety of domestic
48
sons can stay on board as the ship proceeds to port.
ate inland or solely on domestic routes. the ferries that do not come under the SOLAS Convention and is working on the develop- ment of standards for non-Convention vessels. In January 2006 the IMO signed an MOU with Interferry, a shipping association representing the ferry industry worldwide, to coop- erate toward enhancing the safety of non-Convention ferries. The aim of the MOU was to reduce fatalities by 90%, with Bangladesh selected as a pilot country to identify potential
46
ferries held in Nanjing, China.
The agreed actions include inviting governments to
The IMO has recognized the need to focus on
350
No
Ship
Date
Location
Fatality Cause
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
Le Joola Spice Islander I Al-Salam Boccaccio 98 Princess of Stars Nasreen I Salahuddin 2 Senopati Nusantara Rabaul Queen KM Terati Prima Bulgaria Thomas of Aquinas Samson Princess Ashika Coco-4 Costa Concordia
Senegal Zanzibar Egypt Philippine Bangladesh Bangladesh Indonesia Papua New Guinea Indonesia
Ferry Ferry Ferry Ferry Ferry Ferry Ferry Ferry Ferry Cruise Ferry Ferry Ferry Ferry Cruise
9.26.2002 9.10.2011 2.03.2006 6.21.2008 7.08.2003 5.03.2002 12.30.2006 2.02.2012 7.10.2011 7.10.2011 8.16.2013 3.07.2004 7.07.2009 11.28.2009 1.13.2012
Off coast of Gambia Zanzibar Channel Red Sea Off Mandalika Island Meghna River Meghna River
1,863 Overloading 1,570 Overloading 1093 Fire, Design Flaw 814 Stormy weather 530 Strong current 469 N/A
Note: *The Sewol ferry is not listed.
Status of Fatal Passenger Country Type
Ship Accidents
Worldwide since 2000*
Russia Philippine Madagascar Tonga Bangladesh Italy
Off Mandalika Island Solomon Sea Makassar Strait Volga River
404 Stormy weather 321 Large waves 280 Stormy weather 122 Stormy weather 120 Overcrowding 111 Stormy weather 74 Unseaworthiness 56 Stamped
Table 1
Off coast of Cebu Off coast of Madagascar Off coast of Tonga Near Bhola Island Off Isola Del Giglio
32 Grounding
The Sewol Ferry Disaster and Maritime Safety Management 351
develop appropriate regulations; reviewing and updating laws as well as keeping up with technological advancements and new IMO instruments; promoting a safety culture among stakeholders; ensuring that shipowners and operators develop and implement safety man- agement systems; facilitating the provision of aids to navigation including Vessel Traffic Services; and encouraging ship designers and builders to seek better technical solutions for ferry construction, such as sink resistance and equipment to facilitate search and rescue.
Passenger Ship Accidents in Korea
Maritime accidents in Korea can usefully be compared with those in Japan. Table 2 shows the number of marine accidents in both Korea and Japan in recent years. The statis- tics indicate that, in Korea, there have been 10,155 marine accidents with 1,282 fatalities from 2008 through 2014, averaging 1,455 marine accidents each year and 183 fatalities annually. Passenger ship accidents, including accidents caused primarily by ferries, account for 2.2% of the marine accidents nationwide. In Japan there have been 8,064 marine accidents during the same period, averaging 1,152 marine accidents annually, of which passenger ship accidents account for 6.5%, with 75 accidents annually on average. The number of fatalities between 2009 and 2012 totals 240 people, averaging 60 fatalities annually.
Compared with Japan, Korea appears to be more prone to fatal maritime accidents, with a higher number of accidents and a higher rate of fatalities. Concerning passenger ship accidents, Korea has had fewer passenger ship accidents, with 228 accidents, as opposed to 525 accidents in Japan in the same period. However, this does not necessarily
Table 2
Status of Marine Accidents in Korea and Japan
Korea
Number of Marine Year Accident (passenger ship)
2008. 2008 948 (21)***
2009. 2009 1,815 (17)
2010. 2010 1,617 (22)
2011. 2011 1,809 (22)
2012. 2012 1,573 (33)
2013. 2013 1,093 (39)
2014. 2014 1,330 (74)
Total 10,185 (228)
Fatality (%)
116 (12) 148 (8) 170 (11) 158 (9) 122 (8) 101 (9) 467 (35) 1,282 (13)
Japan
Number of Marine Accident (passenger ship)
873 (59) 1,522 (62) 1,334 (79) 1,126 (68) 1,115 (99) 1,084 (103) 1,010 (55) 8,064 (525)
Fatality (%)
N/A 59(4) 52(4) 65(6) 64(6) N/A N/A 240 (5)**
Source: Adapted from the Korea Maritime Safety Tribunal, and from the Japan Transport Safety Board and the Statistic Bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications
Note: *The ratio of fatality per marine accident.
**The figures are counted with only the numbers of casualty available in the period between 2009 and 2012.
***The upsurge in marine accidents in 2009 in Korea and Japan alike is believed to be due to a wider coverage of marine accident statistics, rather than a rapid increase in marine accidents.
352 S. K. Kim
indicate that Japan is more likely to have passenger vessel accidents, because Japan con- sists of several thousand islands and has an extensive network of ferry routes connecting each island. The disparity in the numbers of passengers carried by both domestic and international passenger ships in the two countries supports the argument. In Japan, 87 mil- lion people were carried by 2,272 passenger ships in 2010, as opposed to 17 million peo- ple carried by 224 ships in Korea.
It is important to note that in terms of fatalities, the number of people dead or missing in accidents in Korea is much higher than Japan between 2009 and 2012, averaging 150 and 60 people annually. This is also demonstrated in the statistics of fatalities per acci- dent, for which Korea recorded 15 fatalities per accident in the last seven years, as opposed to five for the four years between 2009 and 2012 in Japan. This can be explained either by Korea being more prone to large-scale maritime incidents or that the responses to accidents have not been as effective as in Japan.
Notably, the number of marine accidents in Korea in 2013 dropped significantly to 1,093, approximately 500 cases fewer than the average annual maritime accidents for pre- vious years, which had recorded over 1,500 cases per year. This can be credited to “The Project to Reduce Marine Accidents by 30%,” of the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries and the Korea Coast Guard. The Project has focused on the prevention of marine acci- dents, of which fishing boats and small ships less than 100 tons accounted for approxi-
49
The Shipping Act provides that the operators of passenger ships are to have a license,
50
Vessels purchased overseas are exempt from a newly built vessel inspection and instead are subject to a special inspection carried out by the Korean Register (KR), in accordance with Art. 60 of the Vessel Safety Act, which provides that vessel inspections
51
As already noted, the safety requirements of the SOLAS Convention apply only to pas-
senger ships engaged in international voyages52 with the safety standards of passenger
ships engaged in domestic voyages left to the governments in each country. Accordingly,
passenger ships are not subject to the safety management system to be adopted by states
pursuant to the International Safety Management Code (ISM Code), which obliges every
company to develop, implement, and maintain a safety management system that includes
53
the requirements of the SOLAS Convention, including the ISM Code. Safety standards for domestic passenger ships are regulated by the Shipping Act under which the task of
mately 66% and 71.1% of maritime accidents, respectively.
Governing the Safety of Passenger Ships in Korea
Licensing
varying with the types of shipping services, from the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries. The Chenghaejin Marine Co., in March 2013, had acquired from the Incheon Regional Oceans and Fisheries Administration a license of domestic passenger liner service enti- tling it to operate two ferries on a route between Incheon and Jeju.
are outsourced to a public corporation. was inspected by the KR in February 2013 before being placed in service in February 2013.
Safety Management System
The Sewol ferry, purchased in Japan in 2012,
safety requirements. Korea has the Vessel Safety Act and the Maritime Safety Law; the latter implements
The Sewol Ferry Disaster and Maritime Safety Management 353
safety management had been outsourced to the Korea Shipping Association (KSA),54 a cooperative association of domestic shipping companies established in 1949 to promote the shipping industry.
The shipping management regulations under the Shipping Act are quite similar to the safety requirements in the Vessel Safety Act. However, they differ concerning the respon- sibilities and authorities of a captain and a ship owner. The ISM Code places direct responsibilities and authorities on a captain and a ship owner, but this is not the case under the Shipping Act.
Under the supervision of the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries and the Korea Coast Guard, the KSA was responsible for the safe operations of passenger ships engaged on domestic voyages. The responsibilities of the KSA inspectors cover a wide range of checks for safe voyages, including adequate safety education for operators, the existence of safety officers in passenger ships companies and safety reporting, weather, and ship’s departure and arrival. Most importantly, the KSA was to monitor that passenger ships are
55
tion of a conflict of interest. In the aftermath of the Sewol ferry accident, the task of safety checking passenger ships was transferred to the Korea Ship Safety Technology Authority,
56
The Disaster Response Act provides the legal framework for responding to disasters natu- ral or social in Korea. Under the Act, the Minister of the Ministry of Public Safety and Security (MPSS), a newly created ministry in the aftermath of the Sewol ferry disaster, is responsible for coordinating the tasks of disaster response and safety management by cen- tral and local governments.
The Disaster Management Act states that when a large-scale disaster is declared, the Central Disaster Response Headquarters (CDRH) is to be established within the MPSS
57
influence of a disaster is socially or economically far-reaching. is responsible for coordinating response and recovery operations for a large-scale disaster by all the agencies concerned. The Minister is also authorized to ask for financial meas- ures and administrative supports of the agencies concerned.
Operational Maritime Safety
The management of maritime traffic, such as maintenance of waterways, aids to naviga- tion, and vessel traffic management, is provided primarily by the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries. This differs from countries like the United States and Japan, in which these services are carried out mostly by their coast guards. It has been a long-held position by the Korea Coast Guard (KCG) that VTS responsibility should be unified into a single agency, principally the KCG, as is the case in the United States and Japan. In the after- math of the Sewol ferry accident, the task of VTS, both port and coastal, have been incor- porated into MPSS, to which KCG currently belongs.
not overcrowded or overloaded. It has long been argued that the KSA should not monitor safety because it is in a posi-
a public corporation responsible for ship inspections and surveys.
Disaster Response
under the control of the Minister. level is necessary, the Prime Minister will be in charge of the CDRH. A large-scale disas- ter is defined as a disaster that inflicts enormous damages on life or property or that the
58
If a response to a large-scale disaster at the national
The Minister of MPSS
354 S. K. Kim
Restructuring of the Korea Coast Guard
The Korea Coast Guard (KCG) has been unique, in terms of its duty and organization. Unlike the coast guards in the United States and Japan, the KCG has been a “police type” coast guard. While other coast guards are primarily committed to search and rescue and maritime safety and security, the KCG’s duties have included some essential policing
59
In the Presidential Announcement of May 2014, President Park called the Korea Coast Guard’s Sewol ferry rescue operations a failure, noting that “if it had tried to rescue people more swiftly and more actively right after the accident, it could have greatly reduced the casualties.”60 She further said that “the Korea Coast Guard has been commit- ted to criminal investigation and its organizational growth since its inauguration, neglect- ing search and rescue works.”61
As part of the plans to reorganize governmental organizations to respond to disasters more efficiently, the Korea Coast Guard (KCG) was restructured, splitting its duties into the National Police Agency and the Ministry of Public Safety and Security (MPSS). The MPSS incorporates the tasks of disaster management from other government agencies and the KCG. The restructuring will result in the KCG focusing more on search and res- cue with the previous criminal investigation and intelligence functions transferred to the National Police Agency.
Maritime Safety Standards and Penalties
The Korean government has strengthened maritime safety by amending the maritime laws
62
ships from 30 years to 25 years; (2) imposing strict liability for a shipowner responsible for a large-scale accident; (3) increasing fines for those who violate safety regulations; (4) transferring the oversight on the safety of passenger ships from the industry to a public corporation; (5) establishing electronic ticketing to ensure proper management of passen- gers and cargo; (6) requiring the designation of personnel responsible for the safety man- agement in a ship company; and (7) creating a five-year plan to modernize passenger ships in Korea.
Amendments of the Seafarer’s Law includes (1) establishing the master’s responsi- bility to ensure the stability of a ship, the proper storage of cargo, and adequate equipment and personnel, and to report the result of such checks to the shipowner; (2) requiring the captain to be in command of the vessel in areas of frequent occurrence of accident; (3) clarifying the master’s duty to take actions necessary to save passengers and cargos in case of emergency and not to leave a vessel until protective measures are completed; and (4) increasing the penalty for masters who leave a ship in an emergency without complet- ing lifesaving actions or other necessary measures.
Amendments of the Vessel Safety Act includes (1) the prevention of modifying a ship after a newly built inspection without a permit from the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries; (2) and preventing any official who has worked as a ship inspector
missions, such as criminal investigation and intelligence gathering. comes from its organizational history. The KCG had been part of the National Police since its creation in 1953. When the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries (MOF) was created in 1996, the KCG became separate from the National Police Agency and placed under MOF as a central government agency.
related to the safety of passenger ships. The amendments of the Shipping Act includes (1) reducing the age limit of passenger
This uniqueness
The Sewol Ferry Disaster and Maritime Safety Management 355
within five years of retirement from taking a job of inspector less than two years after retirement.
Recognizing that a cause of the Sewol ferry disaster was the collusive link between the shipping industry and government regulators, the Korean government has engaged in
63
Further Challenges to Maritime Safety
In addition to the package of maritime safety measures implemented by the Korean gov- ernment, a number of further steps, based on the lessons from the Sewol disaster, are suggested.
As discussed above, a culture of the pursuit of a rapid economic growth has domi- nated Korean society. The value of safety has often been neglected. It is essential to pro- mote “a culture of safety first” to prevent further maritime disasters.
Institutionally, more stringent standards should be employed to ensure maritime safety. The trend of deregulation and government outsourcing helped maritime safety reg- ulation become lax. For example, modification of passenger ships was left out of direct government approval.
It is necessary for the government to take a greater responsibility in educating, train- ing, and certifying crew and captains within the small-scale passenger ship industry. To this end, a public academy that specializes in the qualification of shipping crews of domestic and international passenger ships should be created. The academy could also be responsible for the inspection of crews in service.
In the wake of the Sewol ferry disaster, it was found that some in the Korean Coast Guard were not properly trained and lacked the appropriate equipment to res- cue passengers onboard a large passenger ship tilting or capsizing. It was also found that the Coast Guard was not able to cope with a massive maritime disaster due to limited resources, mobility, access, and equipment. To bolster the rescue capability of the Korean Coast Guard, capacity building tailored to advanced rescue and equip- ment is essential. Such a rescue capacity cannot not be achieved without a close partnership with the civil sector. As part of these efforts, the establishment of reserve rescue units, composed of civilian divers, on a regional basis, should be con- sidered. Their mission would be to assist the Coast Guard in the event of a maritime accident or to carry out rescue work on their own.
In a massive disaster, a unified command is essential to ensure a response and recov- ery in a prompt and orderly manner. At the initial stages of the Sewol disaster, the response was not well coordinated and managed among the relevant government agen- cies. To avoid such a lack of coordination, a unified command across the government agencies should be established. Moreover, response officials should be prepared through training, exercises, and actual experience.
Conclusion
The causes of the Sewol ferry disaster were a combination of human error, institutional and legal deficiencies, the greed of the shipowner, the lack or negligence of seamanship
steps to break these close ties. revised to expand the employment restriction of retiring government officials from two years to three years and to broaden the scope of job relevance to government positions through which job opportunities are restricted.
As a step to this end, the Civil Servant Ethics Law was
356 S. K. Kim
by the captain and crew, lax safety regulations, a lack of rescue capability, and the collu- sive ties between the industry and bureaucrats.
The disaster has had a profound impact on the Korean society. Shocked by an unde- veloped country-type disaster, the country has engaged in developing a comprehensive package of measures to enhance maritime safety. Along with these safety measures, a cul- ture of “safety first,” should be entrenched in daily life, and more emphasis should be placed on proactive measures to prevent and reduce maritime accidents.
Notes
1. On December 12, 1970, the Namyoung ferry with 338 passengers on board en route to Busan from Jeju Island capsized off the coast of Yeosu, leaving 326 people dead.
2. The description of the sinking of the Sewol ferry is based on the Safety Investigation Report released by the Korea Maritime Safety Tribunal (KMST) on December 9, 2014. The KMST probed into the ferry accident through a special investigation team for eight months. The KMST Safety Investigation Report is available at <chogabje.com/ upload/세월호_특별조사_보고서(중앙해 심).pdf>. (in Korean)
3. The Maengol Strait is a narrow channel 4.5 km in width between Jindo Island and Maengol Island. The current speed in the channel is up to 6 knots, the second highest in Korea.
4. The Prosecution Service released its results of their investigation on the Sewol ferry’s sink- ing on October 6, 2014. The Prosecution Report is available at <www.spo.go.kr/spo/notice/press/ press.jsp?modeDview&article_noD583069&pager.offsetD410&board_noD2&stypeD>. (in Korean) The focus of their investigation was on five areas: causes of the Sewol ferry’s sinking and the crew’s responsibilities; negligence in the management and supervision of the ship’s safety; cor- ruption of the owner of Chunghaejin Marine Company and his family; irregularities in the shipping community; and the violation of responsibilities in rescue operations.
5. Bureau of Audit and Inspection material is available at <www.bai.go.kr/bai/cop/bbs/detail BoardArticle.do?bbsIdDBBSMSTR_100000000009&nttIdD1673&mdexDbai20&searchCndDall_ NTT_SJ_CN&searchWrdD&searchBgnDeD&searchEndDeD&searchYearD&pageIndexD13&rec ordCountPerPageD10>. (in Korean)
6. KMST, Report supra note 2, p. 10. 7. Ibid. 8. Ship Safety Act, Art. 15. The Korean Ministry of Government Legislation maintains a Web
site for English translation of Korean legislation at <www.moleg.go.kr>. All the legislation refer- enced in this article is available on this Web site. The modification of a ship requiring government approval is limited to the length, width, depth, and purpose of a ship.
9. KMST Report, supra note 2, p. 10. 10. The Prosecution Service, supra note 4, p. 5. 11. Ibid., pp. 4–5. 12. Ibid., pp. 6 and 17. 13. Ibid., p. 6. 14. Ibid., p. 7. 15. KMST Report, supra note 2, p. 90. 16. KMST Report, supra note 2, p. 29. 17. Ibid., pp. 93–95. 18. Ibid., p. 3. 19. The Prosecution Service, supra note 4, p. 8. 20. Ibid. 21. “Captain Gets 36 Years for Deserting Korean Ferry,” New York Times, November 11,
2014. 22. Ibid.
23. Ibid. 24. Ibid. 25. CNN, “Sewol ferry captain jailed for murder of 304 passengers,” CNN, April 2015, avail-
able at <www.cnn.com/2015/04/28/asia/Sewol-ferry-captain-jailed-murder/>. 26. International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1184 U.N.T.S. 2.
The Sewol Ferry Disaster and Maritime Safety Management 357
27. The Maritime Safety Act, Art. 36. 28. The Presidential Decree of the Maritime Safety Act, Art. 12. 29. KMST Report, supra note 2, p. 51. 30. Ibid., p. 53. 31. Ibid. 32. Ibid., p. 54. 33. The Prosecution Service, supra note 4, p. 12. 34. The Distress and Rescue Act, Art. 5. 35. “The captain of the Coast Guard Ship 123 says those who asked for rescue were rescued,”
Yonhap News, 16 October 2014, available at <www.yonhapnews.co.kr/bulletin/2014/10/16/ 0200000000AKR20141016136200001.HTML?inputD1179m>.
36. “South Korea coast guard captain jailed over Sewol ferry rescue bid,” BBC News, April 21, available at <www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-31412680>.
37. Catherine T. Lawson and Roberta E. Weisbrod, “Ferry Transport: The Realm of Responsi- bility for Ferry Disasters in Developing Countries,” Journal of Transportation 8, no. 4 (2005): 17.
38. Ibid., p. 22.
39. “How Safe Are Ferries?,” Discovery News, April 18, 2014, available at <news.discovery. com/human/how-safe-are-ferries-140418.htm>.
40. Abigail Golden, “Ferry Fatalities: Statistics and Causation of Major Accidents 2000- 2014,” available at <www.ferrysafety.org/news.htm>.
41. The PS General Slocum was a passenger ship built in 1891. She operated in the New York City area as an excursion steamer for the next thirteen years. On June 15, 2014, the General Slocum caught fire and sank in the East River of New York City. An estimated 1,021 of 1,342 people onboard died.
42. On October 15, 2003, a Staten Island Ferry, with 1,500 passengers onboard, crashed full speed into a concrete pier at the St. George Terminal in New York. Eleven people were killed and 165 injured.
43. International Maritime Organization (IMO), “Safety of ro-ro ferries,” available at <www. imo.org/OurWork/Safety/Regulations/Pages/RO-ROFerries.aspx>.
44. Ibid. 45. SOLAS Convention, supra note 26, Art. 3. 46. “Safety of ro-ro ferries,” supra note 43. 47. “Taking action on ferry safety,” October 2, 2014, available at <www.ship-technology.
com/features/featuretaking-action-on-ferry-safety-4379066/>. 48. IMO, “The Nanjing Plan,” available at <www.imo.org/OurWork/TechnicalCooperation/
TCActivities/Documents/NANJING PLAN.pdf>. 49. Korea, Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, “The Implementation Plan for Maritime
Safety 2014,” p. 8, available at www.mof.go.kr/article/list.do?boardKeyD25¤tPageNoD2& menuKeyD389&recordCountPerPageD10&searchEtc1D&searchEtc2D&searchEtc3D&searchEtc4 D&searchEtc5D&searchDeptNameD&searchStartDateD&searchEndDateD&searchSelectDtitle& searchValueD.
50. The Shipping Act, Art. 4. 51. The Vessel Safety Act, Art. 7. 52. SOLAS Convention, supra note 26, Art. 3. 53. Ibid., International Safety Management Code, Part A (1.3). 54. The Shipping Act, Arts. 21 and 22. 55. The Regulation of the Shipping Act, Art. 15.8. 56. The Shipping Act, Art. 22. 57. The Disaster Management Act, Art. 14. 58. The Presidential Decree of the Disaster Management Act, Art. 13. 59. Other than search and rescue, the Korea Coast Guard’s mission included law enforcement,
protection of marine resources, anti-maritime terrorism, integrity of maritime domain, maritime traffic service, national defense, and oil pollution response, etc.
60. Presidential Announcement, May 19, 2014, available at <news.chosun.com/site/data/ html_dir/2014/05/19/2014051900809.html>.
61. Ibid.
62. See Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries, Press release, “Passing the National Assembly of the Follow-up measure Bills of the Sewol Ferry,” December 10, 2014.
358 S. K. Kim
63. President Park noted in the May 2014 Presidential Announcement, supra note 60, that “if safety regulations were properly complied, this disaster would have not occurred” and “The Ship- ping Association, a lobby for the industry, was in charge of inspecting the safety of ships, and retir- ing government officials took jobs at the association.” “It is obvious that so long as such collusive ties exist, safety management will not be adequately implemented.”
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