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1 Has Brokerage Politics Ended?

Canadian Parties in the New Century R. KENNETH CART Y

“Canadian politics is brokerage politics.” This claim is central to most ac- counts of the distinctive organizational and competitive dynamics of na- tional party politics in Canada. It reflects a perception that the country’s dominant political elites are forced to adopt unique mechanisms of socio- political brokerage in order to build winning coalitions capable of defining and defending a national interest. In his classic account, John Meisel (1963) argues that this stems from a fundamental incoherence in the body politic. He suggests that, in the absence of an “underlying social cohesion” and a “secular political culture,” politicians are forced to act as accommodating brokers, continually reconciling the country’s internal tensions.

In this interpretation, political parties are identified as the principal tools of these brokerage politicians. Meisel goes further and suggests that because they “are among the relatively few genuinely national forces in Canada,” it is inevitable that “the chief and most important latent functions of the political parties and the party system are to foster and develop a sense of national unity and national being” (Meisel 1963, 370). Thus, the brokerage theory of Canadian politics is essentially an argument about the distinctive character of the Canadian party system, particularly about Canadian parties as brokerage parties.

Of course, the notions that successful democratic politicians need to be brokers and that their principal tools are political parties is hardly distinct- ively Canadian. Lowell (1913, 64) long ago pointed out that “if politicians

Parties, Elections, and the Future of Canadian Politics, edited by Amanda Bittner, and Royce Koop, UBC Press, 2013. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/templeuniv-ebooks/detail.action?docID=3412833. Created from templeuniv-ebooks on 2018-01-21 17:53:26.

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are largely brokers, party is the chief instrument by which they work.” Our question is whether Canada’s so-called brokerage parties are a unique form of party organization, practising a distinctive kind of politics, or whether they are simply particular local manifestations of more general impera- tives of party building.

The argument that brokerage parties are a distinctive form of political party is rooted in a conception that their approach to organization and com- petition is fundamentally different from that practised by other kinds of parties. In most democratic systems, the principal function of political par- ties is to articulate the distinctive interests of classes and of religious, eth- nic, or other social groups, and to organize electoral competition designed to reflect the inherent conflicts among them. Thus “normal” institutional- ized party systems mirror, but also perpetuate, the salience of particular lines of social cleavage and so provide a democratic mechanism for recon- ciling differences and balancing interests. Brokerage parties are held to turn this natural relationship on its head. Rather than articulating and de- fending the particular interests of distinctive constituencies, such parties are driven to obscure differences and to muffle conflicting interests in the name of social accommodation and the promotion of national community.

As consensus-seeking organizations, brokerage parties are character- ized as determined to eschew ideological agendas and programmatic pol- itics, embrace shifting and heterogeneous support bases, and establish often parochially structured organizations dominated by leaders ready to shift position in the interest of maximizing electoral support (cf. LeDuc et al. 2010, 33, 529). This portrait suggests that the brokerage party may be es- sentially just a version of the European catch-all party, whose theoretical and empirical physiology and development are well known to students of political parties. If, on the other hand, brokerage parties are unique organ- izational entities that differ in significant ways from catch-all parties, it is important to specify the differences in order to understand their conse- quences for the operation of a country’s political life.

This leads first to a consideration of the recognizable characteristics of catch-all parties and then to an assessment of how brokerage parties do, or do not, differ. That will then allow us to apply the respective party mod- els to Canadian experience in an analysis of the working of its party or- ganizations and their competitive practices. At issue is the extent to which Meisel’s conception of Canadian politics as brokerage politics holds true of the new party system emerging in the early decades of the twenty-first century.1

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12 R. Kenneth Carty

The Catch-All Party Modern catch-all parties are portrayed as large, heterogeneous organiza- tions engaged in a catholic, vote-seeking, pragmatic electoral competition that revolves around media-centred party leaders. These are organizations in which ideology has been deliberately abandoned in an attempt to operate as political consensus purveyors, and which do not offer ordinary members much opportunity to play a significant role in their affairs. Kirchheimer’s classic analysis (1966) of catch-all parties recognizes their emergence in a number of competitive party systems of postwar Europe, and it is easy to identify many of the features he identifies as intrinsic to the character and behaviour of parties in most established party systems. This enables us to enumerate several essential features of catch-all parties and their politics.2

1 Despite the implications of the catch-all label, Kirchheimer is clear that such parties “cannot hope to catch all categories of voters,” although they may reasonably expect to increase their support among voters “whose interests do not adamantly conflict” (186). This is because the inherent social cleavages of a political community put natural limits on the reach of any one party and its ability to make political bedfellows of those whose interests are intrinsically opposed. He illustrates this prop- osition by noting the inability of parties such as the German Social Democrats or British Labour to accommodate groups like agricultural- ists, given those parties’ history and natural base in urban populations. The important point to note is that the catch-all label is misleading: such parties do not even try to appeal to all voters.

2 Catch-all parties were not created de novo, as the mass parties had been by previous generations. Kirchheimer’s analysis indicates that they evolved through a competitive dynamic as large parties sought to outdo their opponents in finding “a wider audience and more immediate elec- toral success” (184). Two aspects of that process command our attention. The first is that, having started with a clearly defined base, the catch-all party is never able to completely escape from its demands and the core support it provides. It is precisely this developmental history accounting for a party’s structure and practice in the face of the continuing reality of politicized social divisions that inhibits the catch-all party from ap- pealing to all members of the electorate.3 Second, the competitive dy- namic that drives the emergence of catch-all party competition suggests that a single catch-all party is unlikely to emerge on its own (188). This means that such parties exist in opposition to others of the same kind.

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Thus, in Britain, both Labour and the Conservatives emerged as catch- all parties because of, and in response to, each other’s presence and ac- tivity. With at least two major competitors, catch-all party systems ought not to be controlled by a single dominant party.

3 Kirchheimer is at some pains to discuss the contradictions visited upon the catch-all party, particularly with respect to the exercise of a party’s traditional “expressive function,” which he argues is left in “an ambigu- ous state” (189) with those parties’ deliberate “de-ideologization” of pol- itical discourse (187). Transformed from an organization with a “vision of things to come” into a mere “vehicle for short-run choice” (195), the competitive catch-all party, with both ambitions to office and occasional responsibility for it, is forced to restrain its critical appeals as it seeks to broaden its electoral base.

4 In the traditional (cadre or mass) parties out of which catch-all institu- tions emerged, party loyalty was a central dimension of political life. It reflected the place that supporters naturally had in the wider political system and was a bulwark against the erosion of the party’s organiza- tion. In Kirchheimer’s catch-all organization, however, the attenuation of social roots that defines “the very character of the party makes mem- bership loyalty far more difficult to expect” (193). As a consequence, the party is forced to depend on the technocrats of modern public relations to manage its electoral campaigns.4

5 Finally, catch-all orientations to political life involve more than a dis- tinctive accommodative style, for, as Kirchheimer notes, these parties also transform both the role of leader and ordinary member in the life of the organization. (This is another version of Michels’s 1915 observations about the natural oligarchic tendencies in large membership organiza- tions like political parties.) The position of party leader in a catch-all party has heightened importance because that individual has the prin- cipal responsibility for first establishing and then carrying the party’s electoral message. To do so successfully, leaders must be freed from “specific direction and supervision” (198). This leaves ordinary party members stripped of any significant ability to shape the agenda and direction of the party, a power Kirchheimer describes as “a historical relic” (190).

Taken together, these central features of a modern catch-all party would appear to constitute the key organizational ingredients required by demo- cratic socio-political brokers. A consideration of each of them suggests,

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however, that a very different constellation comprises an organizational form more recognizable as a brokerage party.

The Brokerage Party Whereas catch-all parties accept that it is unrealistic to assume they can win support from all groups and classes of voters, the raison d’être of the brokerage party is to do just that. It aims to reconcile, or at least accommo- date, the full range of different perspectives and interests within the same single organization. Thus, in a fundamentally important way, the brokerage party, particularly one asserting a nation-building mission, claims to do precisely what the catch-all party cannot – that is, catch support from all categories of voters. This does not necessarily mean that it wants to catch all voters, for it may well be politically dysfunctional (i.e., electorally un- stable) to build a party that catches too many.

Brokerage parties are not the product of an evolutionary dynamic in which mass-integration or bourgeois-cadre parties are transformed into catch-all organizations. Unlike the catch-all party, the brokerage party is not the product of a competitive evolutionary process. Such parties are the deliberate and independent creations of political leaders who wish to estab- lish an autonomous organizational base. This frees these parties from his- torical structural linkages and allows them to act as a distinctive instrument of accommodation, reconciling the divergent interests and demands of a pluralistic electorate.

Brokerage parties are not restrained by a haunting ambivalence as to the limits of their expressive appeals. Indeed, quite the opposite is the case. Operating as an instrument of multi-interest accommodation, a broker- age party uses an exaggerated form of a party’s normal expressive function – representing itself as the natural, national governing party – as one of its principal means of mobilizing support.

While the internal dynamics generated by the attenuation of traditional social roots means that party loyalty is not a critical feature of the catch-all party’s organizational glue, the same cannot be said for brokerage parties. Indeed, in the absence of any social basis for membership, unquestioning organizational loyalty is the supreme virtue in brokerage parties. This re- quires that members commit to the party and accept its discipline whatever policy twists are required by the demands of electoral pragmatism.

The brokerage party’s orientation to political competition engenders dis- tinctive internal organizational relationships. While it is true that leaders

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enjoy enhanced positions in virtually all modern political parties, a leader’s place and authority in the brokerage party is unique. The leader is more than the public personification of the party message; the leader is the chief broker, the individual who determines both the style and content of the ac- commodative package the party represents. Responsible for creating the message, brokerage leaders are not especially constrained by past policies or any natural limits on the party’s reach. This generates its own uncer- tainty for it means that the very thrust and direction of a brokerage party can be instantly changed by the simple process of changing the leader.

Determined to appeal to and represent all elements of society, the broker- age party accommodates them by enhancing the role that members of the party (the grassroots) play in internal party decision making (Mair 1994). This typically provides ordinary members significant power over personnel decisions, especially leadership selections and candidate nominations, but not over policy questions that would constrain the ability of party leaders to broker competing interests. Inevitably, intraparty competition may be a source of factionalism as elites and local activists seek to enrich their pos- ition at the expense of others. In such parties, ordinary members are the storm troops of vigorous intraparty democratic competition.

This brief comparison helps distinguish brokerage parties from other- wise apparently similar (in the sense of being non-ideological, electorally focused) catch-all parties. The key differences are summarized in Table 1.1.

TABLE 1.1 Key differences between catch-all and brokerage parties

Characteristic Catch-all parties Brokerage parties

Target Constrained by historic core Entire electorate

Origins Competition with other Created as original political catch-all opponents instruments

Expressive Restrained to balance Central message as articulation function appeals to old supporters of national interest and new targets

Loyalty Limited expectation Supreme virtue

Leaders Personification of message Creator of message

Members No significant role Active participants

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16 R. Kenneth Carty

The Politics of the Brokerage Party As a unique party form, brokerage party organizations practise their own distinctive style of politics; they also shape the political dynamics of the party systems they inhabit.

Claiming the ability, and indeed defining their raison d’être as the ac- commodation of all significant interests in the political community, broker- age parties make electoral success and holding public office their central purpose and standard of success. Consequently, they are governed by no single principle but are the very embodiment of electoral pragmatism. Openness to shifts in policy and fluidity in their mobilization strategies force brokerage parties to depend on institutional loyalty as the primary organizational glue holding them together.

The need for creative responses to the electoral imperatives of the day gives the leader of a brokerage party a special position and responsibility. Unfettered by ideology or past commitments, the leader has comparatively greater latitude than leaders in other types of parties to set the direction and pace of the party. Indeed, the only effective check on this power is a direct attack on his or her leadership itself. The result is strong, but inher- ently fragile, leadership that is the ultimate focus of all intraparty division and conflict.

A party structure of this sort, supported by organizational practice and depending on electoral success rather than any social or ideological coher- ence, is bound to generate intraparty discord and competition. Some ele- ments of the electorate that are being embraced within its bounds will inevitably prefer different means or divergent ends than others. The classic hierarchical structures of centralized mass parties are too inflexible to pro- vide effective organizations. Thus brokerage parties thrive using a stratarch- ical structure that allows for the flexible incorporation of the wide range of supporters’ and members’ preferences and activities (Eldersveld 1964). This makes the “franchise” model the preferred organizational form. It is one that increases the opportunities for intraparty democracy, although at the cost of blurring organizational boundaries and increased internal competi- tion articulated by personal factions (Carty 2004, 2013a).

This theoretical equilibrium of stratarchical form and brokerage func- tion raises the question of whether function drives form or form shapes function. In any given case, this may well be a matter of the origins of the party (and party system) in question. It does suggest, however, that parties that seek to practise brokerage are not likely to be successful if they adopt a

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tightly centralized organization, and that catch-all parties may be less effi- cient if they emulate the stratarchical forms of a brokerage competitor.

Presenting themselves as the system’s “natural governing party” leaves brokerage parties with a deep antipathy to coalition politics, for to accept the principle or practice of coalition government would be to deny their central identity. Thus brokerage parties would prefer to form a minority government than enter a coalition with other political parties.

Successful brokerage parties have an insidious impact on the dynamics of democratic party competition, for when one establishes itself as capable of genuinely embracing the full range of interests in society, it leaves little room for the emergence of similar competitors. Thus a party system is like- ly to have room for only one brokerage party at any time. Other parties are left to adopt other representational strategies: some may adopt catch-all forms, others may reject that approach and articulate more narrowly de- fined interests. This imbalance advantages the brokerage party and can provide the structural basis for the party’s long-term dominance of the system.5

Recognizing dominant parties such as Ireland’s Fianna Fáil, Japan’s Liberal Democrats, or India’s Congress as brokerage parties would help us understand their long-term success and the impact they have on the dy- namics of their respective party systems.6 We now turn our attention to the Canadian case, often held up as the epitome of democratic brokerage.

Is Canadian Politics Brokerage Politics? If the question is whether all Canadian political parties are brokerage par- ties, then the answer is obviously not. This seems theoretically impossible as systems cannot successfully accommodate more than one. More to the point, the historical record is filled with accounts of parties that explicitly rejected any kind of either catch-all or brokerage appeal in favour of speak- ing for identifiable groups in the community. Some of these have had a short life span (e.g., the Bloc Populaire, which contested the election of 1945 but was gone four years later), others persisted for decades (e.g., the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, which appeared in 1935 and last- ed until it willingly transformed itself into the New Democratic Party in the 1960s); most were rooted in either Quebec or the western provinces. None were ever contenders for government office or accepted the idea that the indiscriminate electoral appeals inherent in pragmatic accommodative impulses represented an acceptable basis for representative politics.

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This reduces the claim about Canadian electoral politics being struc- tured by brokerage parties to an observation that its two large (significant) office-seeking parties have practised brokerage politics and that the minor parties were thus, by definition, a sideshow – interesting but relatively per- ipheral to the central dynamics of the party system. A closer consideration of the Conservative Party casts doubt even on this proposition, however.

For well over one hundred years the Conservatives cannot be said to have sought to accommodate the interests of all Canadians or incorporate them within the party. With the death of John A. Macdonald, the initial denial of the leadership to John Thompson and McCarthyite impulses at the grassroots signalled that Roman Catholics were not to be embraced as equal partners in the party; its subsequent estrangement from Quebec in 1917 crippled any capacity it might have had to act as a political bridge between the country’s two dominant linguistic communities. This self- awareness and acceptance that the party could not, and should not, even attempt to act as a genuine national broker was perhaps best articulated in the famous (1954) Gordon Churchill memorandum that argued that the party “ought not to squander its resources on Quebec” but seek to build a majority by focusing on other regions (Beck 1968, 300). Since the party had “succeeded in alienating” (293) its own Quebec activists in choosing the individual least acceptable to the province as its leader, this may have sim- ply reflected reality. This closed representational orientation was reinforced by the party’s narrower, more ideological conception of Canada’s essential nature, whether it was expressed as Arthur Meighen’s support for British imperial adventures or John Diefenbaker’s commitment to the Union Jack.

Although coalition politics has rarely been on the national political agenda, it is noteworthy that it was Robert Borden’s Conservatives who, in 1917, formed the country’s only coalition government. The Harper version of the party appears to have attempted to construct an anti-Liberal parlia- mentary coalition in 2005, suggesting that, despite its subsequent attempts to delegitimize the notion in the aftermath of the 2008 general election, it too was open to the possibility.

This all suggests that the Conservative Party can be best understood as a catch-all party wanting to expand beyond its traditional ideological and regional bases in an effort to fashion a majority government. Its inability to act as a genuine socio-political broker has meant that it has not often been successful, given the structure of the Canadian electorate. Three times dur- ing the twentieth century it constructed huge majorities – the three largest of the century – but each proved to be an oversized electoral coalition that

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imploded in the face of the party’s inherent inability to encompass a large, disparate clientele.

It seems clear that the Conservative Party has been regularly disadvan- taged by its attempts to marry a catch-all style of politics with an essentially stratarchical organizational form. This disjuncture has worked at cross- purposes, severely limiting the party’s capacity to operate as a coherent, disciplined machine. The resulting tension has been manifested in recur- ring bouts of intraparty conflict, most of it centred on the party’s leader- ship, which the stratarchical structure leaves open and vulnerable. By continually weakening the party’s competitive capacity, this “Tory Syn- drome” was at the heart of a century of political defeats (Perlin 1980).

On at least two occasions, the party abandoned the stratarchical prin- ciple to build a more appropriate hierarchically disciplined organization for its catch-all strategy, and in both cases the result was electoral success. Under Richard Bennett, however, the new structure did not outlive the leader, collapsing under the weight of the country’s divergent localisms (Glassford 1992); it remains to be seen whether the current Conservative “garrison” party experiment (Flanagan 2010) will survive Stephen Harper’s leadership.

If the minor parties have adopted classic group and interest representa- tional strategies, and if the Conservatives have been (at best) a Canadian version of a catch-all party, then only the Liberals are left as a brokerage party candidate.

As early as 1906, André Siegfried pointed to features of Canadian par- ties that marked them as brokerage organizations: the special position of the leader (who is “the central organization” himself and whose “mere name is a program”), the critical place of loyalty in holding the party together (the party understood as a “sacred institution”), and the stratarchical char- acter of organizational activity (the “shrewd working of the constituen- cies”). Although the Conservatives may have possessed these characteristics until Macdonald’s death, by the time Siegfried was writing only the Liberals were capable of accommodating the interests of the two “races” (defined linguistically or religiously) that he recognized as one of the most central electoral tasks of a Canadian party. It was this capacity that led the Liberals to conceive of themselves as, and act as if they were, the country’s natural governing party.7

This sense of themselves as the indispensable instrument of national unity has led the Liberals to resist forming coalitions on occasions when voters, and the electoral system, failed to deliver a parliamentary majority.

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Thus King in the 1920s, Pearson in the 1960s, Trudeau in 1972, and Martin in 2004 established minority governments and sought a propitious mo- ment to go back to the electorate in search of a majority. For the most part, however, the Liberals’ monopoly of the national unity issue enabled it to control the political agenda and thus laid the foundation for its long-term dominance.

Recognizing the important roles leaders play in managing political brokerage, the Liberals have been careful to signal their commitment to the centrality of a French/English partnership through the party’s leader- ship. Although some would argue that alternation is not a “rule,” the reality is that for over a century the party’s leadership has alternated between French and English native speakers – and the Liberal Party is the only party for which this has been true.

The Liberals’ stratarchical structure, organized as a franchise system (Carty 2002), produced a succession of extraordinarily strong party leaders. Over the course of the twentieth century, the Liberals had four leaders who served as prime minister for over ten years; by comparison, all the parties in the four other Anglo-Celtic Westminster democracies managed to pro- duce only three during the same period. The party was a pioneer in having its leaders chosen by party activists (Courtney 1973), a process that ac- knowledged the power and place of members in making key intraparty de- cisions. The fragility of this leadership pattern was exposed, however, when members and activists used their influence to drive Jean Chrétien from the party’s leadership and the prime minister’s office.

So dominant was the Liberal Party that its organizational framework be- came the norm to which other Canadian parties were drawn, despite its un- suitability to other representational modes. As we have seen, this proved to be dysfunctional for the Conservatives, thwarting their ability to effectively challenge Liberal pre-eminence. This left the Liberals perfectly positioned to lead in the reconstruction of electoral organization and competition on its own terms on each of the three occasions when the party system was re- shaped during the twentieth century.

It is fair to ask, however, whether the Mulroney interlude, and the sub- sequent rise of the Bloc Québécois, finally eroded the essential basis for the Liberals’ successful brokerage formula. The party has seen its national vote share drop to historically low levels and, importantly, it has not won a plur- ality of the Commons seats from Quebec since 1980. The most recent elec- tion, in 2011, has further eviscerated the party’s parliamentary presence, not only in Quebec but also nationally. Targeting its appeals to identifiable

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social groups, largely in urban Canada, the Liberals now appear to have been reduced to a catch-all party not unlike their Conservative opponent. Although the party has not abandoned its nation-building calling, it is not obvious how, as long as Quebec continues to reject the party, it can re- emerge as a genuine brokerage party.

Brokerage Politics without Brokerage Parties? Brokerage parties emerge as a distinctive organizational form where polit- ical elites manage to denigrate interparty division and celebrate intraparty accommodation as the most important feature of democratic electoral pol- itics. A successful brokerage party’s capacity to command the principal lines of division enables it to establish a dominant position in the party system and forces its opponents to adopt other modes of representation and organization. Thus, to say a country’s party politics are brokerage politics is to highlight the style and form of the dominant party at the expense of the other parties, which are left with other party models and are engaged in different kinds (generally losing ones) of electoral politics. For a century, Canadian politics could be cast as brokerage politics because the Liberal Party – but only the Liberal Party – existed and operated as a brokerage party par excellence. Its opponents may have been driven to adopt its stratarchical form but they could not replicate its brokerage essence.

The collapse of the Liberals as a brokerage party leaves the contempor- ary party system one in which catch-all parties will compete for office. The continuing presence of more ideologically focused or regionally based par- ties will confound the possibilities of creating genuine national coalitions and make winning parliamentary majorities by any party more difficult. The continued absence of a brokerage party seems bound to fundamentally change the character of Canadian politics and end a century of brokerage politics.

Notes 1 Carty, Cross, and Young (2000) provide an account of the collapse of the third

Canadian party system in the last years of the twentieth century. 2 It ought to be noted that Kirchheimer is not always as precise as one might like in

his account of the distinctive features of the catch-all party. Here I have simply at- tempted to identify several key aspects that will allow us to contrast the catch-all party with a brokerage party. One can find elaborations and analyses of the Kirchheimer catch-all party in Wolinetz (2002) and Krouwel (2006).

3 On the importance of party origins, see Panebianco (1988).

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4 Here is an important point at which Kirchheimer’s analysis of “catch-all” party activity comes close to that of Panebianco’s “electoral-professional” party.

5 This is not to say that all dominant parties are brokerage parties. As the case of the Swedish Social Democrats illustrates, it is possible for classic mass parties to become dominant parties.

6 For a sketch of such a comparison, see my “Brokerage Parties, Brokerage Politics” (2013b).

7 The classic statement of the Liberals as the “Government Party” is still that found in Whitaker (1977).

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