philosophy discussion
8/28/2015
1
Phil 2: Puzzles and Paradoxes
Prof. Sven Bernecker
University of California, Irvine
Lecture 13.3
Solutions to the
Confirmation Paradox II
Two Assumptions of the Ravens
Paradox
2
EC. If two hypotheses can be known a priori to be equivalent, then
any data that confirm (disconfirm) one hypothesis also confirm
(disconfirm) the other.
IC. A generalization is confirmed by any of its instances
Paradox of the Ravens
1) A brown shoe confirms the hypothesis that all non-black things are non-ravens. (IC)
2) The hypothesis that all non-black things are non-ravens is equivalent to the hypothesis that all ravens are black. (EC)
C) Therefore, a brown shoe confirms the hypothesis that all ravens
are black.
3
The conclusion seems absurd. Data relevant to whether or not all ravens are black must be data about ravens. The color of shoes can have no bearing whatsoever on the matter. Thus IC and EC – apparently acceptable principles – lead to an apparently unacceptable conclusion.
Solutions to Confirmation Paradox
• Denial of the Equivalence Condition
• Acceptance of the apparently unacceptable conclusion
(Hempel‘s solution)
• Denial of the Instance Condition
4
8/28/2015
2
Accepting the Conclusion
• Why not say that a brown shoe (i.e., a non-black non-raven) does
confirm the hypothesis that all ravens are black?
• Suppose that you are on an ornithological field trip. You have seen
several black ravens in the trees and formulate the hypothesis that
all ravens are black. You then catch sight of something brown in the
topmost branch. For a moment you tremble for the hypothesis,
fearing a counterinstance -- fearing that you have found a brown
raven. A closer look reveals that it is a shoe. In this situation you are
likely to agree that a brown shoe confirms the hypothesis.
• But this would mean that indoor ornithology is possible!
5
• Hempel thinks that “the impression of a paradoxical situation is not
objectively founded; it is a psychological illusion.” He claims that the air
of paradox vanishes once we realize that the hypothesis “All ravens are
black” is not merely about ravens. For, anyone who holds this
hypothesis also holds the view that every object is such that it is either a
raven or not black, or, equivalently, that nothing is a non-black raven.
• The air of paradox disappears when the number of objects under
consideration is small.
• “All ravens are black” is supported by observation of any object that is
not a non-black non-raven. General moral: if evidence doesn't
contradict a hypothesis, then it supports the hypothesis.
6
Three Problems with Accepting the
Conclusion
• 1) It’s not clear that some fact which just raises the probability of a
hypothesis thereby constitutes positive evidence for it.
• Counterexample: The publication of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason
(1781) increased the probability that it will be turned into a
blockbuster film starring Jennifer Aniston. After all, if the Critique of
Pure Reason had never been published, the chances of its being
made into a film would be even smaller than they are. But surely the
actual publication of this book is not positive evidence for the
hypothesis that this book will be turned into a blockbuster film.
7
• 2) We may require that E is positive evidence for H only if E
makes H’s probability sufficiently high, say above 0.5. So let’s
say:
E is confirming evidence for H if and only if Prob(H/E) ≥ 0.5
• Counterexample: H is the hypothesis that Tom is not
pregnant, while E is the statement that Tom smokes. Since
the probability of H is extremely high, the probability of H
given E (H/E) is also extremely high -- above 0.5. Yet
intuitively E is no evidence for H.
8
8/28/2015
3
• 3) My brown shoe not only confirms the hypothesis “All
ravens are black“ but also the hypothesis “All ravens are
white.“ For my brown shoe is a non-white non-raven. But
one and the same observation cannot confirm two mutually
exclusive hypotheses!
9
Denial of Instance Condition
• Counterexample: Consider the hypothesis “All ravens live outside
Orange County”. According to IC, any raven found outside of Orange
County confirms the hypothesis. But the sighting of ravens outside of
Orange County, particularly in adjoining counties with similar climate
and environs, actually disconfirms the hypothesis. Unless we find some
special reason for excluding them from Orange County, the more
pervasive their presence in surrounding areas the less likely they are to
be absent from Orange County.
10
IC. A generalization is confirmed by any of its instances
Another counterexample to IC:
• Three people leave a party each wearing one of the three
hats they arrived with. The hypothesis “Each person is
wearing someone else’s hat” is disconfirmed (even
falsified) by the two confirming instances “person A is
wearing person B’s hat” and “person B is wearing person
A’s hat”.
11
Replacing the Instance Condition
• The problem of IC is that it takes no account of the role of
background information in inductive reasoning. Confirmation is not
simply the accumulation of confirming instances.
• We need to take into account background knowledge. In the case of
ravens‘ color, this background knowledge will include the fact that
birds‘ plumage serves to protect their species by camouflaging
them. So it‘s more important to look for ravens in different
environments – temperate, tropical, snowy – than to accumulate
more evidence about ravens in our own environment.
12
8/28/2015
4
What is the correct principle determining what makes a body of data
confirm a hypothesis? Reformulation of IC:
• Example: “A” stands for lobsters, “B” stands for being red, and “H”
stands for being boiled. Having observed lots of red lobsters does
not confirm the hypothesis that all lobsters are red if all the observed
ones have been boiled and if one knows that lobsters become red
when they are boiled.
13
IC*: A hypothesis “All As are Bs” is confirmed by its instances if and
only if the data do not say, of some property H that the As in the data
are H, and if they had not been H they would not have been Bs.