Term Project about US foreign policy regarding North Korea's nuclear program

Korea’s pursuit of low-carbon green growth: A middle-power state’s dream of becoming a green pioneer

Heejin Han

Abstract After a brief introduction of the existing literature on environmental pioneer states and their internal characteristics, this study examines various low- carbon green growth (LCGG) initiatives that the South Korean government introduced to market Korea as a trendsetter in the global environmental arena. The country’s domestic foundations for environmental innovation, however, reveals a dissonance between its international aspirations and the internal conditions that are needed to sustain the pursuit. This case of mixed environmental achievements by a rising middle-power state suggests the insufficiency of a state-led approach to environmental innovation and leadership.

Keywords: green pioneer; Korea; green growth; environmental innovation; middle power.

Introduction

States remain the dominant actors in both producing and enforcing domes- tic and international environmental policy. They, for instance, undertake various leadership roles and contribute to regime formation in the face of increasing transnational environmental threats, such as, global warming (Eckersley 2004; J€anicke and Jacob 2004). Indeed, environmental protec- tion considerations have emerged as part of the contemporary state’s port- folio of core interests and responsibilities (Dryzek et al. 2002). A country’s response to environmental issues has also become a barometer for measur- ing progress of that society. Faucheux (2000) has predicted that approxi- mately 40% of the major innovations in 2010 would include, or be premised on, environmental factors. Moreover, the World Economic Forum’s annual Global Competitiveness Report (2012) has found a

Heejin Han is a lecturer at the Department of Political Science in the National University of Singapore. Her research interests include environmental politics and policy (with a regional focus on East Asia), civil society development in China, non-state entities’ roles in gover- nance, and governance of water resources. E-mail: polhh@nus.edu.sg Address: Department of Political Science, Faculty of Arts & Social Sciences, National University of Singapore, AS1, #04-49, 11 Arts Link, Singapore 117573

� 2015 Taylor & Francis

The Pacific Review, 2015 Vol. 28, No. 5, 731�754, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2015.1013491

consistent correlation between a country’s environmental policy ambitions and its system-wide competitiveness (J€anicke 2005: 134). States, thus, often adopt policy instruments and frameworks that are aimed at shaping both environmentally and economically competitive outcomes (Aizawa and Yang 2010; Damon and Sterner 2012; The Pew Charitable Trust 2009).

States primarily contribute to global environmental concerns through two mechanisms. First, some states contribute to building international environmental regimes by undertaking and exercising various forms of leadership (Andresen and Agrawala 2002; Young 1989, 1991). In this vein, Young (1991) argues that states can exercise three types of leadership � structural, entrepreneurial, and intellectual � in the process of establishing regimes for international environmental reform. Andersson and Mol (2002) add to this list the environmental leadership demonstrated by states that exhibit ambitious domestic environmental policies and their effective implementation.

Second, states contribute to global environment development through the diffusion and dissemination of innovative environmental programs at both the regional and international levels (Busch et al. 2005; DeSombre 2000; J€orgens 2004; Kern et al. 2001; Okano-Heijmans 2012; Tews 2005). States have also been found to engage in regulatory competition with one another to obtain leading market positions and to benefit from ‘first-mover’ advan- tages (J€anicke 2005: 133; Porter and van der Linde 1995; Rabe 2007; Saikawa 2013; Wallace 1995), including the growth of national industrial champions (Andersen and Liefferink 1997). Best environmental practices, through the competitive behavior of states, lead to concrete economic benefits.

Various studies have outlined the internal characteristics of these pio- neer or trendsetter states that lead innovation. J€anicke and Jacob (2004: 37) maintain that states taking a lead in environmental issues are character- ized by a high per capita income, demanding buyers, internationally recog- nized high-quality standards, and innovation-friendly conditions for producers and users of advanced technology. J€anicke (2005: 138) further argues that in addition to favorable windows of opportunity, such as global economic conditions and the emergence of new technologies, domestic capacity � including institutional, informational, and economic capacity � and strategic factors � including will and skill � make some states natural pioneers in the competition for sustainable environmental policies and practices. Moreover, green pioneer states benefit not just from capable government agencies, but also from the formation of advocacy coalitions that can uphold more progressive environmental policies (J€anicke 2000, 2005). Various studies have found that domestic pressure from non- governmental entities, such as special interest groups, can affect a state’s decisions to promote innovative environmental policies (Bryner 2008; Dietz et al. 2013; Kamieniecki 2006; Michaelowa 1998). Environmental innova- tions are, therefore, products of top-down state guidance and promotion as well as bottom-up demand (J€anicke and Jacob 2004: 34; J€anicke 2005: 135).

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Environmental pioneers, however, are not merely first-movers in the global green marketplace. They also aim to achieve international visibility, reputation, and intellectual leadership, which are highly coveted political objectives (J€anicke 2005: 139). The environmental policy realm provides opportunities to demonstrate leadership and innovation not only for pow- erful states, but also for middle-power states, such as those found in north- ern Europe (Andersen and Liefferink 1997; Andersson and Mol 2002).

The concept of a middle-power state remains somewhat contentious. Some authors have chosen to focus on the importance of a state’s structural position or economic and military capabilities (Holbrand 1971; Neack 1993; Wood 1987). Others have chosen to focus on particular functions and roles a state may play in international organizations (Neack 2008). For instance, Keohane (1969) defines a middle-power state as one that cannot effectively act alone, but may be able to have a systemic impact in a small group or through an international institution. In contrast to this, other authors have looked at the psychological dimension and intentions of mid- dle-power countries. For instance, Cooper (1997, 2013) defines middle- power states as those willing to take the initiative in specific areas they see themselves as having the necessary qualifications to effect change in. Particularly due to the absence of dominant global players, the environ- mental arena can be seen by these middle-power states as a unique plat- form for demonstrating their innovation and leadership abilities.

With this discussion in mind, this article critically assesses the implemen- tation and performance of the low-carbon green growth (LCGG) policy pursued by Korea during the Lee Myung-bak administration (2008�2013). The administration adopted various policy programs and initiatives to meet domestic and international challenges, and to expand its influence as a mid- dle-power country by marking itself as a global environmental pioneer. This research, by drawing attention to the country’s ambitions to become a global environmental leader, enriches the existing literature on environ- mental innovation by middle powers. It does this by demonstrating how a rising middle-power state can expand its power and leadership in the global environmental arena by pursuing aggressive environmental policies.

Korea has characterized itself as a middle-power state since at least the mid-1990s, when its government began pursuing greater international influ- ence commensurate with the size of its economy, population, and military capacity. Numerous studies have applied the middle-power concept to ana- lyze Korea’s foreign policy (Choi 2009; Cooper 2013; Kim and Jones 2007; Robertson 2007; Rozman 2006; Saxer 2013). These studies have, however, largely described Korea’s attempts to expand its regional and global influ- ence through foreign economic diplomacy. Korea’s role in global environ- mental politics, a non-traditional security realm, has not been as extensively documented.

Several factors make Korea an interesting case. First, studies on green pioneers have thus far focused on Western countries that have dominated

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the field of environmental innovation for decades. By focusing on Korea, however, this article examines the example of an emerging green state from a non-Western hemisphere. The Korean experience might generate useful policy lessons for other emerging states (such as Brazil, China, and India) that have also pursued low-carbon development strategies through various innovative policies (Aizawa and Yang 2010; Dent 2012). Second, Korea’s state-led campaign to market itself as a global environmental leader (Kang et al. 2012; Seong 2011: 20; Watson 2012) offers critical insights for future research into the diverse paths that a state may take in pursuing environmental policies. Third, in succeeding the Lee administra- tion, the Park Geun-hye government has promoted the concept of a ‘creative economy’. The Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning (MSIFP) of the Park administration defines the concept as an economic model in which creative assets are generated through the convergence of ideas sourced from the fields of science and technology, and especially in relation to the information and communication technology (ICT) industry (MSIFP undated). Although the term does not explicitly incorporate envi- ronmental elements, a thorough examination of Korea’s LCGG policy (as pursued by the Lee administration) may provide the new leadership with valuable insights. As a middle-power state with limited structural power to translate its resources and capacity into bargaining leverage, Korea is likely to continue emphasizing the power of ideas and its intellectual capital in bargaining on the world stage (Saxer 2013: 411). This study will explore what Korea, moving forward, might learn from the successes and failures of Lee’s LCGG policy.

Factors driving Korea’s introduction of LCGG

Lee Myung-bak introduced the LCGG policy in a speech entitled ‘A Great People with New Dreams’, which he delivered in August 2008 during Korea’s celebration of the 60th anniversary of the republic’s foundation.1

He urged the nation to join the government in promoting his green growth vision (Lee 2008). This vision emphasized the need to forge a win–win rela- tionship between environmental concerns and economic growth by inte- grating environmental goals into the national development strategy (Lee and Yun 2011: 293; Seong 2011: 17). Lee also expressed the new adminis- tration’s aspiration to mark Korea as a global green pioneer.

Various factors pertinent to Korea’s national interests � economic growth, energy security, the need for crisis and risk management, as well as soft power concerns � informed the Lee administration’s decision to adopt LCGG (Iglauer 2011; Watson 2012). First and foremost, the Lee adminis- tration realized that the conventional growth model that Korea had main- tained in the past was no longer sustainable. This was because the model had resulted in a pattern of energy- and resource-intensive economic

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development that had been undertaken at the expense of the environment (Jeong and Seo 2012). Furthermore, Korea’s rapidly aging population and increasing energy dependence meant that a quantity-oriented growth strat- egy that simply relies on a continuous input of labor, capital, and natural resources would not be sustainable, and would eventually diminish the country’s global competitiveness. Accordingly, the government began to emphasize the urgency of transitioning to a knowledge-based economy (Lee 2010a, 2010b). It believed that green technologies and high-tech, high value-added industries would serve as the new engines for economic growth, while also redressing the negative impact that Korea’s industrial development had had on the environment. Lee believed that by setting ambitious goals and by aggressively pursuing them, Korea would emerge as a global environmental leader (Lee 2008). Lee’s administration, for instance, pledged to make an all-out investment to expand the use of renewable energy from 2% to more than 11% by 2030 and, ultimately, to more than 20% by 2050. Research and development (R&D) investment in green technology would also boost Korea’s global market share to 8% within five years (Jones and Yoo 2011: 6).

The Lee administration also expected that the shift to a greener eco- nomic development paradigm would help Korea reduce its dependence on energy imports, thus improving its overall energy security. Korea’s export- oriented economy had relied on imported fossil fuels, which fed up to 97% of its energy needs. In 2010, Korea ranked ninth in terms of oil consump- tion, tenth in electricity consumption, tenth in gas imports, and fourth in oil imports in the world (Yun et al. 2011). The country’s growing need for energy and its reliance on imported sources threatened its energy security. This vulnerability served as a driving imperative for Korea to explore ways of enhancing its energy security by increasing domestic supply from renew- able and nuclear sources (Yun et al. 2011). Lee argued that the LCGG vision would help Korea raise its energy self-sufficiency rate from 5% to 18% during his tenure, and eventually to 50% by 2050 (Lee 2008).

The Korean government also began to pay greater attention to various global challenges that emerged in the new millennium, as both potential sources of crises and risk. For instance, in late 2008, the global financial cri- sis destabilized Korea’s export-oriented economy, decreasing its growth rate to below 4% and increasing the number of the unemployed to 757,000 (Chon 2009). The oil price hike during the crisis made energy imports costly, further straining the Korean economy and its energy security pro- spectus. In 2008 alone, Korea spent over one-third of its export revenue on energy imports. These and other domestic problems, triggered by the vola- tile global economic landscape, provided the impetus for Korea to explore innovative avenues in an attempt to limit its vulnerability and reliance on the international market (Pascha 2010). While introducing LCGG in 2008, Lee compared the 2008 economic crisis to the 1997 Asian financial crisis and urged the nation to turn the experience into an opportunity to

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restructure its economy and generate new growth. Lee argued that LCGG and its programs should be seen as innovative solutions for improving the country’s competitiveness and resilience in the contemporary economic cli- mate (Lee 2008).

The Korean government also realized that the international community would increase pressure on the country to take greater environmental responsibility (Lee 2010b). Indeed, Korea had become one of the world’s heaviest polluters. Between 1971 and 1997, its energy use increased at an annual rate of 8.8%. In tandem with this, between 1990 and 2007, the country’s greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions doubled, the highest increase of any organization for economic cooperation and development (OECD) coun- try (Park and Cho 2011). As of 2012, Korea was the tenth largest energy con- sumer and the tenth largest GHG emitter in the world (US EIA 2012). Thus, the Korean government expected that the post-Kyoto climate change regime would demand sterner environmental regulation and policy. Korea had also become increasingly vulnerable to the negative impact of global climate change. Over the last century, the country’s average temperature increased by 1.5 �C, double the global average (Yun et al. 2011). Consequently, Korea now faces higher risks of flooding and drought, induced by climate change, which could cost billions of dollars to rectify (World Bank 2010). These envi- ronmental challenges have forced the Korean government to pay greater attention to environmental concerns. The Lee administration, thus, adopted the LCGG policy as a means of fulfilling responsibilities to the global climate change agenda while increasing economic competitiveness.

The Lee administration also saw the green growth initiative as part of its foreign policy vision for a ‘Global Korea’. This initiative expressed the administration’s commitment to global diplomacy and the global move- ment for peace and development and ultimately aimed to position Korea as a responsible and contributing member of the international community (Snyder 2009: 23). Through this initiative, Lee’s administration envisioned Korea as a proactive international leader and as one of the strongest newly industrialized countries (Olbrich and Shim 2012). Lee further sought to enhance Korea’s soft power capabilities by improving its international image and reputation mainly by positioning the country as a pioneer in green growth and innovation (Nye 2010).

Finally, Lee’s personal ambitions also influenced his promotion of LCGG.2 During his tenure as Mayor of Seoul, Lee implemented the Cheonggyecheon Restoration Project, which turned one of the metropoli- tan city’s most polluted conduits into a natural stream. The stream was cov- ered by an elevated freeway when, between 1955 and 1970, pollution in it became unmanageable. The road had remained one of the most congested areas in Seoul (Lee 2011b: 250). However, Lee completed the river restora- tion within two years of planning, despite several obstacles, including traf- fic problems, reconstruction costs, and public resistance. Since then, the stream has become a landmark tourist attraction in Seoul. For the project,

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Lee was awarded the Best Public Administration Award for Urban Con- struction at the 2003 Venice Biennale (Lee 2011b: 258�9) and was also chosen by Time magazine as one of its Heroes of the Environment in 2007 (Walsh 2007). Lee acknowledged that this experience led him to develop an interest in sustainable development and environmental issues (Lee 2011b: 267). Thus, the administration’s global efforts to promote green growth as a key element of ‘Global Korea’, with the attendant mobilization of financial and diplomatic resources, can be understood as partial conse- quence of Lee’s ambition to become a global environmental leader (Lee 2010a). Indeed, in his keynote speech at the 64th UN General Assembly in September 2009, Lee expressed his commitment to expanding Korea’s global responsibilities through green growth initiatives (Lee 2009).

Korea’s pursuit of LCGG and policy outputs

The Lee administration introduced various programs and measures under the overarching LCGG vision. At the domestic level, it assembled a presi- dential committee solely devoted to green growth and promulgated a com- prehensive body of law on green growth intended to establish institutional and legal foundations (Jones and Yoo 2011; Seong 2011). The government also promulgated the National Strategy for Green Growth, a high-level government plan with three primary objectives: (1) to promote a mutually beneficial relationship between economic growth and environmental pro- tection; (2) to improve citizen’s quality of life and promote environmental sensitivity in their daily lives; and (3) to contribute to international efforts to fight climate change and other environmental threats (Jones and Yoo 2011: 6). Reflecting a rising middle power’s ambition, this national strategy also set specific and concrete targets, such as raising Korea’s position to that of the seventh largest global green power by 2020 and the fifth by 2050 (Woo 2010; Yun et al. 2011).

Moreover, the administration embarked on various initiatives to pursue LCGG at the international level. Although Korea has promoted regional cooperation as a middle-power state for some period of time (Kim 2014; Yoon 2006), the administration’s promotion of LCGG was more broadly aimed at a global audience. As such, its specific programs and initiatives can be grouped into two categories: (1) showcasing best practices through the integration of LCGG into the national development vision; and (2) expand- ing global environmental responsibility by contributing to institution building and by assisting less developed countries on their paths toward green growth.

Showcasing best practices

One of the three objectives included in the administration’s National Strat- egy for Green Growth was to portray Korea as a role model by taking the

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lead in the global green growth movement. The President’s annual State of the Nation speech also expressed the government’s ambition to make Korea one of the first countries in the world to adopt green growth as a national developmental vision, a vision that was also shared by both the OECD and UN (Lee 2011a).

The concept of green growth was first introduced to Korea during the Ministerial Conference on Environment and Development in Asia and the Pacific (MCED), held in Seoul in March 2005 (Chon 2009). Jointly hosted by Korea’s Ministry of Environment and the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP), the MCED adopted the Seoul Initiative on Environmentally Sustainable Economic Growth. The initiative aimed to promote sustainable economic development in the Asia-Pacific region by establishing communication networks among mem- ber countries to promote the sharing of information, cooperation, and pol- icy support for green growth (UNESCAP 2005). When the OECD and several other states reintroduced green growth as a global issue by signing the Green Growth Declaration in June 2009, Korea was already at the forefront of integrating green growth into its national economic develop- ment strategy (Zelenovskaya 2012). Korea’s active participation in these international meetings, both as a host country and participant, indicated that it intended to define itself as a leader in the global green growth arena.

Accompanied by measures to promote itself as a global leader, the Korean government also introduced various environmental programs as a lever for economic recovery (HSBC 2009). The Green New Deal, launched in January 2009, was designed to serve these goals (World Bank 2010). Korea adopted a stimulus package program, worth $38.1 billion (the equiv- alent to 4% of its GDP) to fight the recession triggered by the global finan- cial crisis. Of this amount, it allocated $30.7 billion, or about 81%, to its environmental projects under the Green New Deal (Normile 2010a: 1570). The Korean government expected that its spending on various projects � renewable energy ($1.80 billion), energy-efficient buildings ($6.19 billion), low-carbon vehicles ($1.80 billion), railways ($7.01 billion), and water and waste management ($13.89 billion) (World Bank 2012) � would stimulate economic production to the tune of $141.1�160.4 billion between 2009 and 2013. The country also expected that the domestic green market would grow from KRW 1.8 billion to KRW 17 billion. Consequently, Korea’s share in the global green market was expected to grow from 1.4% to 5% during the same period, reaching an ultimate projected growth of 13% by 2020 (Hahm and Choi 2009: 632). The administration expected that this program would create 1.6�1.8 million domestic jobs (World Bank 2010).

Korea thus marked itself as a leader in the green economy by imple- menting a stimulus package just three months after the UN Environmental Program (UNEP) launched the Global Green New Deal in October 2008 (Normile 2010a: 1570). Although many advanced economies adopted simi- lar projects, Korea ranked first in terms of green investment in proportion

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to the total amount of the fiscal stimulus, although its net investment fell behind China ($221 billion) and the US ($112 billion) (Bigg 2011; Pascha 2010: 148). Korea’s allocation of 2% of its GDP to green projects was remarkable, given that other G20 members failed to meet the UNEP rec- ommended 1% of GDP expenditure (Barbier 2010: 832) and OECD countries’ average total contribution of $454.7 billion amounted to only 0.7% of their GDP total (or 15% of the total fiscal stimulus) (Barbier 2010: 832).

Korea was also the first country to establish legal institutions as a guar- antor of green growth. The Framework Act on Low Carbon Green Growth (FALCGG) (2010), which embraces all of the key aspects of the LCGG policy � such as climate change, energy, sustainable development, and green growth education (Chon 2009) � went into effect in April 2010, pro- viding the legal foundations for the successful implementation of the LCGG policy (Seong 2011: 16). The framework came to officially define green growth as

[g]rowth achieved by saving and using energy and resources effi- ciently to reduce climate change and damage to the environment, securing new growth engines through research and development of green technology, creating new job opportunities, and achieving har- mony between the economy and environment (FALCGG, Art. 2).

Moreover, the FALCGG specified various policy instruments to achieve green growth. One of the most remarkable measures was the mandatory enforcement of GHG emissions reduction targets (O’Donnell 2010). As party to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Korea ratified the Kyoto Protocol as a non-Annex I signatory with no obli- gation to set an emissions reduction target (Jones and Yoo 2011). In August 2009, however, the government considered the three options of cut- ting emissions by 21%, 27%, or 30%, relative to the projected emission level in 2020, in the context of a ‘business-as-usual’ (BAU) scenario that projected a 36.9% rise in emissions between 2005 and 2020 (Jones and Yoo 2011: 5�6). These options corresponded to an 8% increase in emis- sions, no change, or a 4% reduction relative to 2005, respectively (Yun et al. 2011). Among these, the administration selected the most ambitious option of a 30% reduction. By adopting reduction targets and cementing them as a legal obligation in the FALCGG, Korea made itself the first non-Annex I country to legally require mandatory emissions reduction (O’Donnell 2010).

These initiatives drew international attention (Na 2010). The World Bank (2010) cited Korea as one of the first countries to enshrine green growth as part of a national development strategy. It also acknowledged Korea’s promotion of a green philosophy, as well as its efficient implemen- tation of a green stimulus package. Indeed, Korea registered a 2.3%

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growth rate, the highest among OECD countries, in the second quarter in 2009. Acknowledging this success, the OECD decided to host the first Global Green Growth Summit in Seoul, in June 2011. The UNEP (2010) also applauded Korea for its engagement and leadership in promoting green growth as a global concern.

Expanding global environmental responsibility

During Lee’s tenure, Korea also attempted to take on a larger share of global environmental responsibility, befitting its status as the world’s 15th largest economic power in terms of GDP. The administration’s efforts focused on two fronts. First, the country aimed to contribute to institution building and shape international discourse in the green growth arena. Second, Korea expanded its developmental assistance initiatives to less- developed countries that were willing to experiment with their own green growth.

Korea achieved several tangible outcomes in building institutions. First, it competed against Germany and Switzerland to host a secretariat of the Green Climate Fund (GCF). Frequently regarded as the equivalent of the World Bank on the green growth and climate change fronts (Korea Times 2012), and supported by the 191 signatories to the UNFCCC, the GCF is a key global instrument for enabling poor countries to undertake invest- ments in renewable energy and climate change mitigation. It has been tasked with raising $100 billion per year for low-income countries by 2020 (Sachs 2012).

The Lee government undertook the responsibility of hosting the GCF as a means of cementing its leadership role in the green growth sector. More- over, Korea calculated that there would be numerous substantial material and economic benefits to be gained by hosting hundreds of UN employees and 120 international meetings annually (Korea Times 2012). According to the Korean Development Institute, 100 annual meetings attended by 500 employees would generate KRW 380 billion and create 2000 jobs, in addi- tion to enhancing Korea’s green growth infrastructure (Presidential Office 2012: 18).

Korea also succeeded in re-launching the Global Green Growth Insti- tute (GGGI), a locally developed think-tank established in June 2010, with the goal of promoting green growth in developing countries. It was recog- nized as an international organization, with 18 member states, in October 2012 (O’Donnell 2012). The support for this institute originated from Lee’s speech at the 15th Conference of the Parties (COP) in Copenhagen, where he expressed his administration’s commitment to establishing an organiza- tion dedicated to the globalization of green growth (Presidential Office 2012). The GGGI aims to promote green growth as a globally important issue by providing aid to developing countries, and is specifically aimed at

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helping them incorporate green growth strategies into their economic development agendas. This would, in turn, aid them in building their own green technological capacities and competitiveness.

As of 2012, the GGGI had 62 staff members and three regional offices, located in Abu Dhabi, Copenhagen, and London, in addition to its Seoul headquarters. In 2012, the GGGI operated on an estimated budget of $35 million (O’Donnell 2012). Indonesia, Brazil, and Ethiopia were the first countries to receive GGGI’s assistance. Korea planned to contribute $10 million to GGGI’s annual funding for the first three years, and has sub- sequently pledged to seek further contributions from other governments and foundations (O’Donnell 2010). The GGGI, furthermore, obtained observer status at the UN General Assembly in December 2013. Prior to this, there was no international organization dedicated to the promotion of green growth strategies, aimed specifically at developing countries (O’Donnell 2012). Korea, thus, became an important conveyor of green growth ideas, especially through its assistance of the developing world.

In addition to contributing to institution building, the Lee administration has also tried to shape the international green growth discourse through the promotion of new ideas. Lee championed the principle of the Nation- ally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMA) as a new paradigm for addressing global climate change issues (O’Donnell 2011). The core philos- ophy behind the principle is that developing countries should fashion their own GHG emissions reduction targets and strategies, even in spite of their lack of obligation to reduce emissions under the existing climate change regime. This principle reflected Lee’s ‘me first’ approach to climate change, which holds that all countries should take an initiative and implement poli- cies appropriate to their respective circumstances, rather than wait for other states to act first (O’Donnell 2012). The Korean government embod- ied the NAMA principle by adopting, for instance, the voluntary emissions reduction targets. The GGGI was also founded on the idea that countries should adopt mitigation strategies tailored to their individual characteris- tics and reflective of their stage of economic development, financial ability, and technological resources. Korea further proposed the establishment of the NAMA Registry, which was designed to enhance international trans- parency by recording each country’s mitigation attempts. The registry was adopted at the 16th COP in Cancun, Mexico, in December 2010.

Korea also undertook to expand its global responsibility to international environmental concerns through its official development assistance (ODA) programs. In 2009, Korea became the first former recipient of international aid to become a donor country, sending $1 billion to dozens of less-developed countries, with a plan to triple that sum in the following five years (Lee 2010a). Korea’s ODA currently accounts for 0.15% of its GDP (Olbrich and Shim 2012). Under the Lee administration, Korea pro- moted the concept of ‘green’ ODA in particular. According to the World Bank, Korea quadrupled its foreign assistance budget from $200 million in

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2000 to $800 million in 2009. The country, furthermore, pledged to expand its financial support for green energy, conservation, and development proj- ects from 11% of its total aid budget in 2009 to 30% by 2020.

Korea has also spearheaded the promotion of LCGG among developing countries by forming partnerships with them. For instance, the country launched the East Asia Climate Partnership (EACP) in 2008 (O’Donnell 2011) after Lee proposed the program during the G8 expanded summit meeting, held in Tokyo in July 2008. Lee pledged to provide $200 million to developing countries in the Asia-Pacific region for five years. The EACP was designed to help developing countries introduce measures to address climate change-related challenges and promote sustainable devel- opment in five areas: clean energy, water management, forestation, waste management, and high-efficiency power generation (Park 2012). Benefit- ting from Korea’s financial and technological assistance, several recipient countries have witnessed positive environmental and social developmental outcomes (Park 2012). Korea also supported green growth projects in Bra- zil, Indonesia, and Ethiopia by contributing $10 million to the GGGI and by committing an additional $50 million, in 2013, for green projects in 18 countries (Kim 2013).

In sum, the Lee administration’s green diplomacy aimed to unravel Korea’s image as an economically successful but inward-looking middle- power state and transform it into a respected global leader that could serve as a bridge between the global North and South in the environmental arena (Kim 2013; Lee 2010a; Shim 2010). Korea has achieved tangible outcomes in this regard. It obtained international recognition as an intellectual leader in green growth and a global market leader in clean energy technology (Kim 2013; O’Donnell 2010, 2011, 2012). Indeed, Jeffrey Sachs (2012) praised the international community’s decision to locate the GCF in Korea, given the country’s reputation as a forerunner in green growth. Korea’s contributions to institution building and capacity development in green growth, and its promotion of a new approach to climate change, were also remarkable, given that most of the existing international environ- mental institutions as well as the dominant environmental discourses have originated from the West (Presidential Office 2012).

Ripe for a pioneer state? Domestic foundations for green growth

The Korean government, thus, seems to have generated several visible pol- icy outputs under the Lee administration’s top-down guidance. As reviewed in the Introduction, studies on environmental pioneer states gen- erally argue that they are characterized by a strong economic and techno- logical capacity, sound domestic environmental performance, and the presence of state–society partnerships that advance innovative and pro- gressive environmental policies. This section evaluates Korea’s pursuit of

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leadership in environmental affairs by applying these domestic underpin- nings as a yardstick.

Korea ranks highly in terms of overall economic capacity and national competitiveness, which has been shown to facilitate environmental innova- tion. The Global Competitiveness Report measures numerous factors including infrastructure, institutions, macroeconomic stability, education, technological readiness, and innovation. It can thus serve as a useful indica- tor of a country’s overall standing in the global marketplace. Most of the well-known environmental pioneer states � such as Switzerland, Germany, Finland, and the Netherlands � have been consistently ranked in the upper tier of the report. The report ranks Korea at an average of 19.4 out of 137 countries between 2008 and 2012, indicating that the country has retained a sound economic and technological foundation on which to pursue a more aggressive domestic and international environmental agenda.

Korea has also made a continuous effort to close the gap between itself and more advanced states by strengthening its capacity for environmental innovation. For instance, the country recorded an astonishing 19,584% increase in electricity generation from renewable sources between 2002 and 2011, the highest among the G20 states (Schmidt and Haifly 2012). In 2011, Korea ranked 15th in terms of the ratio of electricity production from renewable sources by generating 0.9% of its total electricity from wind, solar, and other forms of alternative energy. In the same year, Korea invested $200 million in clean energy, the 11th highest amount among G20 members. Korea has also emerged as a world leader in tidal energy and a key player in solar photovoltaic technology (Dent 2012: 571).

However, Korea’s overall technological development is still only 50%�80% of that of more advanced countries (Kim et al. 2012:9). Accord- ing to the Korea Institute of Science and Technology Evaluation and Plan- ning (2013), Korea’s solar power technology is 80% of that of the US; its wind power technology is 70% that of the EU’s. Korea’s technology in the field of emissions reduction also shows a considerable gap at 75% of that of the EU. These technological gaps suggest that Korea remains at least several years behind the most advanced countries in green innovation. Korea does, however, maintain sound economic and technological funda- mentals, which could be bolstered over time to fulfill its ambition to become a green pioneer. Barring major economic and financial disruptions, the country is likely to retain its environmental momentum.

Korea’s domestic environmental performance, however, has not been of the standard generally expected of a state with its economic and technolog- ical capabilities. The Environmental Performance Index (EPI) (2013), developed by Yale and Columbia University in collaboration with the World Economic Forum, can help measure the country’s recent environ- mental performance in relation to others. Korea was placed at 42nd posi- tion in the 2006 pilot EPI and at 51st position in 2008. In 2012, it ranked 43rd out of 132 countries, an increase from its 2010 position of 94th out of

H. Han: Korea’s Pursuit of Low-Carbon Green Growth 743

163 countries. This trend seems to represent a gradual improvement in domestic environmental performance, but these scores still place Korea well behind many developing countries, including some of its Asian peers (Figure 1).

Korea’s environmental performance in 2012, the last year of Lee’s presi- dency, was strikingly poor particularly in the category of climate change (e.g. 91st in CO2 per GDP), although it stands pre-eminently among LCGG-related agendas. Korea also ranked 87th in the overall ecosystem vitality. The EPI index, thus, illustrates the continuing gap between Kore- a’s ambition to become an environmental leader and pioneer at the inter- national level and its domestic environmental performance.

The literature on green leadership has also emphasized the necessity of political, economic, and social coalitions that favor environmental innova- tion. The Lee administration did not succeed in terms of mobilizing broad support for its pursuit of a leadership role in global environmental politics. The Public Opinion Survey on the Green Growth Policy (2013), conducted by the Presidential Committee on Green Growth (PCGG), revealed some of the reasons for the level of public support. The survey’s results showed that 97.2% of 1000 adult Korean respondents either strongly agreed, or agreed, with the notion that the next President should continue the LCGG policy. This indicates that the Korean public largely shared the gov- ernment’s understanding that the country needed to transition to a greener mode of economic development. However, the public’s positions regarding the next President’s priorities in pursuit of green growth varied widely.

Figure 1 Environmental Performance Index of Asian countries (colour online). *Source: Yale University EPI Index (http://epi.yale.edu/dataexplorer/ countryprofiles).

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The survey showed that 54.6% of the respondents prioritized renewable energy; 34.5% prioritized public relations for the promotion of green life- styles; 32.8% prioritized stronger regulations for GHG emissions reduc- tion; 27% prioritized the expansion of green technology; 22% prioritized system enhancement for the reduction of energy use; 11.3% prioritized bureaucratic strengthening to implement green growth policy; and only 2.8% of the respondents prioritized global leadership. This result suggests that the Korean public were more concerned with seeing the government pursue concrete deliverables, and that they remained ambivalent about Korea playing the role of a public goods provider on the international stage (Snyder 2009: 23).

Moreover, the Lee administration did not succeed in forging an ecologi- cal coalition with Korea’s increasingly environmentally conscious civil soci- ety. Their knowledge and ideas were not incorporated into the decision- making and implementation processes surrounding the LCGG policy, as the government adopted a top-down, elite-centered approach (Lee and Yun 2011: 311�13; Kang et al. 2012; Seong 2011: 20). For example, the presidential committee on green growth was largely composed of presiden- tially appointed specialists and techno-bureaucrats, while civil society groups and individuals remained disproportionately under-represented (Lee and Yun 2011: 303�4).

Civil society actors were critical of the Lee administration’s major green growth programs. They saw them as nothing other than BAU infrastruc- ture initiatives, or social overhead capital development projects, framed as green undertakings (Gil and Jeong 2009; Jones and Yoo 2011; Seong 2011; Moon 2010). For instance, the Four Major Rivers Restoration project, implemented as part of the Green New Deal, failed from the very begin- ning to obtain public endorsement. The government allocated KRW 15.4 trillion (36.8% of the green stimulus budget) to this project (Seong 2011: 20), making it one of the most expensive civil engineering projects in Korean history (Normile 2010b: 1568). Civil society launched a number of opposition movements, identifying the project as one concerned with kill- ing, rather than restoring, the river (Kim 2012; Kwon 2011; Normile 2010b). Opponents from environmental, religious, and academic communi- ties raised concerns that the construction of dams, weirs, highways, and recreation facilities would affect the river’s ecosystems and water resource management negatively (Lee and Yun 2011: 305; Kim 2012: 77). The Lee administration, however, proceeded with the project, antagonizing societal actors who could have otherwise constituted an important pillar in a coali- tion for green growth.

The industrial sector did not turn out to be an avid supporter of the administration’s pursuit of LCGG and its associated programs, either. This was problematic, as the sector accounted for nearly half of Korea’s energy use in 2007 (Jones and Yoo 2011: 7). In 2008, energy-intensive industries � including steel, petro-chemicals, and cement � accounted for nearly 12%

H. Han: Korea’s Pursuit of Low-Carbon Green Growth 745

of the total of the value-added production in the country, the highest among OECD countries and well above the average of 8% (Jones and Yoo 2011: 24). These factors indicate that Korea’s pursuit of LCGG cannot be effective without a fundamental restructuring of the composition of industry and a transition to less-polluting green enterprises, a process that would require the drastic adaption and adjustment of the energy-intensive sector.

The industrial sector, in general, remained ambivalent towards the administration’s initiatives, including the GHG emissions reduction tar- gets. The administration’s draft on the GHG emissions trading scheme met the sector’s opposition. The Federation of Korean Industries fought the proposal, arguing that such a scheme would undermine Korea’s global competitiveness vis-�a-vis its competitors, including China and Japan (Choi 2011; Jones and Yoo 2011: 5�6). The industrial sector, thus, remained lukewarm in embracing the government’s LCGG vision and its programs. These mixed responses from the public, civil society, and the industrial sec- tor suggest that the Lee administration did not succeed in cultivating broad social support in its pursuit of the LCGG policy.

Conclusion

This study has described the Lee Myung-bak administration’s aspirations to mark Korea as an environmental leader through its low-carbon green growth (LCGG) policy. States ascending to the position of a pioneer or leader in the global environmental arena often share several internal char- acteristics, including a strong economic and technological capacity, sound domestic environmental performance, and the existence of an ecological coalition in favor of progressive environmental policy. This study examined whether these features existed in Korea, and whether they had contributed to the Lee administration’s goals.

The Lee administration embarked on various initiatives designed to nur- ture Korea as a global leader in green growth under the National Strategy for Green Growth. Korea’s earmarking of more than 80% of its fiscal stim- ulus to environmental projects in the wake of the 2008 global financial cri- sis stood out as extraordinary. The administration’s introduction of a comprehensive law on green growth and its inclusion of the GHG emis- sions reduction target also drew international attention.

Moreover, Korea adopted measures to expand its global environmental leadership and responsibility. The administration contributed to interna- tional institution building through the GCF and the GGGI, two organiza- tions dedicated to the promotion of green growth on a global scale. The administration also promoted the principle of the Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions as a complementary approach for addressing the cli- mate change issue and embodied this principle in various programs. Korea, for instance, took the lead by expanding its green ODA and partnership

746 The Pacific Review

programs to assist developing countries that pursue their own green growth initiatives.

Despite the Lee administration’s production of various tangible outputs and the international recognition it obtained through diplomatic efforts, this study has identified a gap between the administration’s ambitions and the domestic foundations upon which they were based. First, Korea cur- rently lags behind the advanced countries in Europe or North America in terms of green technology and innovation even though it retains sound eco- nomic and technological capacity and infrastructure as well as the potential for continuous progress in these dimensions. Second, Korea’s relatively poor domestic environmental performance over the years does not bode well for its intended aim of playing a leadership role on the global environ- mental stage. Moreover, the Lee administration did not succeed in either mobilizing broad public support for Korea’s leadership quest or in forming an ecological coalition with civil society and the industrial sector. The administration’s relations with the former remained confrontational, and the latter resisted any drastic change that would compromise their market competitiveness. The study, thus, has determined that the internal condi- tions that would contribute to Korea’s emergence as an environmental pio- neer are yet to ripen.

These findings suggest that Korea should confront the following chal- lenges if it aims to continue to pursue a global green leadership position. First, the political elite largely dictated Korea’s green growth initiative. Consequently, the Lee administration was able to produce several achieve- ments because of its top-down, state-driven efforts despite the lack of strong domestic support. One of the most obvious questions then is whether the Park Geun-hye administration will continue to promote green growth, either as a domestic or international priority. LCGG was her predecessor’s brainchild, and some of its programs raised a great deal of controversy. For instance, the Four Major Rivers Restoration project has continued to gener- ate negative publicity since its completion in 2009. As these problems were unveiled, the newly inaugurated government began to distance itself from LCGG to avoid any immediate domestic political fallout (Park 2013). It is thus possible that some of Korea’s international commitments to green growth might be withdrawn, or simply dissipate altogether. Whether the Park administration will maintain its support of the GCF and the GGGI also remains to be seen.3 Without the support and commitment of the host government, these institutions might face challenges in maintaining interna- tional support, recruiting staff, and securing funding (O’Donnell 2012). If the Park administration decides to withdraw the Korean government’s com- mitments from the international stage, the credibility and reputation that Korea began to build as an emergent environmental leader may also be questioned. Therefore, the Park administration should build on the previous administration’s legacy through the continuous promotion of a global envi- ronmental agenda while treating the matter separately at the domestic level.

H. Han: Korea’s Pursuit of Low-Carbon Green Growth 747

Second, this study indicates that Korea’s pursuit of a leadership position in the global environmental arena will require not only the commitment of the elite within government, but should also be embedded in, and rein- forced by, amicable domestic politics. Lacking a social base for green inno- vation, the government’s projects and initiatives will be difficult to sustain, given that a change in leadership can undermine its commitment levels. When domestic foundations are mature, however, any democratically elected Korean leader and their government will be pressured to respond to the domestic socioeconomic imperative for green transformation and sustainable development.

For Korea to become a genuine green pioneer, while making its global commitments credible and sustainable, its policy-makers should pay atten- tion to improving the country’s domestic environmental record, based on its economic and technological capacity. They should also attempt to mobi- lize broad social and industrial support for the state’s environmental policy while strengthening the social foundations for environmental reform and innovation. When these domestic conditions meet the strategic efforts of the state, Korea will be able to set an example to be emulated by other emerging states. It will also be able to make a genuine contribution to the global environmental commons. This lesson can be further extended to other rising middle-power states that might resort to top-down promo- tional strategies such as that of aggressively pursuing an environmental agenda for visible, short-term international recognition.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. Although this research adopted the definition of green growth used by the Lee administration, one should note that it remains a contested concept. Critics argue that green growth introduced by the administration is simply another name for conventional development, as it focuses on economic growth via envi- ronmental means and neglects the empowerment of the public for the creation of a green society (Moon 2010).

2. Although this research focuses on the role played by the president and his beliefs, various ministries, including the Ministry of Strategy and Finance, the Ministry of Environment, and the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Trans- port, were also major bureaucratic actors behind the administration’s pursuit of LCGG. The Presidential Committee on Green Growth also participated as the coordinator of various sectors’ and ministries’ LCGG-related interests. The prime minster and a president-appointed civilian expert co-chaired this commit- tee, however, indicating the overall executive dominance in policy formulation and implementation (Lee and Yun 2011: 303�4).

3. The Park administration has begun to distance itself from the GCF. Bureau- cratic departments installed under the Ministry of Strategy and Finance and the

748 The Pacific Review

Ministry of Environment to promote GCF-related tasks were merged or down- sized (Inchon Times 2013). As for the GGGI, various controversies regarding the operation of the GGGI have already raised public suspicions of its legiti- macy and durability. The alleged budget waste on internal operational expenses raised questions among Korean taxpayers as to whether the government had simply created another bureaucracy interested in self-aggrandizement and led some OECD member states, such as Norway, to consider suspending financial contributions (Joong Bu Daily 2013).

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