Behavioral and Psychological Factors to disengage from terrorism
Tom Pettinger: De-Radicalization and Counter-Radicalization
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De-radicalization and Counter-radicalization: Valuable Tools
Combating Violent Extremism, or Harmful Methods of
Subjugation?
Tom Pettingera1 aPhD Candidate, Warwick University
Article History
Received Ju 18, 2017
Accepted Sept 2, 2017
Published Sept 29, 2017
Keywords: Deradicalization, counter-radicalization, rehabilitation, discrimination, Islamophobia
Introduction
Given the consistency of terror attacks around the world, the slow defeat of Daesh, and
the growth of domestic anti-terror policies, how do we deal with those who have carried out
1 Corresponding Author Contact: Tom Pettinger, Email: t.pettinger@warwick.ac.uk, Postal Address: Department
of Politics and International Studies, Social Sciences Building, Warwick University, Coventry, CV4 7AL
Abstract
This article debates the justifications behind the practice of counter-radicalization and
de-radicalization. It emphasizes the concepts as shrouded in confusion, and highlights
that the practices continue to develop and expand despite claims of counter-
productiveness, wholly subjective evaluation, and significant doubt around their
premises. The aim of this article is to encourage a greater awareness of the potential
costs to society of promoting policy with no rigorous basis of evidence. Focussing on
both (rehabilitative) prison counter-radicalization schemes and (preventative) non-
prison based de-radicalization, the discussion explores the evaluative methods that
remain chaotic despite a growing need for ‘evidence-based’ public policy-making,
examines the tenuous link between terrorism and ideology which upholds the
principles behind attempts to combat radicalization, and then analyses the possible
outcomes for society of relying on these schemes to minimize extremist violence. It
concludes that taking the link between terrorism and ideology as causal is deeply
flawed, and that by persisting with no systematic method of evaluation combating
radicalization in these ways will continue to fail. Indeed, in prisons, they have been
found to be distrusted, ineffective and even detrimental. Outside of prisons, where
preventative counter-radicalization programmes exist, these will continue to divide
societies among the lines where suspect communities are drawn. It takes the view that
whilst we continue to elevate de-radicalization as a ‘useful tool’ in combating
terrorism, we will also continue to associate certain people groups with terrorism and
only add to grievances that exist in our societies.
Tom Pettinger: De-Radicalization and Counter-Radicalization
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violent extremism, and how do we protect our societies from further atrocities whilst treating
them justly? This discussion examines the use of, and the power exerted by what are known
as de-radicalization and counter-radicalization programmes that have developed over the last
two decades. Accused of rarely focussing on actually practising de-radicalization,2 and with
expert Daniel Koehler accepting that “the fail rate is great,”3 such programmes are beset by
problems of definition, objective, evaluation, manipulation and discrimination. A ‘cottage
industry’ is being established; money being poured in to counter the perceived threats has
ensured the arrival of hosts of inexperienced practitioners.4 However, these schemes are also
said to be an “essential tool to combat terrorist and extremist threats.”5 How useful are they in
delivering results, are they built on rational conceptions of risk, and what are the
consequences for society? As chronic confusion over the language exists, the following
discussion firstly explores the definitions of important terms. The paper then moves on to
exploring the value of de-radicalization and counter-radicalization as public policy, and how
they are informed and measured. It then moves on to examining the consequences on society,
and finally shows how these anti-terror policies could be differently approached.
This paper establishes a distinction between Muslim-majority states which employ
largely post-crime rehabilitation practices to deal with often low-level militants (but whose
evaluative methods are dubious), and secular states that engage in preventative measures who
involve themselves in the pre-crime space. Although not focussing solely on Britain for the
preventative cases, the country’s approach is emphasized as a case study for its pervasiveness
and growing influence (on Australia, the USA and Canada for example). The discussion
2 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (2009), Addressing the
Effectiveness of Current De-radicalization Initiatives and Identifying Implications for the Development of US-
Based Initiatives in Multiple Settings,
https://www.start.umd.edu/sites/default/files/publications/local_attachments/De-
radicalization%20Programs%20Final%20Report.pdf, START, published Sept 2009, accessed 23/06/17 3 Davis, M. (2016), De-radicalization Expert Finishes Testimony in ISIS Case,
https://www.mprnews.org/story/2016/09/21/de-radicalization-expert-finishes-testimony-minnesota-isis-case,
MPR News, published 21/09/16, accessed 27/04/17 4 Zerofsky, E. (2016), The Growth of a De-radicalization Industry in France,
http://pulitzercenter.org/projects/growth-de-radicalization-industry-france, Pulitzer Center, published 02/09/16,
accessed 19/06/17 5 Koehler, D. (2014), The Routledge International Handbook on Hate Crime (Routledge: London), pp. 420-9
Tom Pettinger: De-Radicalization and Counter-Radicalization
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challenges not only the notion that de-radicalization is practised with any consistency,6 but
that its developing use may not successfully address the incidence of terrorism but instead
enable its continuance, by focussing on countering ideologies that aren’t causally linked to
extremist violence. It takes the view that practising de-radicalization and counter-
radicalization entrenches the idea that extremist violence is an individual-level phenomenon
based on a warped ideology rather than encouraging rational discussions about risk.7 It
concludes that the use of ‘de-radicalization’ as a term and in practice augments the belief and
reality that certain groups are being profiled and further stigmatized. Such policies also
discourage the ability to hold and discuss radical views within a society, with governments
determining what acceptable religious and political views can be. Ultimately, the discussion
suggests that we should reform the way we use the terms, and questioning their very validity
as methods of securing ourselves against actual levels of threat. These policies remain flawed
practice based on flawed theory, compounding discrimination against those at the fringes of
our societies at the expense of considering rationally the level of risk we face.
Definitions
The term ‘de-radicalization’ has been consistently misused and misunderstood; it has,
for example, been used to refer to community-based initiatives aimed at preventing
engagement in radical violence, to policies effecting the demobilization and reintegration of
insurgent groups, and to programmes aimed at counter-radicalization practices curtailing
radical thoughts and utterances in those who have not engaged in violence. Despite emphatic
calls for the different terms to be deployed with consideration and caution,8 even in literature
considering the concepts explicitly the terms are often treated as one or are at least
6 Horgan, J., Braddock, K. (2010), ‘Rehabilitating the Terrorists?: Challenges in Assessing the Effectiveness of
De-radicalization Programmes’, in Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 22, pp. 267-91 7 Schmid, A. (2013), Radicalization, Counterradicalization: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review,
https://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Schmid-Radicalisation-De-radicalisation-Counter-Radicalisation-
March-2013.pdf, International Centre for Counter-terrorism - The Hague, published March 2013, accessed
23/06/17 8 Koehler, D. (2014), loc. cit.
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inadequately separated from one another.9 This section looks at the definitions of pertinent
terms, including ideology, establishing a difference between preventative, pre-crime counter-
radicalization and schemes which rehabilitate individuals who have committed violent crimes
ideologically.
Ideology
Targeting the radical ‘ideology’ held by individuals is the focus of programmes
combating radicalization; ideology has been portrayed in discourse as a key motivating factor.
This discussion takes the framing process theory in “understanding the character and course
of social movements.”10 The theory suggests that ideology does play a role in individuals’ and
groups’ movements towards political violence but it should not be thought of as a
homogenous entity that motivates similarly across these individuals and groups. It should
instead be seen and explained through ‘frames’, or stages of interaction of thought and
articulation that influence an actor’s behaviour.11 Rather than just stating that ‘ideology’
mechanically causes terrorism, the theory proposes that the process of movement mobilization
includes diagnostic framing (i.e. the identification of a problem and the defining of why a
movement exists), prognostic framing (i.e. exploring what can be done to rectify the
problem), and motivational framing (i.e. mobilizing affected individuals to join the cause and
expanding the potential pool of recruits).12 The paper takes the view that ideologies are
actively acquired by subjects, and are dynamic and “more complex than often presumed.”13
David Snow and Scott Byrd write that it is fallacious to consider ideology as “tightly coupled,
inelastic set of values, beliefs, and ideas”;14 within both individuals and movements the
9 See: El Said, H. (2015), New Approaches to Countering Terrorism: Designing and Evaluating Counter-
Radicalization and Dr-Radicalization Programs (Palgrave Macmillan: London), p. 21 10 Snow, D., Benford, R. (2000), ‘Framing Processes and Social Movements’, in Annual Review of Sociology,
Vol. 26, pp. 611-39 11 Ibid. 12 Snow, D., Byrd, S. (2000), ‘Ideology, Framing Processes, and Islamic Movements’, in Mobilization: An
International Quarterly Review, Vol. 12, Issue 1, pp. 119-36 13 Snow, D. (2004), ‘Framing Processes, Ideology, and Discursive Fields’, in eds. Snow, D., Soule, S., Kriesi, H.,
The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements (Blackwell: Oxford), pp. 380-412 14 Snow, D., Byrd, S. (2000), loc. cit.
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ideologies are constantly changing depending on the circumstances and those engaging in
framing.
De-radicalization vs. Disengagement
The notion of psychological reform for those who have committed acts of terrorism
has consistently defined as de-radicalization, though far more frequently (even within
academic literature) de-radicalization is confused with behavioural disengagement. For the
purposes of this discussion, I will emphasize the difference between disengagement and de-
radicalization, taking disengagement as the group-based “physical cessation of some
observable behaviour”15 in this context acts of terrorism, and taking Horgan’s definition of
de-radicalization from his seminal 2009 work Walking Away from Terrorism as:
“the social and psychological process whereby an individual’s commitment to, and
involvement in, violent radicalization is reduced to the extent that they are no longer at
risk of involvement and engagement in violent activity”.16
Daniel Koehler, the internationally renowned de-radicalization expert, contends that to ensure
the minimization of recidivism, programmes should place “ideological reassessment as the
basis of practical work”.17 In other words, he promotes the idea that the most effective method
of countering the threat of extremism from subject participants is to walk them through
ideological reform (or otherwise challenging the diagnostic framing element of the acquisition
of an ideology), alongside more practical rehabilitation methods like skills training and social
integration. The logic driving this perspective is that if purely mechanical behavioural change
is achieved, the conditions for re-engagement in violence could easily occur. But if a subject
was ideologically reformed through de-radicalization to a point where they “abandon the
15 Horgan, J., Braddock, K. (2010), loc. cit.; also see: Szmania, S., Mastreo, C. (2016), Surveying CVE Metrics in
Prevention, Disengagement and De-radicalization Programmes,
https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_SurveyingCVEMetrics_March2016.pdf, START, published Mar 2016,
accessed 10/09/17 16 Horgan, J. (2009b), Walking Away From Terrorism: Accounts of Disengagement from Radical and Extremist
Movements (Routledge: London), p. 153 17 Koehler, D. (2014), loc. cit.
Tom Pettinger: De-Radicalization and Counter-Radicalization
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radical worldview that justifies the use of violence”,18 then the likelihood of them turning to
violence if the same conditions were present is far smaller.
History
The current wave of what are perceived or claimed to be de-radicalization programmes
- which target ideology as a primary cause of terrorism - began in earnest when Yemen
commenced its own initiatives, following al Qaeda attacks on US and French interests in the
country. Fearing Western intervention after the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the Yemeni
government felt it had to adjust from its failing and unpopular policy of hardline suppression
of al Qaeda, to include ‘re-education’ of captured militants: the Yemeni Committee for
Dialogue was born.19 The prisoners were challenged by the Religious Dialogue Committee
(RDC, comprised of five religious scholars) on their views and beliefs. The RDC used the
Quran to debate with them, “not on the content but on their understanding of the verses and
hadiths”.20 Although it was discontinued by 2008 as a result of controversial decisions (like
releasing some of the USS Cole attackers), the ideas developed in this programme were
exported across the region, notably to Saudi Arabia, but also as far as Malaysia, Singapore,
and Indonesia.21 Horgan argued that the Yemeni programme would “most closely resemble
what one would expect of ‘de-radicalization’: a softening of views, an acceptance that the
individual’s pursuit of his objectives using terrorism were illegitimate, immoral and
unjustifiable”.22
18 Rabasa, A. (2012), Angel M. Rabasa - De-radicalizing Islamist Extremists,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=24O5FjHG2AA, YouTube, hosted by RumiForum, published 26/04/12,
accessed 11/06/17 19 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (2009), loc. cit. 20 Ibid. 21 Rabasa, A., Pettyjohn, S., Ghez, J., Boucek, C. (2010), De-radicalizing Islamist Extremists (RAND
Corporation: California) 22 Horgan, J. (2009), ‘De-radicalization or Disengagement? A Process in Need of Clarity and a Counter-terrorism
Initiative in Need of Evaluation’, in International Journal of Psychology, Vol. 24, Issue 2, pp. 291-8
Tom Pettinger: De-Radicalization and Counter-Radicalization
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Pre-Crime Counter-radicalization and Post-Crime De-radicalization
Programmes which deal with those who have not yet engaged in violent crimes are
also often referred to as ‘de-radicalization’ schemes,23 although by taking Horgan’s definition
of de-radicalization being a post-crime process, then dealing with pre-crime individuals
holding radical views could be called ‘counter-radicalization’. Participants of these
programmes can be those who possess a radical ideology, or those who are seen to be
developing a radical ideology. Largely these take pre-crime schemes place outside of prisons,
whereas de-radicalization mostly occurs with people actually convicted of crimes and in
prisons. The effects of counter-radicalization and de-radicalization (with different levels of
subjects’ criminality) are similar in curtailing the ability to hold radical views in a society, the
Othering of groups of citizens, and so on, hence the parallel analysis of the two processes.
There is a somewhat stark difference between what are known as ‘de-radicalization
programmes’ that operate inside prisons, and those that operate outside. Schemes that target
prisoners largely function to de-radicalize former militants, whilst those that target civilians in
a pre-crime space function to prevent radicalization from occurring in the first place.24 Prison-
based de-radicalization programmes range from informal ‘chats’ between prisoners and
imams (as in Victoria, Australia, until the Islamic Council of Victoria recently ended their
partnership with the prison), to two-week intense ‘courses’ teaching prisoners basics of Islam
(as in Mauritania), to years-long integrated programmes (as in Saudi Arabia). Most famously
Saudi Arabia has engaged in constructing a comprehensive programme; alongside the
ideological focus upon which it was first built, it now incorporates “political education,
vocational training, painting, physical education and social and economic programs to
facilitate reintegration of detainees”.25 It has even tried to find spouses for its prisoners when
they are released.26 The Saudi scheme has been perceived somewhat as a model programme,
23 Koehler, D. (2017), Structural Quality Standards for Work to Intervene with and Counter Violent Extremism,
http://www.kpebw.de/wp-content/uploads/Handbuch-KPEBW-engl.pdf, Counter Extremism Network
Coordination Unit, published 2016, accessed 08/09/17 24 Schmid, A. (2013), loc. cit. 25 El Said, H. (2015), op. cit., p. 256 26 Rabasa, A. (2012), loc. cit.
Tom Pettinger: De-Radicalization and Counter-Radicalization
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involving both ideological de-radicalization and continued disengagement through
reintegrating them into their communities.27 Former militants are often used where possible in
prison programmes to encourage the de-radicalization of subjects, and it runs classes on a
wide range of areas to educate detainees, readying them for eventual rehabilitation.28
Indonesia’s de-radicalization efforts include ensuring that captured Jemaah Islamiyah
members spend time with a former commander, Bin Abbas, who challenges their justification
for violence against civilians even before the police become involved with the process.29
However, the Indonesian scheme is far less organized than the Saudi programme: Abuza
remarks it remains “underfinanced, understaffed, and not terribly institutionalized”.30 At
possibly the lowest level of institutionalization is the Australian de-radicalization initiative, in
Victorian prison Goulburn, where imams came and chatted to inmates on an informal basis,
and gave lectures on the basic tenets of Islam.31 The prison authorities are so uneducated on
Islamic culture though, that “conversion is not only a cause for concern [for them], but is also
taken as a sign of radicalization.”32 Another signifier of the lack of formality of the Victorian
scheme was that instead of being allowed to talk in their mother tongue, the prison required
that inmates’ visitation discussion took place in English, reinforcing “distrust between
families and detained relatives on the one hand, and incarceration authorities on the other”.33
Given differences in approach to the prison-based programme and dissatisfaction with other
27 Neumann, P. (2013), How Do Prison De-radicalization Programmes Work?,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T5WKyn6nQEs, YouTube, hosted by ICSR, published 09/12/13, accessed
21/06/17 28 al-Hadlaq, A. (2015), Saudi Efforts in Counter-Radicalisation and Extremist Rehabilitation, in eds. Gunaratna,
R., Bin Ali, M., Terrorist Rehabilitation: A New Frontier in Counter-Terrorism (Imperial College Press: New
Jersey), pp. 21-39 29 Abuza, Z. (2009), ‘The Rehabilitation of Jemaah Islamiyah Detainees in South East Asia: A Preliminary
Assessment’, in eds. Bjørgo, T., Horgan, H., Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective
Disengagement (Routledge: New York), pp. 193-211 30 Ibid. 31 El Said, H. (2015), op. cit., p. 29 32 Ibid., p. 87 33 Ibid., p. 84
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forms of extremism not being treated in the same way as Islamist violence, the Islamic
Council of Victoria in 2017 ended its role in the programme.34
Outside of prison settings, counter-radicalization is practised even less systematically.
Where Middle Eastern and Southeast Asian countries have tended to emphasize the counter-
radicalization of individual captured fighters who have engaged in illegality and violence,
European efforts (with a couple of notable exceptions) have been aimed more at tackling
radical beliefs and ‘ideologies’ before the threshold into physical violence and crime has been
crossed. Although they are often called de-radicalization programmes,35 by Horgan’s
definition these preventative schemes are not technically de-radicalization,36 nor are they
disengagement as they intervene before crimes have been committed. Technically counter-
radicalization, they could be described as ‘risk prevention’ schemes (this point is discussed in
more detail below). Efforts to keep individuals from engaging in radical violence are much
more focussed on the prevention of radical ideologies and encourage the integration of ‘at-risk
communities’ (which are primarily taken to be ‘Muslim communities’).37 Some genuine
ideology-centred processing does occur outside of the prison setting, however: EXIT-
Germany requires that its subjects progress through a “successful challenge of the old
ideology… An exit is successful when the fundamental ideologies and purposes of the
previous actions have been resolved.”38 Voluntary, non-prison-based programmes mostly
target those who have not yet committed crimes, but are those who the authorities consider at-
34 Le Grand, C. (2017), Muslim Mentors Walk away from Jail De-radicalization Programme,
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/policy/muslim-mentors-walk-away-from-jail-deradicalisation-
program/news-story/9411aadf130f14ed39f0254975d53782, The Australian, published 09/06/17, accessed
07/09/17 35 Della Porta, D., LaFree, G. (2012), ‘Guest Editorial: Processes of Radicalization and De-radicalization’, in
International Journal of Conflict and Violence, Vol. 6, issue 1, pp. 4-10 36 For an introduction to the debate around radicalization, de-radicalization and definitions of related concepts,
see: Demant, F., Slootman, M., Buijs, F., Tillie, J. (2008), Decline and Disengagement: An Analysis of Processes
of De-radicalisation (Institute for Migration & Ethnic Studies: Amsterdam); Schmid, A. (2013), loc. cit. 37 Institute for Strategic Dialogue (2010), PPN Working Paper: De-radicalization,
https://www.counterextremism.org/resources/details/id/115/channel-process, Institute for Strategic Dialogue,
published June 2010, accessed 15/06/17, p. 185 38 European Commission (date unknown), EXIT-Germany, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/node/7420_en,
European Commission: Migration and Home Affairs, published unknown, accessed 20/06/17
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risk of committing crimes.39 The Channel programme in the UK for instance (technically
counter-radicalization) is known as a ‘de-radicalization’ programme40 despite extremist
violence not having taken place, focusses on the ideology of those referred to it, who move
through a series of interventions by officials.
Value of De-radicalization and Counter-radicalization as Practice
The main arguments put forward in support of combating ideological radicalization
(often alongside more mechanical disengagement) are that it reduces recidivism from former
militants more assuredly in the long-run and, where no crimes have been committed, it
reduces the risk of individuals engaging in violence in the first place. Overall its proponents
claim that, where successful, combating ideological radicalization is “more enduring, resilient
and immune from recidivism”41 than schemes where ideology is not challenged and reformed.
Hamed El Said suggests that de-radicalization programmes save significant sums of public
money, because “‘wining hearts and minds’ is less [financially] costly than waging wars”,42
and consequentially anger at the country’s foreign policy is limited, meaning fewer
individuals see turning to violence as legitimate. The programmes are also praised, where they
accompany rehabilitative practices, for working with friends and families of the individuals
on their return to normal life, to ensure that the supporting contacts are vigilant against
“radicalization and recruitment”,43 such as is the practice in Saudi Arabia. De-radicalization
of the individuals can also be supported by families; in Kuwait, Guantanamo Bay returnees
remarked that their families could help to persuade them to abandon violent extremism.44 This
section explores and criticizes the value of de-radicalization against its own claims of success
and internal justifications.
39 Institute for Strategic Dialogue (2010), op. cit., pp. xx-xxi 40 BBC (2015), De-radicalization Programme Referrals on the Rise, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-34469331,
BBC, published 08/10/15, accessed 19/06/17 41 El Said, H. (2015), op. cit., p. 7 42 Ibid., p. 263 43 Porges, M., Stern, J. (2010), Getting De-radicalization Right, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/persian-
gulf/2010-05-01/getting-de-radicalization-right, Foreign Affairs, published 2010, accessed 19/06/17 44 El Said, H. (2015), op. cit., p. 37
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Measures of Evaluation
The principle justification though for developing and expanding such schemes is that
they are claimed to ‘work’. Though there is debate about the ideal outcomes of de-
radicalization, rates of recidivism are understood to be legitimate markers of a programme’s
success, and indeed, they are consistently referred to when discussing the effectiveness of
programmes and initiatives.45 Sometimes startlingly and “suspiciously”46 low rates of
recidivism are reported by programme administrators; German right-wing extremism
programme EXIT-Germany, which focusses explicitly on countering the subject’s extremist
ideology, boasts a 3% recidivism rate over 500 cases, for instance.47 For several years Saudi
Arabia remarkably claimed its scheme resulted in 0% recidivism,48 and the Mauritanian
programme led to only 1 arrest from 37 cases of ‘de-radicalization’.49 Claims of
overwhelming success, like these, are not uncommon.50
However, the stats produced are arguably misleading for a number of reasons. Often
the results are misreported: Saudi Arabia moved its estimate from zero to 5-7% of the
participants of its comprehensive (de-radicalization and reintegration) programme being re-
arrested,51 later made an admission that actually 10-20% recidivism was more accurate,52 but
the director of the University of St. Mary’s Center for Terrorism Lt. Col. Jeff Addicott states
the figure is more likely to be nearer 30-40%.53 Furthermore, the Saudi Security
Subcommittee places “tight restrictions on what [programme participants] may do and with
45 Koehler, D. (2017), Understanding De-radicalization: Methods, Tools and Programs for Countering Violent
Extremism (Routledge: New York), p. 172 46 Horgan, J., Braddock, K. (2010), loc. cit. 47 EXIT-Deutschland (date unknown), EXIT-Germany: We Provide Ways out of Extremism, http://www.exit-
deutschland.de/english, EXIT-Deutschland, published unknown, accessed 22/06/17 48 Koehler, D. (2014), loc. cit. 49 El Said, H. (2015), op. cit., p. 134 50 Porges, M. (2010), The Saudi De-radicalization Experiment, https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/saudi-de-
radicalization-experiment, Council on Foreign Relations, published 22/01/10, accessed 21/06/17 51 Gardner, F. (2008), Saudi Jails Aim to Tackle Terror,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/7220797.stm, BBC, published 31/01/08, accessed 22/06/17 52 Koehler, D. (2014), loc. cit. 53 Lt. Col. Addicott, J., in Fox News (2010), More Guantanamo Detainees are Returning to Terror upon
Release, http://www.foxnews.com/us/2010/03/29/gitmo-detainees-return-terror.html, Fox News, published
29/03/10, accessed 16/07/17
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whom they may associate”54 even after they have ‘graduated’. Had these individuals been
truly de-radicalized and really come to believe in the ideals of the state, they would not need
such stringent governmental oversight. As well as the ‘spinning’ of actual data, Ferguson
notes that recidivism rates amongst political terrorists can be consistently and significantly
lower than ‘normal’ criminals, regardless of their participation in ideologically-based
reformative programmes.55 More structurally, the real incidence of reoffending is hidden
through different understandings of who the subjects of de-radicalization are. EXIT-Germany,
for example, demonstrates a 2% reoffending rate, but the individuals subjected to the
programme are in fact volunteers, and have contacted EXIT to help them leave the extremist
groups they’ve been involved with.56 These individuals are actively looking to remove
themselves from the groups, and can therefore be counted as ‘soft’ targets for de-
radicalization. This is not even accounting for ‘abortions’, or those who don’t make it through
the programme.57 Other programmes’ alleged low level of recidivism should also be
questioned; El Said notes in his study examining de-radicalization and disengagement
programmes that “the most radical [individuals in the Mauritanian programme]… refused
even to participate in the dialogue process.”58 Had the scheme represented all of the militants,
the rate of recidivism may have been far higher than that which was reported. Similarly,
despite relatively low levels of reported recidivism in the reputed Saudi Arabian programme,
its de-radicalizing efforts are focussed not explicitly on violent extremists, but lower-level
supporters who “are said not to have blood on their hands.”59 The Institution for Strategic
Dialogue comments that it directs its efforts towards
54 Braddock, K. (2013), ‘The Talking Cure: Communication and Psychological Impact in Prison De-
radicalization Programmes’, in ed. Silke, A., Prisons, Terrorism and Extremism: Critical Issues in Management,
Radicalization and Reform (Routledge: London), pp. 60-74 55 Ferguson, N. (2016), ‘Disengaging from Terrorism: A Northern Irish Experience’, in Journal for De-
radicalization, Vol. 6, Spring Issue, pp. 1-29 56 European Commission (date unknown), EXIT-Germany, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/node/7420_en,
European Commission: Migration and Home Affairs, published unknown, accessed 20/06/17 57 Koehler, D. (2017), op. cit., p. 172-4 58 El Said, H. (2015), op. cit., p. 134 59 Rabasa, A. (2012), loc. cit.
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“reforming terrorist sympathizers and supporters, not hard-core militants. This has
become increasingly apparent in light of the number of Saudi Guantanamo detainees
who have returned to terrorism upon their release.”60
This method obviously distorts the perceived potential impact of de-radicalization, but it
poses some tough questions: does this esteemed de-radicalization model (that has shaped the
formation of others) deem some individuals as unable to be ‘brought back from the brink’? Is
the process deemed only to work on those who haven’t committed actual violence?
Programmes that intervene in the purely pre-criminal space also suffer from the inherent
problem of measuring recidivism. How is the level of threat they were deemed to pose
effectively measured against the new, lowered risk, and at what point do they return to posing
a threat and are said to have experienced or committed ‘recidivism’? This is surely an
overwhelmingly subjective - and therefore poor - metric for understanding perceived risks
against the state.
As well as the problem of de-radicalization schemes often focussing on pre- and low-
level criminals, the case of Northern Ireland demonstrates how figures can also not accurately
represent the truth; the Independent Monitoring Commission reported only on murders that
took place, none of which were carried out by groups involved in the political peace
settlement that had disavowed violence. But a far higher number of non-fatal shootings and
assaults took place in the country, and Horgan and Braddock suggest “it is likely that some
shootings and assaults”61 were ultimately carried out by these groups. The murder rate in
Belfast is consistently around 50% higher than that of London, and has seen the second
highest rates only to Glasgow across the whole of the UK over time.62 The Saudi programme
has been reported to challenge the validity of attacks in Saudi Arabia as it is not occupied by a
foreign power and enjoys an Islamic government (de-radicalization), but simultaneously has
60 Institute for Strategic Dialogue (2010), op. cit., p. xvi 61 Horgan, J., Braddock, K. (2010), loc. cit. 62 Irish Examiner (2009), Dublin Ranks 6th Among European Capitals for Murder Rates,
http://www.irishexaminer.com/ireland/icrime/dublin-ranks-6th-among-european-capitals-for-murder-rate-
81103.html, Irish Examiner, published 02/01/09, accessed 16/07/17
Tom Pettinger: De-Radicalization and Counter-Radicalization
14
not discouraged ‘jihad’ outside the borders in occupied or apostate states.63 This tactic helps
to reduce the domestic rates of recidivism and obviously helps to bolster security, but de-
radicalization (and disengagement) is not truthfully being achieved.64 Pakistan has faced
similar criticism; violent extremists are dissuaded from attacking Pakistanis, but of Indians are
told “it’s not wrong to want to kill these infidels or apostates.”65 Taking recidivism figures at
face-value is therefore short-sighted and inadvisable; as a metric these statistics may not be a
useful representation of the effectiveness of de-radicalization programmes, given the diverse
variables involved.
Moreover, relying on recidivism rates of subjects to demonstrate relative successes
implies that the de-radicalization (and disengagement) programmes in question are a variable
and therefore the - or at least a - cause of the avoidance of further violence. In Australia, the
prisoners once released are subjected to constant surveillance, and the risks involved in re-
engaging in criminal activity are therefore very high.66 Evaluating the impact of their
ideological reformation is consequentially very challenging. Though Neumann suggests that
the best programmes take a comprehensive approach, incorporating both ideological and
rehabilitative practices,67 Rabasa emphasizes that ideology remains the “glue that holds [the
groups] together [and] provides an explanation for the grievances”,68 a position assumed by
governments that has driven a perceived need for ideologically-based counter- and de-
radicalization initiatives. However, demonstrating actual causality rather than merely
explanations of the acquisition or possession of a radical ideology on the engagement in
terrorism appears futile. As most programmes consist of both psychological and practical
63 Rabasa, A. (2012), loc. cit. 64 Institute for Strategic Dialogue (2010), op. cit., p. xvi 65 Shahin, S. (2015), De-radicalization: Sharing Best Practices - ICT15,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=426pLAaFjco&t=373s, YouTube, hosted by International Institution for
Counter-terrorism (CT), published 20/12/15, accessed 23/06/17 66 El Said, H. (2015), op. cit., p. 92 67 Neumann, P. (2010), Prisons and Terrorism: Radicalization and De-radicalization in 15 Countries,
http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/1277699166PrisonsandTerrorismRadicalisationandDe-
radicalisationin15Countries.pdf, International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence,
published 2010, accessed 15/06/17, p. 47 68 Rabasa, A. (2012), loc. cit.
Tom Pettinger: De-Radicalization and Counter-Radicalization
15
aspects, it remains onerous to determine “which part of these efforts produces moderation.”69
The Yemeni approach, which was almost entirely focussed on countering prisoners’
ideology,70 was not renowned for its low recidivism; Mustafa Alani, the Gulf Research
Centre’s then Director of Security, noted that the programme suffered from 70% recidivism
(those being arrested for terrorism-related offences).71 Ferguson elucidates the difficultly of
using recidivism rates to demonstrate the effectiveness of such programmes: “What would be
a successful recidivism rate for terrorists, and how would we know the program created this
low rate of recidivism?”72 Until these questions have been answered, evaluating their value
will remain as speculation, rather than science.
Though recidivism has been taken as a default metric of success of de-radicalization
(at least by its practitioners), in an area so beset by opacity some consider it appropriate to
challenge what success could even mean.73 After all, how could what is essentially deemed a
psychological process be measured in practical results? How can those who have only
supported - rather than engaged in - radical violence be deemed successfully de-radicalized by
not engaging in an activity they were never engaged in? Koehler himself notes that “the de-
radicalization field globally is more or less completely free of any working standards”.74
Evaluative methods have been suggested by various academics and the discussion is slowly
but surely moving forwards.75 Those like Koehler are driving a conceptual approach, such as
in Structural Quality Standards for Work to Intervene with and Counter Violent Extremism,
where he urged minimum working standards in the field to allow for greater consistency in
69 Institute for Strategic Dialogue (2010), op. cit., p. 184 70 Neumann, P. (2010), op. cit., p. 51 71 Gardner, F. (2008), Saudi Jails Aim to Tackle Terror,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/7220797.stm, BBC, published 31/01/08, accessed 22/06/17 72 Ferguson, N. (2016), loc cit. 73 Horgan, J., Braddock, K. (2010), loc. cit. 74 Koehler, D., in Koerner, B. (2017), A Controversial New Programme Aims to Reform Homegrown ISIS
Recruits back into Normal Young Americans, https://www.wired.com/2017/01/can-you-turn-terrorist-back-into-
citizen/, Wired, published 24/01/17, accessed 13/02/17 75 For a discussion on evaluation methods, see: Szmania, S., Mastreo, C. (2016), Surveying CVE Metrics in
Prevention, Disengagement and De-radicalization Programmes,
https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_SurveyingCVEMetrics_March2016.pdf, START, published Mar 2016,
accessed 10/09/17
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evaluation.76 Alongside this standards-driven movement, in-depth, case-based evaluations are
also taking place: Michael Williams, John Horgan and William Evans examined a single US-
based programme that, whilst accepting its limitations in terms of scale and measuring the
causality of different variables, showed that a flexible and localized approach to measuring
the countering of violent extremism could prove valuable.77 In what Horgan and Braddock
considered a viable method by which to analyse risk-reduction programmes, the
Multiattribute Utility Technology,78 its authors Edwards and Newman proposed that such
programmes should be evaluated using actual data, and the building of similar new
programmes should be informed by statistics.79 Likewise, Williams and Kleinman have
developed a ‘roadmap’ by which schemes can be evaluated, including a greater role for
stakeholders to determine the meaning and validity of a programme’s success.80 However,
serious issues around the evaluation of programmes still exist. Who measures a programme’s
success is also a matter of debate; Szmania and Mastreo remarked that a Yemeni judge
oversaw the evaluation of a programme, but that a “psychologist, a teacher, or a family
member”81 could determine success very differently. Furthermore, if statistics and practices
are country- and even programme-specific, based on how they each calculate their successes
differently, it remains problematic to attempt to encourage coherent practice with highly
disparate contexts. Compared to far more mechanical disengagement efforts to rehabilitate
former militants on both an individual and collective level, such as FARC or AUC militants in
Colombia82 where the metrics of success are more clearly gauged (the laying down of arms,
76 Koehler, D. (2017), Structural Quality Standards for Work to Intervene with and Counter Violent Extremism,
http://www.kpebw.de/wp-content/uploads/Handbuch-KPEBW-engl.pdf, Counter Extremism Network
Coordination Unit, published 2016, accessed 08/09/17 77 Williams, M., Horgan, J., Evans, W. (2016), Evaluation of a Multi-Faceted US Community-Based, Muslim-led
CVE Programme, https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/249936.pdf, National Criminal Justice Reference
Service, published 2016, accessed 09/09/17 78 Horgan, J., Braddock, K. (2010), loc. cit. 79 Edwards, W., Newman, J. (1982), Multiattribute Evaluation (Sage: London), p. 10 80 Williams, M., Kleinman, S. (2013), ‘A Utilization-Focused Guide for Conducting Terrorism Risk Reduction
Program Evaluations’, in Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression, Vol. 6, Issue 2, pp. 102-46 81 Szmania, S., Mastreo, C. (2016), loc. cit. 82 Fink, N., Hearne, E. (2008), Beyond Terrorism: De-radicalization and Disengagement from Violent
Extremism, https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/beter.pdf, International Peace Institute,
published 2008, accessed 20/06/17
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17
for example), the chronic shortage of evaluative processes in de-radicalization schemes - let
alone consideration of what could constitute consistent evaluation methods83 - only highlights
the distance to go regarding the practice of de-radicalization. Though Koehler’s landmark
2017 volume Understanding De-radicalization systematized knowledge on existing counter-
and de-radicalization schemes, it highlighted the diverse approaches to challenging ideologies
in the various countries.84 It is often unclear why those deemed de-radicalized have been
released from prison in different regions, and programmes suffer from a lack of evaluative
processes by which they could offer their justifications or be judged.85 Abuza writes that in
some ‘de-radicalization programmes’, there is in fact no evidence indicating the released
prisoners encountered any de-radicalizing processes whatsoever.86 A core element of policy
making is that “policy makers clearly define the outcomes the policy is designed to
achieve,”87 but Horgan and Braddock conclude that it is “practically impossible to ascertain
what is implied by or expected from programs that claim to be able to de-radicalize
terrorists.”88 In France, a cottage industry has arisen of activists and non-experts who
successfully apply for portions of the abundant funding to practise counter- and de-
radicalization; this scenario has been encouraged by the lack of standards and evaluation of
such practice.89 France24 reported that amongst a “basket of hustlers”90 one activist had
personally acquired €60,000 out of government de-radicalization grants, and who had been
involved in over a dozen cases of fraud and scamming. The country’s approach has been
83 El Said, H. (2015), op. cit., p. 6 84 Koehler, D. (2017), loc. cit. 85 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (2009), loc. cit. 86 Abuza, Z. (2009), loc. cit. 87 UK Cabinet Office (1999), Professional Policy Making for the Twenty First Century,
http://dera.ioe.ac.uk/6320/1/profpolicymaking.pdf, Strategic Policy Making Team, published Sept 1999,
accessed 15/06/17 88 Horgan, J., Braddock, K. (2010), loc. cit. 89 Troendle, C. (2017), ‘Disentanglement, De-integration and Reintegration of Jihadists in France and in
Europe’: The Fact-Finding Mission of the Senate's Law Commission Presents its Progress Report,
https://www.senat.fr/presse/cp20170222a.html, French Senate, published 22/02/17, accessed 09/09/17 90 Jacinto, L. (2017), France’s ‘De-radicalization Gravy Train’ Runs out of Steam,
http://www.france24.com/en/20170801-france-jihad-deradicalisation-centre-closes-policy, France24, published
02/08/17, accessed 09/09/11
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described as a “total fiasco”91 as the only one of the twelve planned de-radicalization centres
has been closed down due to lack of demand. Offering space for 25 individuals, it only ever
welcomed 9 and none of those ever completed the programme.92 Similarly, in Australia, it has
been reported that an industry emerged almost overnight, proliferated by previously unknown
groups and individuals with little research track record or access to radicalized youths.”93
Expert in extremism at Edith Cowan University Anne Aly notes that the Australian CVE field
"has become an enterprise… It's cut throat."94 Programmes have been found largely to be self-
evaluated, and like France, possessing little - if any - governmental oversight, with no
standardized working practices or methods of evaluation.95 With the development of the field
still taking place and only the very beginnings of working standards starting to form, it is
crucial that a field relatively saturated by non-expert practitioners should be driven by the
principles outlined in the works mentioned above. Otherwise misallocation of resources, and
practice-driven failure will continue.
Whilst this learning progresses, we must ask whether the practice of combating
ideological radicalization and its consequences be better understood so that policy more
appropriately deals with threats to our societies. This article aims to accomplish exactly that -
to move the debate forwards, and hopefully contribute to a better method of countering the
risks of terrorism, taking into consideration an accurate level of threat it poses. Those
currently attempting to combat radicalization, in a time where understanding of the causes of
terrorism and the effects and success of anti-terror policies in their infancy, often promote the
91 Senator Bas, P., quoted in McAuley, J. (2017), France’s Deradicalization Centers Seen as a ‘Total Fiasco’,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/frances-deradicalization-centers-are-a-total-fiasco-lawmakers-
say/2017/02/24/218a8072-fa97-11e6-aa1e-5f735ee31334_story.html?utm_term=.9c03c0a9b7e4#comments,
Washington Post, published 24/02/17, accessed 09/09/17 92 Moore, J. (2017), France, Worst Hit by ISIS Attacks in Europe, to Close only De-radicalization Centre,
http://www.newsweek.com/france-worst-hit-isis-attacks-europe-close-only-de-radicalization-center-643260,
Newsweek, published 28/07/17, accessed 08/09/11 93 Olding, R. (2016), The Multi-Million Dollar De-radicalization Business, http://www.smh.com.au/national/the-
multimillion-dollar-deradicalisation-business-20160212-gmske3.html, The Sydney Morning Herald, published
12/02/16, accessed 09/11/17 94 Aly, A., in ibid. 95 Harris-Horgan, S., Barrelle, K., Zammit, A. (2016), ‘What is Countering Violent Extremism? Exploring CVE
Policy and Practice in Australia’, Behavioural Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression, Vol. 8, Issue 1,
pp. 6-24
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19
concept that its value - though not truly understood - is greater than the risks of not ‘de-
radicalizing’ individuals.96 John Horgan alludes to this notion in the foreword to Koehler’s
Understanding De-radicalization, commenting that
“those who care about the extraordinary social and psychological toll associated with
terrorism cannot sit idly by while academics and politicians pontificate on whether we
are using appropriate definitions, language, and terminology.”97
However, although the argument put forward by Horgan and others criticizing ivory-tower
debate98 is persuasive, it could be seen to suggest that any attempt at finding a solution is
valid and necessary, and that results are unimportant. In a field where respective successes or
failures have been impossible to assess, it is incumbent upon academics to challenge policy
makers and practitioners in order to improve policy, and move the debate forwards in search
of better practice. Considering other alternatives encourages the development of better
practice, and helps to understand the consequences for relevant groups within society. More
information, where there exists largely only policy makers’ assumption and practitioners’
intuition,99 can only be a step in the right direction. Policy makers consistently call for an
emphasis on evidence-based policy informed by previous practice and “robust evidence”.100
More importantly, the hegemonic discourse (a society’s dominant narrative driven
through speeches, policy and practice for instance) changes how policy in the future is
approached. For instance, the discourse on terrorism before the 9/11 attacks, which
highlighted its apocalyptic nature and indicated its existential threat,101 helped to enable the
West to wage its ‘War on Terror’.102 If the narrative had existed where 9/11 was viewed as an
anomaly rather than a harbinger of devastating terrorism, the wars in Afghanistan and later
96 Koerner, B. (2017), loc. cit. 97 Horgan J., in Koehler, D. (2017), op. cit., p. xii 98 Koerner, B. (2017), loc. cit. 99 Koehler, D., in ibid. 100 HM UK Government (2012), The Civil Service Reform Plan,
https://www.epims.ogc.gov.uk/CollaborationGPU/public/CSRP-web.pdf?id=15507f72-cad6-45f7-8b50-
56d688ff4edc, published June 2012, accessed 15/06/17, p. 14 101 Laqueur, W. (1999), The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction (Phoenix Press:
London), p. 127 102 Tsui, C-K. (2016), Clinton, New Terrorism and the Origins of the War on Terror (Routledge: London), pp.
32-50
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Iraq may never have happened. Policy makers must be careful how they approach the causes
of extremism and how extremists are treated following the cessation of their crimes, because
as we allow these discourses (through practice) to become hegemonic, they affect how we
approach policymaking in the future. Taking a practitioner-driven rather than an academic
approach can contribute to current practices or perspectives not being challenged, and result
in policy makers developing policy without understanding the potential consequences for
society.
Ideology as a Cause?
As part of deducing how legitimate the aims of combating ideological radicalization
are, we much challenge its internal justifications. It takes ideology as a central cause of
terrorism, or the main risk factor in encouraging individuals to turn to violence to accomplish
their goals. Whilst many prison-based programmes focus on social rehabilitation, they often
also attempt to perform ideological transformation, and schemes aiming to prevent violence
outside of prison settings also endeavour to counter their subjects’ ‘radical ideologies’,
focussing emphatically on their beliefs and the frame through which they view the world. The
National Consortium for Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, after undertaking
quantitative research on better understanding terrorism and disengagement, found there was
“no empirical support”103 upholding many ideologically-focussed approaches. However, are
practices that target ideology justified in principle? How far does a radical ideology actually
cause terrorism to a point where it becomes desirable to spend public money, time and effort
countering it?
The logic of de-radicalization rests upon the ability to reverse ‘psychological
processes’ and violent ideologies, however, academics have seriously contested the ability of
practitioners to reverse these processes. Horgan asks, “Can this actually be done in the ways
103 START (2011), I-VEO Knowledge Matrix, http://start.foxtrotdev.com/#, National Consortium for the Study
of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, published 2011, accessed 22/04/17
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21
that such initiatives suggest? The answer to this is, very simply, no.”104 Furthermore, the
argument that “ideas do not necessarily lead to violence”105 has been championed by Horgan
and Bjørgo as the preeminent scholars in the field. They challenge the perception of any
causal link between ideology and radical violence, rejecting the assumption that individuals
can be effectively dissuaded from partaking in terrorism by reversing some radical ideological
stance.106 Instead, rather than a fundamentalist world view causing engagement in violence,
they suggest that a fundamentalist ideology is acquired only following the individual’s
incorporation with a group.107 Although there are cases where leaders who have quit their
respective movements attempt to ‘de-radicalize’ their former comrades by denouncing
terrorism as a method by which to attain their goals,108 it does not necessarily follow that de-
radicalization and disengagement from violence are causally associated; an individual can
abandon violence without relinquishing their extreme perspectives.109 Indeed, Atran suggests
that “people don’t simply kill and die for a cause. They kill and die for each other.”110
Evidence supports the position of these scholars; where groups have participated in collective
disengagement, some fighters retain their allegiance to the aspirations of the group whilst it
was actively in combat; exploring Colombian insurgent groups, the Human Rights Watch
notes that “while [former fighters] may be disengaged, they are not necessarily ‘de-
radicalized’.”111 Horgan emphasizes that in all of his interviews from 2006-2008, whilst the
vast majority were physically disengaged, none of them was actually truly de-radicalized;
104 Horgan, J. (2010), ‘De-radicalisation or Disengagement? A Process in Need of Clarity and a Counterterrorism
Initiative in Need of Evaluation’, in Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 2, Issue. 4, pp. 3-8 105 Heath-Kelly, C. (forthcoming 2017), 'Is Counter-radicalization an Effective Counterterrorist Tool?: NO'
in Contemporary Debates on Terrorism, 2nd Edition, eds. Jackson, R., Pisoiu, D. (Routledge: Abingdon), Ch. 14 106 Bjørgo, T., Horgan, J. (2009), Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement
(Routledge: Abington), p.28 107 Ibid., pp. 1-13 108 Clubb, G. (2009), ‘Re-evaluating the Disengagement Process: the Case of Fatah’, in Perspectives on
Terrorism, Vol. 3, Issue 3, pp. 25-35 109 Della Porta, D., LaFree, G. (2012), loc. cit. 110 Atran, S. (2011), Talking to the Enemy: Violent Extremism, Sacred Values and What it Means to Be Human
(Penguin: London), preface 111 Human Rights Watch (2005), Smoke and Mirrors: Colombia’s Demobilization of Paramilitary Groups, from
http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2005/07/31/smoke-and-mirrors?print, Human Rights Watch, published 2005,
accessed 20/06/17
Tom Pettinger: De-Radicalization and Counter-Radicalization
22
each had retained the views they had possessed whilst being active in their respective
groups.112 Studying Northern Irish former combatants, Ferguson found that despite whilst
they now denounced violence and worked with counter-radicalization programmes, many
subjects “had actually become more radical through their time in the organization or
especially whilst in prison rather than less”.113 This finding suggests that to attempt to ‘de-
radicalize’ these individuals would not necessarily be productive and could even be
counterproductive; if they were to become less passionate or ‘ideological’, it could result in
them losing interest in preventing further violence and working towards more political
solutions. Is encouraging such militants to consider alternatives to violence whilst they
become more passionately ideological still an act of de-radicalization? If so, the aim of
ideologically-de-radicalizing an individual becomes even more questionable. Afghanistan has
developed its own disengagement programme, which sees incoming Taliban fighters as
having “little ideological baggage”.114 The Indonesian ‘de-radicalization’ programme
reportedly subjects its participants to minimal ideological assessment,115 and those that
disavow violence are said to base their renunciations on financial incentives and early-release
rather than actually believing that terrorism is not legitimate. Money and personal freedom, it
appears, plays more of a role in disengagement than the inmates’ religious ideologies that
justify the radical violence.116 One study of individuals who were recommended to be
researched by the authorities (including the police) for their exemplary behavioural
transformation from terrorism to disengagement and for promoting an anti-violence message,
found that these individuals were fervently critical of the Indonesian de-radicalization
scheme. One participant who had passed through the programme said that “de-radicalization
112 Horgan, J. (2009a), loc. cit. 113 Ferguson, N. (2016), loc cit. 114 Neumann, P. (2010), op. cit., p. 51 115 Horgan, J., Braddock, K. (2010), loc. cit. 116 Crisis Group (2007), ‘De-radicalization’ and Indonesian Prisons, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-
east-asia/indonesia/de-radicalisation-and-indonesian-prisons, Crisis Group, published 19/11/07, accessed
24/06/17
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23
is good if it is successful in performing social re-integration”117 - a perspective that
misunderstands the academic definition of de-radicalization but that ultimately rejects the
importance of ideology in causing terrorism, or the importance of a de-radicalized ideology
on recidivism rates. All of these examples show that attempting to change a former violent
extremist’s ideological stance may not be the most appropriate method to reduce recidivism;
in some cases retaining a radical ideology even encourages the abstinence from violence and a
move towards political solutions.
De-radicalization is often confused for mechanical disengagement,118 resulting in
many rehabilitative programmes being labelled ‘de-radicalization’ initiatives. However, they
often do engage in religious discussions, or touch on issues that could be considered
ideological. However, Porges and Stern note that this occurs to cultivate an environment
where behavioural reform could be effected; exploration of an individual’s ideology is
therefore sometimes only a vehicle to more mechanical disengagement.119 It can therefore be
argued that the priority of schemes that look after imprisoned former combatants is to ensure a
smooth transition back into their families and communities, through their practical training
and education.120
Shaping Discourse
This section pertains largely to those programmes that are considered to practice de-
radicalization, though are more scientifically defined as counter-radicalization; they are
preventative, risk-minimizing schemes that step in and prevent crimes from taking place.
Being one of the most internationally recognized and approaches in countering violent
extremism and whose ideas have been exported across the globe,121 the British model
117 Participant N, in Sukabdi, Z. (2015), ‘Terrorism in Indonesia: A Review on Rehabilitation and De-
radicalization’, in Journal of Terrorism Research, Vol. 6, pp. 36-56 118 Della Porta, D., LaFree, G. (2012), loc. cit. 119 Porges, M., Stern, J. (2010), loc. cit. 120 El Said, H. (2015), op. cit., p. 32 121 Koehler, D. (2017), op. cit., p. 243
Tom Pettinger: De-Radicalization and Counter-Radicalization
24
(operating in the “pre-crime”122 space) has placed a discriminate focus on individuals
espousing significantly critical perspectives. When such programmes operate preventatively,
because of limited resources they will necessarily discriminate, prioritizing the targeting of
individuals who possess characteristics that correlate with people who have committed
terrorist attacks in the past. In Britain this has tended to be Muslims; since the 7/7 bombings
committed by individuals confessing an allegiance with the Islamic faith, Muslims have been
the priority target for British anti-terror efforts, under which the practice of counter- and de-
radicalization falls. The following discussion, taking the British model as the principal case
study, makes three distinct arguments: firstly that such practices silence legitimate grievances
from being discussed within societies; secondly that this vacuum of silence allows states to
promote their preferred version of religion and ideology; and thirdly that the perceptions over
de-radicalization programmes encourage an Othering of groups within society who share
characteristics of those being ‘de-radicalized’.
Silences Discussion
Where preventative programmes exist to step in before a ‘radical ideology’ develops
into physical terrorism, they encourage - and even necessitate - the profiling of individuals
based on their correlations with previous (and high-profile) attacks. The most potent example
is Channel, the intervention arm of the UK’s Prevent programme that attempts to minimize
the threat of violent extremism. Since 2015, those in UK public institutions are required to
refer those they suspect of harbouring extremist views to the Channel programme, at which
point officials then step in and walk through the individual’s ideology with them.123 At the
same time, criminal charges are now being brought for far lower-level threats, and the
entrapment overwhelmingly of Muslims has become standard practice. Those deemed
vulnerable or capable of engaging in terrorism are duped “into committing crimes that would
122 Ibid., p. 6 123 UK Government (2014), Counter-terrorism and Security Act,
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/counter-terrorism-and-security-bill, Home Office, published
26/11/14, accessed 12/02/17
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25
never have occurred [without the authorities’] inducement”.124 Kundnani talks about the
Demographics Unit established in America, where undercover officers and informants are
paid to visit what are essentially thought to be ‘high-vulnerability’ locations - largely mosques
- and listen out for “hostility to the US”.125 In 2008, the FBI had at least 15,000 informants on
their books.126 This phenomenon is no secret; Muslim organizations and mosques are well
aware that their conversations may be being recorded and reported.127
This profiling that results from authorities targeting certain people-groups to assist
either their preventative counter-radicalization (in the UK) or their arrest (in the US), has the
effect of silencing the profiled targets. The Muslim Council of Britain points out that children
have been deemed to be threats and referred for preventative ideological ‘de-radicalization’
for a range of absurd reasons, including the possession of a ‘boycott Israel’ leaflet and ‘Free
Palestine’ badges.128 Since the attacks of 9/11 and the consequential development of
preventative programmes, mosques have been pressurized to expel those demonstrating
radical views (even about their opposition to Western foreign policy), rather than to
encourage discussion and debate, meaning that in public settings, radical views are rarely
aired.129 Though the UK Government has expressed its desire for controversial topics to be
debated in classrooms,130 it is also mandatory for teachers to refer children for ‘de-
radicalization’ for bringing up their “concern about British policy in the Middle East”131 as a
potential sign of radicalization. How does thought-provoking debate take place where the
124 Sageman, M. (2016), Misunderstanding Terrorism (University of Pennsylvania Press: Philadelphia), p. 56 125 Galati, T. (2012), Handschu v. Special Services Division, US District Court, Southern District of New York,
28/06/12, p. 31, quoted in Kundnani, A. (2014), The Muslims Are Coming: Islamophobia, Extremism, and the
Domestic War on Terrorism (Verso: London), p. 136 126 Kundnani, A. (2014), op. cit., p. 97 127 Ibid., p. 199 128 Muslim Council of Britain (2015), Meeting Between David Anderson QC and the MCB,
https://www.mcb.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/20150803-Case-studies-about-Prevent.pdf, Muslim
Council of Britain, published 2015, accessed 28/06/17 129 Kundnani, A. (2014), op. cit., p. 288 130 UK Government (2015), The Prevent Duty,
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/439598/prevent-duty-
departmental-advice-v6.pdf, Department for Education, published June 2015, accessed 19/06/17, p. 7 131 Shabi, R. (2016), De-radicalizing Britain: The Activists Turning Young Muslims Away from Extremism,
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/mar/18/de-radicalising-britain-the-activists-turning-young-
muslims-away-from-extremism, The Guardian, published 18/03/16, accessed 11/06/17
Tom Pettinger: De-Radicalization and Counter-Radicalization
26
terms of engagement are so restricted? Teaching unions have opposed the legal duty to report
their students, claiming that such an approach “encourages lecturers to spy on their students
and will inhibit academic discussion.”132 If preventative de-radicalization is accelerated and
more definitively enforced, which seems to be accelerating - the UK is developing a
mandatory rather than purely voluntary scheme, and US President Trump has indicated that
its preventative focus will confront solely ‘Islamist extremism’ - then this trend is only likely
to continue.
This emphasis on counter-radicalization validates the perception that radicalism itself
is dangerous, and suppresses the communication of radical thoughts and ideas in our societies.
The Saudi Religious Subcommittee, a part of the Saudi approach to de-radicalization, is
comprised of state-approved individuals (clerics, university scholars, religious experts) who
discuss with detainees their interpretations of religious texts “with the goal of persuading
them to adopt a more moderate ideology”;133 in effect seeking to suppress radicalism.
Individuals and groups who have historically been perceived as radicals, like the suffragist
movement or those campaigning for civil rights in the US, have ensured a more equal
society.134 If we quash the ability even to hold radical views, there is a danger we quash
opportunities for social and systemic reform. Had the practice of preventative de-
radicalization existed when the Suffragette movement in the UK was active, it is not
inconceivable that they may have been subjected to such programmes. Where preventative
measures are becoming mandatory (as in the UK, which has typically exported its
counterradicalization policies abroad), parallels can be drawn between current programmes
and the process of silencing of the political objectives of Italian left-wing militants following
their defeat and imprisonment in the 1970s. Heath-Kelly, in studying the political violence of
the ‘Years of Lead’ in Italy, explores the rewards such as early release or employment
132 EIS (2016), ULA Annual Conference 2016, https://www.eis.org.uk/print.asp?id=3348&dbase=, EIS,
published 18/07/16, accessed 20/06/17 133 Braddock, K. (2013), loc. cit. 134 Fitzgerald, A. (2014), Being Labelled a ‘Radical’ Is Meant to Be an Insult. History Tells Us Otherwise,
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jan/20/we-need-radicals-for-social-change, Guardian,
published 20/01/14, accessed 25/06/17
Tom Pettinger: De-Radicalization and Counter-Radicalization
27
presented to militants who denounce violence, writing that “the significance of renunciation
seems to relate to the reintegration of the militant into the reach of the administration.”135 She
found that whilst in prison, those who had been involved in killing, maiming and bombing
during the political turmoil in Italy had organically organized discussion and decided to
abandon armed struggle. Following their shift in perspective, the state viewed these very same
individuals completely differently; despite still having the exact same history, the sentences of
‘the disassociated’ as they became known were ended and they were released.136 This appears
to be a similar technique deployed under contemporary programmes that combat
radicalization: radical stances that challenge the state’s power are solved by the state by re-
imposing its hegemony through paternalistic targeting of imprisoned subjects’ personal values
and political outlook, and rewarding them when ‘divergents’ align themselves with the state’s
view of what is acceptable to believe. The Italian state, in forgiving its opponents who had (at
least outwardly) realigned with its own values was employing this pastoral power to bolster
its legitimacy and curtail criticism. In a similar way, current de-radicalization efforts
encourage citizens to retain mainstream, non-radical mindsets that don’t challenge its
hegemony. They are undertaken to ensure the continuance of the dominant narrative that the
state ‘knows best’, and that violent extremism is only ever destructive and has no aims. Where
radical mindsets are found (in violent and non-violent individuals), they are subjected to a
discourse that states that the acceptance of the “authority of any elected Government in this
country”137 is mandatory and any rejection of which is a sign of radicalization. This could
become a dangerous precedent; if genuine discrimination is occurring - as happened against
women in previous times - and some turn to violence as a result, rather than addressing the
actual issues, governments may rely more on de-radicalization than debate within society to
fix the problem.
135 Heath-Kelly, C. (2013), Politics of Violence (Routledge: London), p. 147 136 Ibid., p. 119-49 137 HM UK Government (2010), Channel: Supporting Individuals Vulnerable to Recruitment by Violent
Extremists, http://tna.europarchive.org/20100419081706/http:/security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-
publications/publication-search/prevent/channel-guidance?view=Binary, HM Government, published March
2010, accessed 15/06/17, p. 9
Tom Pettinger: De-Radicalization and Counter-Radicalization
28
This comparison highlights that combating perceived radicalization allows a state to impose
its dominance by spreading its version of acceptability, and especially in prison programmes
to enforce a state-sanctioned version of religion on the participants. Officials from the
Victorian prison scheme noted that they had “two other imams and we had to let them go too
because they were not doing and saying the right things. We are now looking for new
imams.”138 Saudi Arabia has developed a counter-radicalization approach whereby its
Ministry of Culture and Information “sends religious experts to schools and mosques to
preach the dangers of radicalism.”139 The power of the state is concisely described by
Braddock as he discusses the options put before individuals caught for terrorist offences:
They may either take part in a rehabilitation process and renounce their loyalty to the
terrorist movement of which they are a part, or they can face prosecution for terrorist-
related offences and be sent to a Saudi prison. If the individual chooses to undergo
rehabilitation, Saudi officials ask participants what they did and why they did it…
Members of the Advisory Committee respond by showing how participants’
interpretations of Islam are incorrect, and offer a more moderate interpretation of the
Qur’an upon which the remainder of the rehabilitation programme is based.140
So they can either choose to lose their freedom for years for the crimes they committed, or
accept the Saudi Arabian government’s interpretation of the Qur’an, much like the case in
Italy. Governments in Muslim-majority countries, or where Islam is the official religion, are
often willing to involve themselves in promoting the country’s official doctrine, or a doctrine
that doesn’t harm its interests. This can lead to previously mentioned complications whereby
the prisoners are ordered not to attack their own Islamic societies, but attacking others is not
necessarily wrong. Where countries adopt counter-radicalization schemes, they approach
interlocutors - organizations who could appeal to the profiled groups - to convey their desired
138 High-ranking Goulburn Prison officer, in El Said, H. (2015), New Approaches to Countering Terrorism:
Designing and Evaluating Counter-Radicalization and Dr-Radicalization Programs (Palgrave Macmillan:
London), p. 83 139 al-Hadlaq, A. (2015), Saudi Efforts in Counter-Radicalisation and Extremist Rehabilitation, in eds.
Gunaratna, R., Bin Ali, M., Terrorist Rehabilitation: A New Frontier in Counter-Terrorism (Imperial College
Press: New Jersey), pp. 21-39 140 Braddock, K. (2013), loc. cit.
Tom Pettinger: De-Radicalization and Counter-Radicalization
29
message that emphasizes unity, shared resilience and values supporting the maintenance of
the status quo.141 In these countries - often being liberal democracies - it should be regular
practice to stimulate rather than curtail debate. A healthy, functioning liberal society should
be able to critically challenge differences in perspective rather than attempt psychological
reform on those who don’t conform to the hegemonic patterns of thought. But such a trend
has not been set by the UK Government; it shunned the organization that could most
emphatically claim to represent Muslims,142 the Salafi-controlled Muslim Council of Britain
(MCB), and was “said to have more credibility on the street.”143 The MCB saw its previously
held favour and funding with the UK Government lost, largely over its vociferous opposition
to the Iraq War, and was replaced by the much less critical Quilliam Foundation and the Sufi
Muslim Council (SMC).144 This episode showed that differences of opinion were more
important than collaboration. Kundnani writes that it also is an “unstable”145 practice, setting
one group or set of beliefs as state-approved and another as state-disapproved puts “moderate
Muslims in the precarious position of continually being scrutinized for evidence that they
really have distanced themselves from [the state-disapproved set of beliefs].”146 So promoting
the practice of de-radicalization logically brings a state-sanctioned version of religious beliefs,
with the consequence of securitizing certain groups who don’t necessarily conform to a state’s
(changing) definition of acceptable beliefs.
Othering
Othering divergent and critical perspectives is said to be a negative side-effect of
programmes that seek to counter and de-radicalize citizens.147 The pre-emptive silencing of
141 Institute for Strategic Dialogue (2010), op. cit., p. xxi 142 Yaqin, A., Morey, P. (2011), Framing Muslims: Stereotyping and Representation after 9/11 (Harvard
University Press: Massachusetts), p. 82 143 Rabasa, A. (2012), loc. cit. 144 Kundnani, A. (2014), op. cit., p. 171 145 Ibid., p. 108 146 Ibid. 147 Edwards, P. (2015), ‘How (not) to Create Ex-Terrorists’, in eds. Baker-Beall, C., Heath-Kelly, C., Jarvis, L.,
Counter-Radicalization: Critical Perspectives (Routledge: London), pp. 54-70
Tom Pettinger: De-Radicalization and Counter-Radicalization
30
criticism by minority groups or people on the fringes of society with legitimate grievances148
can occur through the practice of combating radicalization; radical perspectives are gradually
sidelined with a consequence of legitimizing their perception that the state and society are set
against them, compounding the ‘us versus them’ perspective. Edwards notes that
Labelling certain political ideologies as illegitimate; as unacceptably extreme, or as
inherently violent; will inevitably lead some believers of those ideologies to adopt
illegitimate means of expressing those ideologies and pursuing their goals, including
illegal and violent means. Isolating and condemning holders of views seen as
unacceptably extreme is likely to lead to the stigmatisation of individuals, with direct
personal and social costs.149
Whilst de-radicalization programmes existed in Europe first to help rehabilitate right-wing
extremists, many countries’ schemes, like those in France and the Netherlands, were
developed in the wake of attacks perpetrated by Muslims.150 They therefore are frequently and
overwhelmingly aimed at either preventing the spread of some fanatical Islamist ideology, or
attempt in to de-radicalize Islamist extremists in prison. With European countries having
faced decades of left- and right-wing, territorial and religious terrorism, a perception exists
that terrorism perpetrated by Muslims is being treated radically differently given the often
discriminatory practices that combat radicalization.151 EIS, an education trade union in
Scotland (which therefore has a duty to refer suspected students for preventative de-
radicalization), says that “The Prevent Strategy equates ‘extremism’ almost completely with
Islam, this will encourage Islamophobia and racism on campuses.”152 Australian counter-
radicalization practices almost entirely aimed at Muslim ‘communities’ have contributed to
148 Kundnani, A. (2014), op. cit., p. 199 149 Edwards, P. (2015), loc. cit. 150 Zerofsky, E. (2016), How to Stop a Martyr, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/09/01/how-to-stop-a-martyr-
france-de-radicalization/, Foreign Policy, published 01/09/16, accessed 01/07/17; for a comprehensive
breakdown of global practice, see: Koehler, D. (2017), op. cit., pp. 240-89 151 Muslim Council of Britain (2015), Meeting Between David Anderson QC and the MCB,
https://www.mcb.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/20150803-Case-studies-about-Prevent.pdf, Muslim
Council of Britain, published 2015, accessed 28/06/17 152 EIS (2016), ULA Annual Conference 2016, https://www.eis.org.uk/print.asp?id=3348&dbase=, EIS,
published 18/07/16, accessed 20/06/17
Tom Pettinger: De-Radicalization and Counter-Radicalization
31
the perception that they are set apart from the rest of Australian society, and increasing levels
of distrust between Muslim minorities and the authorities in the country have been
reported.153 The effect has been a stigmatizing one154 that is reputedly encouraging some
young Muslims to engage in radical violence.155
Whilst anti-terror policies do not themselves create these discourses of Muslims or as
the Other (it being a millennium-old narrative),156 targeting specific groups through counter-
radicalization corroborates the meaning and strength of such divisive narratives within
societies. Directing ‘cohesion funding’ at areas of high Muslim populations as though they
were a separate, definable and distinct group ensures that those perceived to be Muslims are
thenceforth potential threats as a ‘suspect community’, to be blamed as one for future
attacks.157 There are clearly regions of higher Muslim population, such as Luton in the UK
(25%)158 or Molenbeek in Belgium (41%),159 that are targeted for recruitment by so-called
Islamist terrorist groups. Whilst this is clearly a concerning state of affairs, targeting these
areas through counter- and de-radicalization as a policy with no scientific track record and
claims of counter-productiveness may only enhance the perceived chasm and distrust between
people groups. Requiring that civil society (nurses, teachers and social workers) be
consciously alert to terrorist threats only ensures the unabated continuance of the narrative;
70% of referrals to counter-radicalization programme Channel are Muslims.160 The
153 Harris-Hogan, S., Zammit, A. (2014), ‘The Unseen Terrorist Connection: Exploring Jihadist Links Between
Lebanon and Australia’, in Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 26, Issue 3, pp. 449-69 154 Harris-Horgan, S., Barrelle, K., Zammit, A. (2016), ‘What is Countering Violent Extremism? Exploring CVE
Policy and Practice in Australia’, Behavioural Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression, Vol. 8, Issue 1,
pp. 6-24 155 El Said, H. (2015), loc. cit. 156 Lyons, J. (2012), Islam Through Western Eyes (Colombia University Press: New York), pp. 44-9 157 Hickman, M., Thomas, L., Nickels, H., Silvestri, S. (2012), ‘Social Cohesion and the Notion of “Suspect
Communities”: A Study of the Experiences and Impacts of Being “Suspect” for Irish Communities and Muslim
Communities in Britain’, in Critical Studies on Terrorism, Vol. 5, Issue 1, pp. 89-106 158 Office for National Statistics (2011), Religion: Table Population,
https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/census/2011/qs208ew, Office for National Statistics, published 2011, accessed
05/09/17 159 Cohen, R. (2016), The Islamic State of Molenbeek, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/12/opinion/the-islamic-
state-of-molenbeek.html?mcubz=0, New York Times, published 11/04/16, accessed 05/09/17 160 Gadher, D. (2016), Warning over Rise of Hitler Youth, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/warning-over-rise-
of-hitler-youth-79pkwnfkl, The Times, published 20/11/16, accessed 11/06/17
Tom Pettinger: De-Radicalization and Counter-Radicalization
32
relationship “between the state and some of its ethnic minorities, is characterized by distrust
and suspicion [based on the] unequal approach to violence emanating from their communities
compared to others.”161 It is widely reported to encourage a ‘them and us’ pattern of
thought,162 ironically the very ideology the Government wants to defeat.163 The scheme is
perceived to be so harmful - called an “Islamophobic, toxic policy that claims to be working
towards de-radicalization but is targeting the community and de-Islamising Islam”164 - that the
MCB is reported to be starting its own ‘preventative de-radicalization’ programme in 2017.165
Other countries report similar patterns; El Said comments that US policies countering
terrorism are “among the most frequently cited ‘grievances’ of Muslim Americans”.166 From
9/11 until the Orlando nightclub shooting,167 there were more deaths from other forms of
extremism than so-called Islamist attacks, but the US looks likely to move towards a system
where all community-based counter-radicalization efforts are aimed solely at Muslims.168
Whilst Muslims have felt ‘Othered’, numerous programmes are also aimed primarily
at non-Muslims such as the EXIT strategy employed in several European states, or Crossroads
in Germany. Although a proportion of these programmes do focus on the behaviour and social
integration of subjects, many concentrate on the subjects’ (extreme right-wing) ideologies.169
These individuals may have legitimate grievances - such as concern about the scale or make-
161 El Said, H. (2015), op. cit., p. 43 162 Dodd, P. (2016), Muslim Council of Britain to Set up Alternative Counter-terror Scheme,
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/oct/19/muslim-council-britain-set-up-alternative-counter-terror-
scheme, The Guardian, published 19/10/16, accessed 11/06/17 163 HM UK Government (2012), Channel: Vulnerability Assessment Framework,
http://course.ncalt.com/Channel_General_Awareness/01/resources/docs/vul-assessment.pdf, HM Government,
published 2012, accessed 05/06/17 164 Sheikh, N., in Shabi, R. (2016), loc. cit. 165 Dodd, P. (2016), Muslim Council of Britain to Set up Alternative Counter-terror Scheme,
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/oct/19/muslim-council-britain-set-up-alternative-counter-terror-
scheme, The Guardian, published 19/10/16, accessed 11/06/17 166 El Said, H. (2015), op. cit., p. 23 167 New America (2017), Part IV: What Is the Threat to the US Today?, https://www.newamerica.org/in-
depth/terrorism-in-america/what-threat-united-states-today/#americas-layered-defenses, New America,
published 2017, accessed 02/07/17 168 Ainsley, J., Volz, D., Cooke, K. (2017), Exclusive: Trump to Focus Counter-extremism Programme Solely on
Islam - Sources, http://uk.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-extremists-program-exclusiv-idUKKBN15G5VO,
Reuters, published 02/02/17, accessed 02/02/17 169 Ramalingam, V., Tuck, H. (2014), The Need for Exit Programmes, Institute for Strategic Dialogue, published
2014, accessed 08/09/17, p. 8
Tom Pettinger: De-Radicalization and Counter-Radicalization
33
up of immigration - but are set against mainstream society through counter- and de-
radicalization practices. In sum, programmes that target ideology designate subjects’ views as
unacceptable and illegitimate, and cause those who harbour such perspectives to be seen (and
to see themselves) as separate from the rest of society. With the practice of combating
radicalization being gradually extended, will this expansion of state capacity - like the British
attempt - entrench divisions in societies further and even cause some to turn towards radical
violence?
Individualizing Causes
The practice of performing ideological transformation is based on the theory of
radicalization, which takes the individual as the highest unit of concern, and the cause of
violent extremism. The narrative has individualized the debate to a point where discussion
around government policy as causal (most notably foreign affairs) is often derided as
unpatriotic and those raising the issue are roundly condemned.170 This silencing of the idea
that politics could cause terrorism has occurred gradually: academic debate through the turn
of the millennium shifted from macro analysis down onto the individual, examining in
particular their personal psychology. Theories of how individuals became ‘radicalized’
abounded171 as the defeat of left-wing terrorism, the end of the Cold War and a series of
attacks from ‘home-grown’ extremists like the Oklahoma City bombing and the sarin gas
attack in Japan, brought an end to the dominant discourse around the term ‘terrorism’ to mean
‘state terrorism’ or a ‘state of warfare’, and its use developed instead for individuals and small
groups of like-minded extremists.172 The beginning of the depoliticization of terrorism was
borne of this era; US President Clinton claimed attacks like those mentioned were
170 Corbyn, J. (2017), Corbyn: UK Wars to Blame for Terror,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/05/25/jeremy-corbyn-suggests-britains-wars-abroad-blame-manchester/,
Telegraph, published 26/05/17, accessed 26/05/17 171 Rabbie, J. (2007), ‘A Behavioural Interaction Model: Toward a Social-Psychological Framework for
Studying Terrorism’, in Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 3, issue 4, pp. 134-63; Post, J., Ruby, K., Shaw,
E. (2002), ‘The Radical Group in Context: 1. An Integrated Framework for the Analysis of Group Risk for
Terrorism’, in Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 25, Issue 2, pp. 73-100 172 Tsui, C-K. (2016), Clinton, New Terrorism and the Origins of the War on Terror (Routledge: London), pp.
32-6
Tom Pettinger: De-Radicalization and Counter-Radicalization
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“random”173 rather than being explicitly political. Over time, this idea has taken hold, and the
role of ideology rather than political aims is seen to drive terrorism. Despite anecdotes that
indicate foreign policy is a matter of huge concern to some and the cause of young Europeans
travelling to fight for IS,174 and comprehensive academic studies which conclude
overwhelmingly that challenging military interventions is a key priority for terrorists,175
politicians consistently ridicule the idea that their decisions have a part to play.176 Schemes
countering radicalization, in attempting ideological reform of individuals behind closed doors,
embeds this perception that ideology rather than political aims cause terrorism. Mark
Sedgwick eloquently states,
The concept of radicalization emphasizes the individual and, to some extent, the
ideology and the group, and significantly de-emphasizes the wider circumstances - the
‘root causes’ that it became so difficult to talk about after 9/11, and that are still often
not brought into analyses. So long as the circumstances that produce Islamist radicals’
declared grievances are not taken into account, it is inevitable that the Islamist radical
will often appear as a ‘rebel without a cause’177
The schemes in question, being based on the doctrine of radicalization and therefore re-
emphasizing the individual’s ideology, contributes to the silencing of the relationship between
states’ policy choices and the causes of terrorism. There remain huge gaps in our knowledge
of the causes of terrorism, and predicting such deviant behaviour remains an ill-fated venture.
The root causes perspective (personal grievances, political instability, economic hardship) has
little empirical backing, as does any claim regarding the causes of terrorism. However, de-
radicalization being based on an approach underpinned by an individual’s ideology and the
173 Clinton, B. (1996), Remarks to the Disabled American Veterans Convention in New Orleans,
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1996-book2/html/PPP-1996-book2-doc-pg1209.htm, US Government
Publishing Office, published 28/07/96, accessed 26/04/17 174 Sabeel, in Shabi, R. (2016), loc. cit. 175 Pape, R. (2006), The Problem of Suicide Terrorism, http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people6/Pape/pape-
con3.html, University of California, published 2006, accessed 15/06/17 176 Morrison, D., Oborne, P. (2015), Proving the Link Between British Foreign Policy and Domestic Terrorism,
http://www.middleeasteye.net/essays/proving-link-between-british-foreign-policy-and-domestic-terrorism-
516596279, Middle East Eye, published 26/07/15, accessed 22/06/17 177 Sedgwick, M. (2010), ‘The Concept of Radicalization as a Source of Confusion’, in Terrorism and Political
Violence, Vol. 22, Issue 4, pp. 480-1
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35
predictiveness of terrorism is equally scientifically-unsupported. If we continue to engage in
de-radicalization, or at least framing it as de-radicalization, we will continue to believe
terrorism can be predicted and that it is driven by radical ideology, and remain unable to
consider rationally the level of threat we face.
Risk
It is incumbent upon policy makers to ensure that public policy (and therefore the use
of public money) is based on rationality, and on a “realistic understanding of the facts”.178
Governments have a responsibility to their constituents to ensure security is reasonably
maximized, but that risks against them aren’t artificially magnified. The premise upon which
counter-radicalization, epitomized by the British approach, is built is that the individuals pose
a physical risk to society, however, the threat of terrorism has been consistently overstated,
and the unproven role that ideology has in causing terrorism made central to countering the
threat of terrorism, particularly from Muslims.179 Across Europe, there grew a perceived need
to act to anticipate and prevent further Islamist attacks following 7/7 in London, and the
murder of film producer van Gogh,180 and so began the perceived importance of counter-
radicalization in helping to prevent these threats. In developing its ideology-based
programme, French Senator Esther Benbassa commented that “the government was in panic
as a result of the [Charlie Hebdo] attacks. And it was the panic that guided [its] actions.
Political time is short, we had to reassure the population [that something was being done].”181
The narrative on the risk of terrorism has been consistently built by academia, and politicians
through both their words and policies. Scholars in the 1990s, such as Walter Laqueur,
178 Sunstein, C. (2006), ‘Misfearing: A Reply’, in ed. Olin, J., Program in Law and Economics Working Paper
no. 274 (University of Chicago Law School: Chicago), p. 18 179 Mueller, J. (2015), What Are the Risks of Terrorism?: Free Thoughts Podcast, ep. 112/191,
https://www.libertarianism.org/media/free-thoughts/what-are-risks-terrorism, Libertarianism.org, published
11/12/15, accessed 13/06/17 180 Heath-Kelly, C., Baker-Beall, C. (2014), Counter-Radicalization: Critical Perspectives (Routledge: London),
p. 38 181 Benbassa, E., in Bouanchaud, C. (2017), Report on De-radicalization: “There Will Be No Miracle”,
http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2017/02/23/rapport-sur-la-de-radicalisation-il-n-y-aura-pas-de-
miracle_5084014_3224.html, Lemonde, trans. Google, published 23/02/17, accessed 19/06/17
Tom Pettinger: De-Radicalization and Counter-Radicalization
36
influenced the debate through their assertions in the context of Islamist extremism that
“megaterrorism has not yet arrived” (author’s emphasis).182 Coupled with narratives like
these, the 9/11 attack - which was emphasized as a harbinger rather than an outlier183 -
emphasized the perceived “existential”184 threat, and predictive profiling and surveillance of
‘those who fit the bill’ was promoted as a rational and pressing policy decision. Ever since,
trillions of dollars has been spent across the world in preventing terrorism,185 an aspect of this
being the focus on ideological de-radicalization, and the preventative securitization often of
Muslims by teachers, social workers and peers - even for merely expressing disagreement to
UK foreign policy.186 ‘De-radicalization’ has become so synonymous with Islam and Muslims
that articles in the media about any form of extremism cannot help but maintain the
association between de-radicalization and Islamist extremism.187 The Extreme Risk Guidance
principles that underlie counterradicalization efforts produce unproven claims as to who is
likely to engage in terrorism,188 but which have enabled authorities to “monitor and profile
Muslim citizens for the signs of radicalization and then intervene to prevent the drift to
extremism”189 through de-radicalization practice.
Though risk aversion is necessary to some degree in public policy, it should take a
scientific approach, especially where it can impact negatively on citizens. Where certain
182 Laqueur, W. (2004), The Terrorism to Come, http://www.hoover.org/research/terrorism-come, Hoover
Institution, published 01/08/04, accessed 26/04/17 183 Mueller, J. (2014), Responsible Counter-terrorism Policy,
https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa755.pdf, CATO Institute, published 10/09/14, accessed
10/06/17 184 Blair, T. (2004), Blair Terror Speech in Full, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/3536131.stm, BBC,
published 05/03/04, accessed 11/05/17 185 Mueller, J., Stewart, M. (2011), ‘Balancing the Risks, Benefits and Costs of Homeland Security’, in
Homeland Security Affairs, Vol. 7, https://www.hsaj.org/articles/43, accessed 11/06/17 186 Khaleeli, H. (2015), ‘You Worry that They Could Take Your Kids’: Is the Prevent Strategy Demonizing
Muslim Children?, https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/sep/23/prevent-counter-terrorism-strategy-
schools-demonising-muslim-children, The Guardian, 23/09/15, accessed 19/01/17 187 This particular article, about the rise in right-wing extremist referrals to de-radicalization programmes, was
accompanied by one picture, which showed an ISIS fighter with a flag with Arabic writing: Yorke, H. (2017),
One in Four “Extremists” Reported to Government's De-radicalisation Programme Are Far-Right
Sympathisers, Figures Show, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/02/15/one-four-extremists-reported-
governments-de-radicalisation-programme/, The Telegraph, published 15/02/17, accessed 11/06/17 188 Royal College of Psychiatrists (2016), Counter-Terrorism and Psychiatry,
http://www.rcpsych.ac.uk/pdf/PS04_16.pdf, published Sept 2016, accessed 11/12/16 189 Heath-Kelly, C., Baker-Beall, C. (2014), op. cit., p. 16
Tom Pettinger: De-Radicalization and Counter-Radicalization
37
groups within society are targeted, overstating or understating risk can cost unnecessary
money, expose citizens to preventable dangers, and cause discrimination to occur. The burden
of proof should fall on the government to show its policies are based on evidence190 and are
not causing ‘market failure’ - otherwise an inefficient allocation of resources - within risk
management. It must be shown as prudent for three- and four-year-olds to be ‘de-radicalized’
as well as all other cases; should the burden of proof remain with the intuition of non-experts,
policy implementation will remain prejudicial. 9-year-old British schoolboy ‘Haroon’ was
required to undergo ‘de-radicalization’ with a Prevent officer because he had watched IS
videos and pronounced his sympathy with the group whilst at school. It appeared there were
others who were also watching similar videos, and he felt it was “unfair [that] other people
got away with it”.191 As a result of his watching the graphic videos - in which he was not
alone among his peers - and the declaration of sympathy - which could have resulted from
him being bullied - the state stepped in to ‘de-radicalize’ this 9-year-old child over the course
of a year. How and why do governments determine first of all the boundaries of an individual
being a ‘risk’ (how much of a threat did this child pose?), at what point do individuals cross
that line (why were his peers not similarly ‘de-radicalized’?), and after such a process, what is
the point at which they do not pose a threat (how is it determined that this child no longer
poses the previously perceived threat)? These questions must be answered by governments in
their risk-management strategies, rather than leave non-experts in terrorism risk-management
(teachers, social workers and nurses) to assume that responsibility. Similarly, Umm Ahmed, a
British Muslim, was jailed for 12 months for the possession of Inspire Magazine which she
had obtained to keep updated with her brother’s trial. In sentencing her the judge said that
Umm posed no threat, that she had no intent to harm, that she was not a terrorist - and even
that she was a good Muslim - but that he had to imprison her based on her possession of the
190 Hardaker, B., Fleming, E., Lien, G. (2009), ‘How Should Governments Make Risky Policy Decisions?’ in
Australian Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 68, Issue 3, pp. 256-71 191 ‘Haroon’, in BBC (2017), The Boy Who Watched IS Beheading Videos, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
38959615, BBC, published 14/02/17, accessed 14/02/17
Tom Pettinger: De-Radicalization and Counter-Radicalization
38
magazine.192 The MCB writes that “80% of Channel referrals between 2006 and 2013 were
rejected by Channel panels, demonstrating that children are being viewed through the lens of
security and practitioners are finding threats where none exist in many cases”.193 French
sociologist Farhad Khosrokhavar said that to add value to a society, programmes should admit
only those who would actually pose some threat, such as returned foreign fighters or people
who could be convicted of incitement to violence, rather than children who have divergent
views but clearly do not pose a risk, for example.194 The distortion of risk in the field of
preventing terrorism, only heightened by the exercise of referring thousands of schoolchildren
for de-radicalization, has produced discrimination by civil society and the securitization of
young children. Aside from it being hard to conceive that these minors would actually pose a
threat and carry out destructive terrorism, statistically all of them are highly unlikely to
engage in violence themselves. The West spends trillions on domestic (let alone foreign)
counter-terrorism efforts taking this scientifically unproven and highly presumptuous
ideology-based explanation and to minimize the threat from their constructed suspect
communities; a frightening consequence of this drive is that particularly within the US, in
borrowing predictive principles from the widely-criticized British Prevent Strategy, there has
developed a network of 15,000 informants to target Muslims (in “Stazi-scale”195 surveillance),
and the practice of entrapment has burgeoned. Aside from moving towards an oppressive and
discriminatory surveillance state in which Muslims feel they cannot criticize their
government’s policies without personal risk of being informed upon, the FBI has actually
killed Americans on American soil based on opportunities the agency itself has provided to
‘vulnerable’ Muslims. Judges have recurrently noted that these entrapped individuals would
192 Qureshi, A. (2015), Exclusive Interview with Umm Ahmed: The True Face of Counter-terrorism,
https://cage.ngo/article/exclusive-interview-umm-ahmed-true-face-counter-terrorism/, Cage, published 27/01/15,
accessed 24/06/17 193 Muslim Council of Britain (2015), Meeting Between David Anderson QC and the MCB,
https://www.mcb.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/20150803-Case-studies-about-Prevent.pdf, Muslim
Council of Britain, published 2015, accessed 28/06/17 194 Khosrokhavar, F., in Marmouyet, F. (2017), France ‘Must Change Its Approach’ to De-radicalizing
Islamists, http://www.france24.com/en/20170223-france-report-de-radicalisation-centre-approach-islamists-
jihad, France24, published 23/02/17, accessed 19/06/17 195 Kundnani, A. (2014), loc. cit.
Tom Pettinger: De-Radicalization and Counter-Radicalization
39
not otherwise have engaged in such deviant activities had the FBI not placed them in the
‘wrong place’ at the ‘wrong time’. Judge McMahon, sentencing the Newburgh Four, said,
“Only the government could have made a terrorist out of Mr Cromitie, a man whose
buffoonery is positively Shakespearean in its scope… I believe beyond a shadow of a
doubt that there would have been no crime here except [that] the government
instigated it, planned it, and brought it to fruition.”196
Seen as an integral part of preventing extremist violence is the practice of combating
radicalization, the money spent on it must be justified in terms of violence prevented or lives
saved. With currently spending levels preventing violent extremism many, many times greater
than other potential hazards (like health and safety precautions, preventing car accidents),197
we must vehemently challenge its existence, particularly considering that its underlying
premises - of ideology creating risk and the ability to predict future terrorists - are highly
disputable.198
(Re)Framing the Debate
Reframing the debate on how to deal with radicalness in our societies is crucial, and
pressing. The expansion of programmes across the world will affect how millions of people
experience society and their existence within a state. The consideration of the effects of
counter-terrorism policy, over continuing blindly with a strategy that has no provable record
and costing millions upon millions of dollars, must take place. Here, I explore possible
alternative approaches to both the practice of and understandings behind schemes that ‘tackle
radicalization’.
196 McMahon, C., in Shipler, D. (2012), Terrorist Plots, Hatched by the FBI,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/29/opinion/sunday/terrorist-plots-helped-along-by-the-fbi.html?mcubz=0,
New York Times, published 28/04/12, accessed 22/06/17 197 Paté-Cornell, E. (1994), ‘Quantitative Safety Goals for Risk Management of Industrial Facilities’, in
Structural Safety, Vol. 13, Issue 3: 145-57 198 Horgan, J., Braddock, K. (2010), loc. cit.
Tom Pettinger: De-Radicalization and Counter-Radicalization
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Prison-Based ‘De-radicalization’
Inside prisons where de-radicalization is said to be carried out - most notably in
countries like Saudi Arabia and Malaysia, though others like France followed suit - there are
actually few instances where prisoners’ ideological positions are systematically challenged.
Where they have been challenged in the past, the countries are now gradually concentrating
more on inmates’ economic and social rehabilitation.199 In such programmes that now
overwhelmingly prioritize training the inmates and helping them develop skills for the job
market, and ultimately where they place little emphasis on an ideology which seems to typify
many current approaches,200 it may be helpful to frame these programmes as ‘post-crime
rehabilitation’ schemes. The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses
to Terrorism suggests “risk reduction”201 as an effective alternative. Other terms that
deemphasize the causal relationship that ideology has with terrorism whilst highlighting the
normalcy of the individuals concerned would be appropriate, to help ease their reintegration
into society upon release.
In schemes that incorporate religious discussion, it is often from a point of basic
education; El Said writes that “evidence shows that most violent extremists have weak or no
rigorous religious knowledge.”202 Corroborating this, a study by Tahiri and Grossman found
that “education was identified by all participants as the most critical element in reducing the
appeal of violent extremism.”203 If this is the case, portraying the schemes as educative rather
than de-radicalizing could be helpful, by reducing the emotive element of the definition. It
would help to illuminate that rather than being committed to (often fanatical Islamic)
ideologies, that in fact they are merely under-informed or lacking in effective critical thought.
This could be especially helpful in European or non-Muslim-majority countries where
199 El Said, H. (2015), op. cit., p. 256 200 Horgan, J. (2009a), loc. cit. 201 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (2009), loc. cit. 202 El Said, H. (2015), op. cit., p. 27 203 Tahiri, H., Grossman, M. (2013), Community and Radicalization: An Examination of Perceptions, Ideas,
Beliefs and Solutions Throughout Australia (Counter-terrorism Coordination Unit: Victoria), p. 14
Tom Pettinger: De-Radicalization and Counter-Radicalization
41
Islamophobia has led to revenge terrorism against Muslims,204 to discredit the narrative that
there is a causal association between Islam and terrorism.205 This concept was substantiated
by Zora Sukabdi’s study; she found that “all participants [thought] that most religious terror
activists find the term ‘de-radicalization’ irritating”206 for similar reasons, and for presenting
the idea that Islamic radicalness is only pejorative. French practitioner Marik Fetouh concurs.
She commented that the term de-radicalization is negatively understood, that it implied
oppression rather than the development of critical thought.207 It is clear that new definitions
for prison-based practice, as an absolute minimum, are required.
However, it is imperative to continue to challenge the actual principles behind de-
radicalization where it does occur, for their ability to shape narratives. Importantly, prison
schemes have allowed governments to impose their own religiously acceptable views and
control the discourse within the country. In some cases these programmes have appeared
merely to function as legitimacy-builders for the government in question, with subjects
required to declare their allegiance to the state following their completion of a de-
radicalization scheme whilst in prison.208 Without internationally-recognized and -upheld
standards, these exercises will continue unabated. Criticism of existing practice therefore,
including the underlying principles that drive such programmes and the state’s motivations is
needed as countries expand their prison-based de-radicalization arsenal.
Evaluation is a further element of such schemes in dire need of consideration.
Attempts to assess de-radicalization programmes have failed miserably, with wild variance in
who the schemes are dealing with, their concentration on psychology and ideology, and their
very aims and objectives. Without the rigor of traditional forms of evaluation (after a
complete reconsideration of what success could even look like), the practice will continue to
204 BBC (2017), Man Questioned on Suspicion of Terrorism, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/live/uk-40323279,
BBC, 19/06/17, accessed 19/06/17 205 Schmid, A. (2013), loc. cit. 206 Sukabdi, Z. (2015), ‘Terrorism in Indonesia: A Review on Rehabilitation and De-radicalization’, in Journal
of Terrorism Research, Vol. 6, pp. 36-56 207 Fetouh, M., in Zerofsky, E. (2016), How to Stop a Martyr, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/09/01/how-to-stop-
a-martyr-france-de-radicalization/, Foreign Policy, published 01/09/16, accessed 01/07/17 208 Koehler, D. (2017), op. cit., p. 202
Tom Pettinger: De-Radicalization and Counter-Radicalization
42
consume public money and time with no scientifically discernible success or failure rates. El
Said’s comprehensive study shows that according to academic conceptions of ‘de-
radicalization’, many of the so-called de-radicalization programmes are little more than “a
general improvement in prison management and environment”209 with their practice in use
already elsewhere targeting gangs and drug addicts, but not considered to be de-radicalization.
He points to the Shock Incarceration Treatment some inmates receive, which is similar in
style to some so-called de-radicalization practices, the main different being its more coherent
structure and evaluation.210
Non-Prison-Based / Preventative Programmes
Outside of the prison schemes, governments around the world are engaged in
preventing terrorist attacks often through voluntary so-called de-radicalization programmes
(in fact counter-radicalization) that attempt to reduce the perceived threat certain individuals
pose.
Practising the art of encouraging fighters returned from conflict zones like Syria, or
terrorist attackers captured domestically, to think critically, educate them and discuss religion
if appropriate, would be a justified approach, as they clearly have posed a physical threat and
may still do. If they retain their violent perspectives and see no other alternatives (thereby
rejecting Koehler’s notion of “re-pluralization”),211 they should remain locked up as they still
pose a genuine risk to the rest of society. However, to treat individuals in the pre-crime space,
before they have engaged in violent activism it is impossible to prove would have happened,
only risks alienation between the state and these individuals, and others who empathize with
those targeted and profiled by such policies. It has so far been overwhelmingly Muslims that
have borne the brunt of preventative radicalization-based efforts, which only leads of a
209 El Said, H. (2015), op. cit., p. 255 210 Ibid. 211 Koehler, D. (2017), op. cit., pp. 80-3
Tom Pettinger: De-Radicalization and Counter-Radicalization
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vicious circle of stigmatization of Muslims, attacks on Muslims as a constructed suspect
community, and further division: “terrorism begets terrorism”.212
Without significant criticism and challenge, the development of further preventative
efforts will accelerate; states are addicted to enhancing security until it becomes violated, at
which point politicians reiterate the state’s resilience and securitize further.213 The premise of
counter-radicalization is massively misjudged (in terms of risk and the unproven link between
ideology and terrorism), and has significant consequences for society to a point where those
being silenced are developing policies to compete with what they see as the state’s oppressive
version.214 If the pattern of securitizing and discriminate profiling can be effectively
challenged, our societies might begin to be able to have rational discussions about the causes
of terrorism, and how best to combat it.
However, ceteris paribus, renaming such programmes and practices could help to
illuminate the disparity between the perceived risk posed by those subjected to ‘de-
radicalization’ and the actual level of threat. ‘De-radicalization’ as a definition also cements
in public discourse the notion that ideology is the overriding cause of terrorism, rather than an
associated factor that is also associated with non-violence. If the British programme Channel
was called a ‘risk reduction’ programme, it would help to show teachers and others required
to report those ‘vulnerable to radicalization’ that three- and four-year-old children should
probably not be referred for posing a realistic terrorist threat, or at least implement a checklist
system whereby the risk they pose should be graded. The policy Channel is derived from,
Prevent, was previously called ‘Preventing Violent Extremism’ but this was considered to
have stigmatized Muslims, and so the government changed it.215 However, reviving such a
title (or using the term “risk reduction”) and with it the associated consequences of perceived
212 Primoratz, I. (2004), Terrorism: The Philosophical Issues (Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke), p. 184 213 Heath-Kelly, C. (2016), Death and Security: Memory and Mortality at the Bombsite (Manchester University
Press: Manchester), p. 171 214 Dodd, P. (2016), Muslim Council of Britain to Set up Alternative Counter-terror Scheme,
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/oct/19/muslim-council-britain-set-up-alternative-counter-terror-
scheme, The Guardian, published 19/10/16, accessed 11/06/17 215 Thomas, P. (2010), ‘Failed and Friendless: The UK’s ‘Preventing Violent Extremism’ Programme’, in The
British Journal of Politics and International Relations, Vol. 12, Issue 3, pp. 442-58
Tom Pettinger: De-Radicalization and Counter-Radicalization
44
discrimination would help to highlight where and how far racist practices are in fact taking
place. Overturning the oppressive term ‘de-radicalization’ (by which it is often referred,
despite being counter-radicalization) is critical, as it helps to construct suspect communities,
definable by their skin colour or choice of clothing, and encourages a silencing of deviant and
contrary perspectives which a democracy needs to be able to cope with.
Conclusion and Recommendations
In sum, if there exist better ways to fail at public policy, these should be sought after
rather than tinkering with an imperilled strategy that only entrenches unscientific attitudes and
narratives behind the causes of radical violence. The practice of combating radicalization
consolidates the perception that terrorism is caused by a fanatical religious ideology and that
the holding of radical ideas within a society is only a detrimental attribute. Counter- and de-
radicalization have shown themselves to be an unreliable and divisive policy choice that
shows no scientific basis for reducing risk against societies. Programmes that have asserted
de-radicalization success have focussed on low-level or non-criminal individuals and have
largely ignored the problems around their evaluation. Future expansion of de-radicalization
programmes should be taken extremely seriously, on the basis of unfounded claims of
success.216 As Foucault suggests, “Power exists only as exercised by some on others, only
when it is put into action”217 - discourses and terminology have real world consequences,
which affect individuals and society as a whole. When these are based on unscientific and
politically-based assumptions, and the intuition of practitioners, rather than considered
thought, it is easy to see how divisiveness and stigmatization in society becomes established,
and a lack of foresight as to what such practice hopes to accomplish. This paper, therefore,
recommends that:
216 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (2009), loc. cit. 217 Foucault, M. (1982), ‘The Subject and Power’, in Critical Inquiry, Vol. 8, Issue 4, pp. 777-95
Tom Pettinger: De-Radicalization and Counter-Radicalization
45
• As a minimum, schemes that operate both as inside and outside of prisons are renamed
away from the “unhelpful term”218 ‘de-radicalization’, to more accurately represent
how they function. This will in turn help to disassociate the role of ideology in causing
terrorism, which has been a significant cause of stigmatization for Muslims around the
world.
• “Post-crime rehabilitation schemes” is an appropriate alternative name for schemes
based in prisons, and “risk-reduction schemes” where preventative policy exists
outside of prisons.
• The practice of securitizing alleged risks should be reformed to be driven more by
science than presumption. Governments should legislate for what they consider to be
threatening behaviour so the responsibility for risk-management doesn’t fall on the
shoulders of non-terrorism experts. There should be requirements for referrals to be
made based on evidence of risk rather than intuition and prejudice.
• In the meantime, if practice based around countering ideology is to continue, debate
should accelerate on what constitutes success.
• Expanding programmes based on existing practice is at best flawed, and at worst, a
stimulant for division and racism.
218 Horgan, J., Braddock, K. (2010), loc. cit.
Tom Pettinger: De-Radicalization and Counter-Radicalization
46
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About the JD Journal for Deradicalization
The JD Journal for Deradicalization is the world’s only peer reviewed periodical for the
theory and practice of deradicalization with a wide international audience. Named an
“essential journal of our times” (Cheryl LaGuardia, Harvard University) the JD’s editorial
board of expert advisors includes some of the most renowned scholars in the field of
deradicalization studies, such as Prof. Dr. John G. Horgan (Georgia State University); Prof.
Dr. Tore Bjørgo (Norwegian Police University College); Prof. Dr. Mark Dechesne (Leiden
University); Prof. Dr. Cynthia Miller-Idriss (American University Washington); Prof. Dr.
Marco Lombardi, (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore Milano); Dr. Paul Jackson
(University of Northampton); Professor Michael Freeden, (University of Nottingham);
Professor Hamed El-Sa'id (Manchester Metropolitan University); Prof. Sadeq Rahimi
(University of Saskatchewan, Harvard Medical School), Dr. Omar Ashour (University of
Exeter), Prof. Neil Ferguson (Liverpool Hope University), Prof. Sarah Marsden (Lancaster
University), Dr. Kurt Braddock (Pennsylvania State University), and Dr. Michael J. Williams
(Georgia State University).
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ISSN: 2363-9849
Editors in Chief: Daniel Koehler, Tine Hutzel