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Journal of Social, Evolutionary, and Cultural Psychology www.jsecjournal.com - 2010, 4 (3): 142-155.
2010 Journal of Social, Evolutionary, and Cultural Psychology
142
Original Article
PERCEPTIONS OF CHOICE: FREE WILL, MORAL RESPONSIBILITY, AND MIND-BODY DUALISM IN HUMANS, CHIMPANZEES, AND RATS
Shirley Matile Ogletree. Department of Psychology
Texas State University- San Marcos
Crystal D. Oberle Department of Psychology
Texas State University- San Marcos
Janine Harlow Department of Psychology
Texas State University- San Marcos
Julia Bahruth Department of Psychology
Texas State University- San Marcos Abstract: The nature of choice, whether it is to some extent ―free‖ or completely determined, has implications for moral responsibility and mind-body dualism; this issue may also affect how we think of ourselves as members of the human species in comparison to other animal species. In the current study, we explored whether the ―common college student‘s‖ perception of free or determined choice, moral
responsibility, and mind-body dualism in humans extended to chimpanzees and rats. Humans were perceived as significantly different from chimpanzees and rats on all three of these dimensions. Moreover, chimpanzees were perceived, primarily by women, as significantly different from rats on the dimensions of free (versus determined) choice and moral responsibility. However, on the issue of mind-body dualism, or having a spirit, a significant difference was not found between chimpanzees and rats. Perhaps possessing a spirit separate from the physical body may be considered a uniquely human attribute. As we become more aware of genetic similarities between our own species and other primate species, our attitudes towards choice, moral responsibility, and mind-body dualism may change. Key Words: Determinism; Free Will; Dualism; Moral Responsibility . AUTHOR NOTE: Please address all correspondence to Shirley Matile Ogletree Department of Psychology, Texas State University- San Marco, 601 University Drive, San Marcos, Texas 78666 Email: SO01@txstate.edu
org
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Perceptions of Choice
Journal of Social, Evolutionary, and Cultural Psychology – ISSN 1933-5377 – volume 4(3). 2010.
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Perceptions of Choice: Free Will, Moral Responsibility and Mind-Body Dualism in
Humans, Chimpanzees and Rats Free Will or Determinism
What is the nature of human choice? Are decisions made freely, or are they determined? This topic, having its roots in philosophy (Ayers, 1954; Stace, 1952), is also important to psychologists (Hodgson, 2005; Wegner, 2004;) interested in people‘s beliefs about free will and determinism. According to Hodgson (2005), the ―plain person‘s‖ use of free will includes the understanding that choice is based on a nonrandom component unrestrained by environmental and genetic determinants. Stace (1952), on the other hand, argued that the term ―free will‖ is commonly used to indicate the absence of immediate
causal agents such as being forced at gunpoint. This ―soft determinism‖ perspective does
not deny the internalization of past experiences, emotions, and cognitions that ultimately lead to a choice.
In contrast to the free will and soft determinism perspectives, the ―hard
determinism‖ perspective argues that behavior is completely caused by genetics, past
experiences, and current circumstance. Recently, Moore (2008) suggested that genetic determinism, in particular, is strongly embraced by some students and by some members of the general public for various reasons. For instance, people may notice for themselves that certain characteristics, such as the physical similarity between children and their biological parents, appear to be unrelated to environmental influences. Beyond these personal observations, the media may also influence these beliefs through their simplified reports of such studies as those involving identical twins reared apart and those involving the calculation of heritability statistics. Furthermore, students may be exposed to several theories that stress the importance of genetics, including theories that are based on Mendelian genetics, theories that provide evolutionary accounts of behaviors, and theories that emphasize the role of ―nature‖ on psychological and cognitive
development–not to mention materialistic theories of mind that are grounded in cognitive neuroscience (e.g., Levy, 2003).
Despite the claimed popularity of genetic determinism, data suggest that most college students favor the free will perspective over the hard determinism perspective. For example, Ogletree and Oberle (2008) found that, although most students recognized a role for genes and environment in impacting decision making, a majority of college students believed in some degree of free will beyond these determinants. Comparable results have been found in other studies with undergraduates, who were presented with hypothetical deterministic scenarios. For instance, Nahmias and colleagues (Nahmias, Morris, Nadelhoffer, & Turner, 2005) described a futuristic scenario involving a supercomputer with the ability to predict all future events including human behavior. Even though the supercomputer was described as predicting future human behavior with 100% accuracy, 76% of the respondents believed that a person in the hypothetical scenario still freely chose to rob a bank. Similarly, over 90% of participants in another study were more likely to believe that an indeterministic, rather than a deterministic, universe was more like ours (Nichols & Knobe, 2007).
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Choice and Mind-Body Dualism Perhaps a belief in free will is related to a belief in a spirit that is separate from
the physical body, a mind-body dualism. Nahmias (2006) reported that if human decisions are described as the result of ―chemical reactions and neurological processes‖
rather than the results of ―thoughts, desires, and plans‖ (p. 231), participants are more
likely to give a deterministic response. Perhaps the former wording, portraying human decision-making as the result of biological processes, de-emphasizes mind-body dualism. In related research, Monterosso, Royzman, and Schwartz (2005) found that using physiological versus experiential antecedent explanations for behavior mitigated perceived culpability, or moral responsibility, for behaviors in hypothetical vignettes. Choice and Moral Responsibility
How does a deterministic versus free will perspective affect moral responsibility assigned to actions? The incompatibilist position (Double, 2004; Nichols & Knobe, 2007) argues that if people can make no other decisions than the ones they make, how could they be blamed or praised for such a decision? Clark (2003, 2005) and Stace (1952) have argued that punishments and rewards should not be justified by what is fair but rather by the consequences that promote individual change in a way that is beneficial to society. Thus, if a person commits a crime or other unethical act in one situation, even if the action was determined by genetic or environmental factors, the experience of being punished for the action will ideally result in more acceptable behavior if the person is confronted with a comparable situation in the future (Levy, 2003). The common person, though, may link actions being freely chosen with holding people responsible. In research with college students, Ogletree and Oberle (2008) reported positive correlations between agreeing with a free will perspective and agreeing with the moral responsibility for people who commit crimes or hurt others. Similarly, in the research by Nahmias and colleagues (Nahmias et al., 2005; Nahmias, Morris, Nadelhoffer, &Turner, 2006), the majority of participants both believed in free will and considered a person blameworthy for either robbing a bank or stealing a necklace.
Affect, or the emotion that is aroused by learning about someone‘s immoral actions, can also impact the extent to which a person is held morally responsible. Nichols and Knobe (2007) referred to an ―affective performance error‖ to explain why people believe in moral responsibility to a different degree if they are given either (a) an abstract question of whether a person would be morally responsible for their actions in a deterministic universe or (b) a specific scenario in which ―Bill‖ kills his wife and three children in order to be with another woman in a deterministic universe. Most (86%) of the participants indicated that a person could not be fully morally responsible in a deterministic universe; however, 50% indicated that Bill would be fully morally responsible in this same deterministic universe. Extension to Other Species
Is free will perceived to be uniquely human? Humans share an estimated 94% of their genes with chimpanzees, our closest relative (Minkel, 2006). If the common person assumes humans make choices that are, at least to some extent, independent of environmental and genetic influences, would this capacity also be perceived as characteristic of chimpanzees? Could a chimpanzee, as well as a human, be held morally
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Journal of Social, Evolutionary, and Cultural Psychology – ISSN 1933-5377 – volume 4(3). 2010.
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responsible for an action? To what extent does the common person believe in mind-body dualism in people and chimpanzees?
The findings from a multitude of behavioral and physiological research studies suggest that chimpanzees are remarkably similar to humans in terms of personality, emotionality, and morality. Regarding personality, all five of the following personality characteristics from the five-factor model have been found in chimpanzees: neuroticism, extraversion, openness, agreeableness, and conscientiousness (for a review, see Gosling & John, 1999). Regarding emotionality, like humans, chimpanzees have functional amygdalae and hypothalami, as well as the relevant hormones and neurotransmitters that provide the neural bases for experiencing and expressing emotions and empathy (for reviews, see Gosling, 2001; Preston & de Waal, 2002). Regarding morality, many researchers have concluded that chimpanzees possess the same moral precursors as humans (e.g., Bekoff, 2001, 2004; Brosnan, 2006; Brosnan & de Waal, 2003; Flack & de Waal, 2000; Lyn, Franks, & Savage-Rumbaugh, 2008; Watson & Platt, 2006). According to Bekoff (2001) and Brosnan (2006), these moral precursors, which include perceptions of fairness and moral judgments, develop from such daily social interactions as playing, sharing food, dividing labor, compromising, and resolving conflict, all of which foster cooperation among individuals to avoid inequity. Then, when inequity or injustice occurs, like humans, chimpanzees will experience relevant social emotions and will respond negatively, with temper tantrums by subordinates or punishment by dominants (Bekoff, 2004; Brosnan & de Waal, 2003; Clutton-Brock & Parker, 1995; Okamoto & Matsumara, 2001).
Whereas the aforementioned research shows that chimpanzees do possess personality, emotional, and moral characteristics just as humans, research on people‘s
perceptions of these characteristics in chimpanzees is limited to perceptions of similarity between humans and unspecified non-human animals. This research typically uses a survey with questions asking whether people believe that non-human animals have a spirit or soul like humans, as well as whether people believe that non-human animals can think and can feel emotions such as fear (e.g., Templer, Connelly, Bassman, & Hart, 2006). Not surprisingly, people who respond the most affirmatively to such questions are more likely to be animal rights activists who are predominantly female (Hills, 1995; Plous, 1991). More recent research, however, reveals that people who perceive greater similarity between humans and non-human animals are less likely to dehumanize immigrants (Costello & Hodson, 2010) and are less likely to support violence against African-American crime suspects (Goff, Eberhardt, Williams, & Jackson, 2008), revealing important implications of this perceived similarity. According to Costello and Hodson (2010), dehumanization of ―outgroups‖ is founded in categorizations that
differentiate humans from non-human animals. Current Study
The current study adds to the literature on this perceived similarity by investigating people‘s perceptions about three specific species of animals: humans,
chimpanzees, and rats. The latter two animals were chosen for their differing degrees of similarity to humans and to avoid potentially confounding anthropomorphism that occurs with such common pets as cats and dogs. In terms of genetic makeup, humans are most similar to the Pan genus that includes chimpanzees and bonobos; chimpanzees were selected over bonobos based on expected student familiarity. Beyond this genetic
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Journal of Social, Evolutionary, and Cultural Psychology – ISSN 1933-5377 – volume 4(3). 2010.
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similarity, as mentioned previously, chimpanzees are also remarkably similar to humans with respect to personality, emotionality, and morality. In contrast to chimpanzees, rats possess only about 64% of the DNA sequences comprising the human genome (Gibbs et al., 2004). Further, although they are capable of emotion (Gosling, 2001) and reason (Blaisdell, 2010) comparable to humans, other characteristic similarities are significantly less than in chimpanzees. For example, whereas all five major personality factors have been identified in chimpanzees, only neuroticism and agreeableness have been identified in rats (Gosling & John, 1999). Including all three of these species in the current study will allow for determination of perceived similarities or differences between humans and animals, but also between animals that vary in degree of verified similarity to humans.
Relevant to the preceding review, this study compared college students‘ perceptions of free versus deterministic decision making, moral responsibility, and mind- body dualism in these three species. Additionally, we compared students‘ responses to three types of actions: negative (attacking another), neutral (turning right), or positive (sharing food). We hypothesized three primary findings. First, we expected to replicate Ogletree and Oberle‘s (2008) finding that agreeing with free will would be positively related to perceived moral responsibility. Second, we predicted that a person would be perceived as more morally responsible for a negative or positive act than for a neutral act, based on the affective performance error (Nichols & Knobe, 2007). Finally, we predicted that humans, compared to chimpanzees and rats, would be perceived as more likely to have the capacity for free will, as being morally responsible for an action, and as having a mind separate from the body. Although differences may fail to emerge from a sample of animal rights activists (Plous, 1991), college students, who are otherwise representative of the general public, may conceivably view these characteristics as uniquely human.
Method
Participants The participants were 63 men and 162 women recruited from a junior-level, lifespan development class. The majority of the participants were 25 years of age or younger (93%) and were from middle class or upper-middle class backgrounds (84%). Regarding ethnicity, 65% were Caucasian, 23% Hispanic, 6% African American, 3% Asian, and 3% ―other.‖ Materials and Procedure
For this study, participants completed a 23-item survey. After providing demographic information in response to five of the questions, participants read one of nine scenarios similar to that used by Nahmias (2006). Each scenario included one of three actors (person, chimpanzee, or rat) and one of three actions (sharing food--a positive action, turning left--a neutral action, or attacking another--a negative action). A sample scenario is as follows:
Imagine that a hungry person shares some food with another person at a particular place and time. Now imagine that the universe is re-created over and over again, starting from the exact same initial conditions (and with all the same laws of nature).1
1 This sentence is identical to that used by Nahmias (2006, p. 219).
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Journal of Social, Evolutionary, and Cultural Psychology – ISSN 1933-5377 – volume 4(3). 2010.
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Participants then used a five-point Likert scale to indicate their degree of agreement with 18 statements. These statements related to the likelihood that the actor would repeat the action (―The person will definitely share the food the next time the universe is re-created.‖), whether the actor has free will for choices, (e.g., ―People have free will when making choices.‖), whether the actor has moral responsibility (e.g.,
―Consequences for people only serve the purpose of changing their behavior, not teaching them right from wrong.‖), and whether the actor has a spirit separate from the
physical body (e.g., ―People have a spirit that is separate and distinct from neurological
activity in the brain.‖). Participants who read scenarios related to chimpanzees or rats read items appropriately changed to reflect corresponding opinions for chimpanzees and rats.
Results
To reduce the number of items for analyses, a principal components factor analysis with varimax rotation was performed on the 17 items designed to assess opinions regarding free will, moral responsibility, and mind-body dualism; the item relevant to the repetition of the action was a separate criterion variable that was not included in this factor analysis. Three factors emerged with Eigenvalues greater than 1, though two items loaded strongly on two or more of the factors. To ensure that the scale appropriately discriminated the different constructs, these two items were removed, consistent with the scale work of other researchers (e.g., Hills, Francis, & Rutledge, 2004; Hutchinson et al., 2006; Richardsen & Martinussen, 2004; Van Dierendonck, Schaufeli, & Buunk, 2001). After these two items were removed, another factor analysis was performed on the remaining 15 items. Three factors again emerged, accounting for 58% of the variance. The relevant items and the factor loadings are given in Table 1. The first factor, accounting for 21% of the variance, included six items related to moral responsibility. In creating the resulting composite variable, two of the items were reverse-coded because their factor loadings were negative. The second factor, accounting for 19% of the variance, included four items related to mind-body dualism or spirit. The third factor, accounting for 18% of the variance, included five items related to conscious decision making and free will.
Composite subscale scores were computed for each of these three factors, and Pearson correlation analyses were conducted to analyze the relationships among them. First, the ratings from the six items related to moral responsibility were added to form a composite moral responsibility score (MR), whereby higher values represent stronger beliefs that actors are morally responsibility for their actions. Second, the ratings from the four items related to mind-body dualism or spirit were added to form a composite spirit score (S), whereby higher values represent stronger beliefs that actors possess a spirit that is separate from their body. Third, the ratings from the five items related to free will were added to form a composite free will score (FW), whereby higher values represent stronger beliefs that actors possess free will and consciously make their decisions. The correlation analyses revealed significant positive correlations between FW and MR (r[214] = .54, p < .001), between FW and S (r[216] = .46, p < .001), and between MR and S (r[211] = .54, p < .001). Four three-way independent-measures analyses of variance were performed on the item regarding whether the actor would repeat the action, as well as on each of the three aforementioned composite scores from the factor analysis. The three between-
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subjects factors for each analysis were actor category (humans, chimpanzees, rats), action category (negative—attacking, neutral—turning left, positive—sharing food), and participant sex (male, female). The overall model for the item assessing whether the action would be repeated was not significant. Table 1 Factor Loadings for Moral Responsibility (MR), Spirit (S), and Free Will (FW) Items
Item
Factor
Loading
Consequences for people only serve the purpose of changing their behavior, not teaching them right from wrong.
MR
.75
People cannot be held morally responsible for their behavior.
MR
-.75
People can learn the difference between right and wrong.
MR
.68
People can be taught using rewards and punishments but cannot be held accountable for their behaviors to other people.
MR
-.65
People have a conscience that helps them do the right thing.
MR
.63
People feel guilty if they do behavior they have previously been punished for.
MR
.63
People have a spirit that is separate from neurological activity in the brain.
S
.79
People have a nonphysical spirit in addition to a physical body.
S
.75
People have a soul that continues to exist after their physical death.
S
.74
People have an ―essence‖ that is more than their physical characteristics.
S
.73
Ultimately people use their mind when making a decision.
FW
.74
The person made a conscious decision to share (turn left, attack).
FW
.72
People have the potential to be flexible and spontaneous.
FW
.62
People have free will when making choices.
FW
.58
Choices that people make may be influenced by their genes and environment, but they make choices that are to some extent independent of these influences.
FW
.55
Note. These factors accounted for 58% of the variance. ―Chimpanzees‖ and ―rats‖ were substituted
for ―people‖ for the appropriate versions.
For the MR factor, the main effects of participant sex (F[1, 197] = 8.55, p < .01) and actor category (F[2, 197] = 57.78, p < .001) were significant. Regarding participant sex, women (M = 18.69, SD = 4.64) scored higher than men (M = 17.79, SD = 4.37),
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suggesting that women are more likely than men to assign MR to the actor. Regarding actor category, as indicated by Bonferroni post hoc tests, the means for the human actors (M = 22.27, SD = 3.39) were significantly greater than the means for the chimpanzee actors (M = 17.97, SD = 3.50), which were in turn significantly greater than the means for the rat actors (M = 15.47, SD = 3.94). Participants were most likely to assign MR to people and least likely to assign MR to rats. A significant interaction found between actor category and participant sex (F[2, 197] = 3.30, p < .05) revealed that MR was assigned to chimpanzees more by women (M = 18.56, SD = 3.32) than by men (M = 15.88, SD = 3.42); no sex differences were found for humans or rats (see Figure 1). For the S factor, the main effect of actor category was significant (F[2, 199] = 16.62, p < .001). As indicated by Bonferroni post hoc analyses, the means for the human actors (M = 13.86, SD = 4.20) were significantly greater than the means for both the chimpanzee actors (M = 11.13, SD = 3.64) and rat actors (M = 10.34, SD = 3.50), but the means for the chimpanzee and rat actors did not significantly differ. This result suggests that participants were more likely to perceive mind-body dualism as more characteristic of humans than any other animals. None of the other main effects and none of the interactions were significant.
Actor Category
RatsChimpanzeesHumans
M ea
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or al
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sp o
ns ib
ili ty
S co
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24
20
16
12
8
4
0
Participant Sex
Men
Women
Figure 1: Participant Sex by Actor Category for Moral Responsibility For the FW factor, the only significant main effect was actor category (F[2, 204] = 6.67, p < .002). As indicated by Bonferroni post hoc tests, the means for human actors (M = 19.07, SD = 3.70) were significantly greater than the means for the chimpanzee actors (M = 17.57, SD = 3.84), which were in turn significantly greater than the means for the rat actors (M = 15.92, SD = 3.94). Participants were most likely to attribute FW to people and least likely to attribute FW to rats. However, the interaction between actor category and participant sex was significant (F[2, 204] = 5.19, p < .01), revealing that
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Journal of Social, Evolutionary, and Cultural Psychology – ISSN 1933-5377 – volume 4(3). 2010.
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the effect of actor category was significant for women (humans: M = 19.33, SD = 4.04; chimpanzees: M = 17.51, SD = 4.17; rats: M = 15.00, SD = 4.12) but not men (humans: M = 18.54, SD = 2.89; chimpanzees: M = 17.35, SD = 2.91; rats: M = 18.09, SD = 2.41) (see Figure 2).
Actor Category
RatsChimpanzeesHumans
M ea
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W ill
S co
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24
20
16
12
8
4
0
Participant Sex
Men
Women
Figure 2: Participant Sex by Actor Category for Having Free Will
Discussion
Extending past research on attitudes toward free will and moral responsibility, the present study explored correlations among these and related concepts as well as the attribution of such characteristics to two mammalian species. Regarding the relation between perceived moral responsibility and attitudes toward free will/determinism, those who believe in a deterministic perspective, whereby people can make no other decisions than the ones they make, logically should be less likely to hold people morally responsible for their actions (Double, 2004; Nichols & Knobe, 2007), though punishments and rewards are still justified to promote individual change and to benefit society (Clark, 2003, 2005; Stace, 1952;). On the other end of the spectrum, those who believe that people possess free will should be more likely to assign moral responsibility to people. Consistent with this reasoning and with past research (Ogletree & Oberle, 2008), the present study found a significant positive correlation between beliefs in free will and assignment of moral responsibility.
Underlying the free will beliefs could be a corresponding belief in mind-body dualism, whereby people possess a spirit that is separate from the body. The significant positive correlations relating spirit to both free will and moral responsibility in the present research support this hypothesis. In other words, the assignment of blame,
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Journal of Social, Evolutionary, and Cultural Psychology – ISSN 1933-5377 – volume 4(3). 2010.
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justified by holding someone morally responsible, may be related to both attitudes towards free will/determinism and mind-body dualism.
Regarding the effect of different contextual scenarios meant to arouse positive (sharing food), negative (attacking another), or neutral (turning left) affects, we found no evidence to support the affective performance error (Nichols & Knobe, 2007). Although the mean score relevant to the assignment of moral responsibility was greater for those who were presented with the negative action than for those who were presented with the neutral action, this difference was not statistically significant. Our brief scenarios or the behaviors described may not have been sufficiently emotionally arousing to trigger this response. For instance, the action of attacking another likely did not evoke the stronger emotional response achieved by Nichols and Knobe‘s scenario of a man killing his family to be with another woman. Perhaps using more emotionally charged scenarios would have led to a significant affective performance error.
In terms of human-chimpanzee-rat comparisons, college students in this study were significantly more likely to attribute free will and spirit to humans than to chimpanzees or rats, and they were also significantly more likely to assign moral responsibility to humans than to chimpanzees or rats. These findings suggest that, despite genetic similarities, people are reluctant to make similar attributions to humans and other species. However, the female participants were also significantly more likely to attribute free will and to assign moral responsibility to chimpanzees than to rats; no differences between chimpanzees and rats were found for the male participants. Perhaps women tend to be more animal oriented or more likely to see chimpanzees on a continuum with people. Such a conclusion is consistent with research showing that most animal rights activists are women (Jamison & Lunch, 1992; Pious, 1991) and that women have more humanistic attitudes regarding the treatment of animals (Kellert & Berry, 1987; Knight, Vrij, Cherryman, & Nunkoosing, 2004). Several researchers explain that these findings are due to greater levels of empathy – for both humans and non-human animals – in women than in men (Ascione, 1992; Galvin & Herzog, 1992; Henry, 2006; Herzog, Betchart, & Pittman, 1991; Taylor & Signal, 2005).
Other cultures may have differing perspectives on the nature of human and animal consciousness. Supporting this claim is research showing that such European nations as France and Germany are much more opposed to animal research than the United States (Pifer, Shimizu, & Pifer, 1994). More recently, the Spanish Parliament, lessening the human-other species distinction, approved legal rights for great apes, including bonobos, gorillas, orangutans, and chimpanzees (Mandavilli, 2009). This resolution gives great apes protection from human exploitation for profit, gives them protection from harm during research, and recognizes their right to life. Would cross- cultural research reveal differences in attitudes toward free will, mind-body dualism, and moral responsibility in humans versus primates in Spain and other European countries, compared to the United States?
Psychologists and other scientists are discovering striking similarities between humans and other species. As mentioned previously, humans share an estimated 94% of their genes with chimpanzees (Minkel, 2006), who are remarkably similar to humans in terms of personality (Gosling & John, 1999), emotionality (Gosling, 2001; Preston & de Waal, 2002), and morality (Bekoff, 2001, 2004; Brosnan, 2006; Brosnan & de Waal, 2003; Flack & de Waal, 2000; Lyn et al., 2008; Watson & Platt, 2006). We also share similarities to other species. Wright (2004) reported that rhesus monkeys taught to play a
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video game involving a memory task responded similarly to humans; monkeys and humans were both more likely to recognize the first and last of a series of images than the more difficult images in the middle of the series. The implication is that the monkeys may have demonstrated a form of metacognition in their decision making. Also, for monkeys and rats as well as people, the generalized matching function characterizes responses based on reinforcement contingencies (Neuringer, Jensen, & Piff, 2007).
As we increasingly recognize our similarities to other animal species, particularly primate species, how will our judgments about choice and moral responsibility change? If people believe that humans possess free will and spirit and subsequently assign moral responsibility to humans, would these individuals also believe that chimpanzees and other primate species possess free will and spirit? Would moral responsibility be subsequently assigned to these species, and would we treat these species differently as a result of these conceptual revolutions?
Another possibility, as we become more cognizant of our similarity to other species, is that those individuals who believe that the choices of other primates are determined may also be more likely to believe that human choices are determined. The concept of moral responsibility may evolve; instead of being based on ―fairness‖ and
―deserved outcomes,‖ moral responsibility may more heavily focus on what is good for the individual and others in the community. As Skinner (1948, 1972) argued, consequences should be applied, not because they are fair, but because they promote better outcomes for the individual and society. Furthermore, although punishment would continue to exist for these reasons, our recognition of deterministic choices may lead us to treat others more humanely. Ultimately, as our thinking about the nature of the human species changes, social psychological concepts related to interpersonal judgments may be challenged. If a deterministic perspective becomes more accepted, how will we decide who is ―blameworthy‖ or ―praiseworthy‖? Will individuals be less likely to make the
fundamental attribution error (Heider, 1958; Ross, 1977), overly ascribing causes to intrapersonal factors rather than situational factors in explaining the behavior of others?
In short, how we think about ourselves as part of the natural world impacts our social cognitions. Basic assumptions, related to free will, dualism, and moral responsibility, may affect our interpersonal judgments and how we ascribe credit and assign blame. Regarding our perception of other species, greater perceived similarities between humans and other animals predicts lesser dehumanization of certain minority groups (Costello & Hodson, 2010; Goff et al., 2008). Thus, discovering these similarities may likely impact our treatment of both human and non-human animals. Received May 15, 2009; Revisions received April 23, 2010; Accepted June 15, 2010
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